主题：印度胜了？还完胜？ -- jent
何谓因怒而战？
敌人侵我国土凡70天，在迫使我国停止修路后，乃不受惩罚扬长而去。天朝有司连发六道哀的美敦书而终不发一弹。列国将由此推出五个结论：第一，中国之领土主权并非神圣不可侵犯；第二，中国在一切情况下都会避免用武力解决问题；第三，中国的领土主权是可以拿来做交易的；第四，是可以用武力迫使中国不做某事的，甚至是可以从中国得利的；第五，中国政府缺乏意志、决心和勇气去使用武力保护其国家利益。
由此，所有国家都会受此鼓励，在处理对华关系时采取强硬政策，兵连祸结，不得安宁。彼时朝廷如何处置，绥靖到底吗。
这次洞朗事件，处理的极其不明智，不理性。由此造成的恶果，会很快显现出来，而且会比预想的更加恶劣。勿谓言之不预也。
此外，不要幻想朝廷有什么大棋；不，都是摸着石头过河，惯性驱使下，走一步看一步；没有战略也就算了，我的基本判断，也没有坚定的意志、决心和思想认识去捍卫国家利益。就是内斗内行，外战外行，各种大棋，深得蒋委员长真传，无非何梅协定、秦土协定那一套罢了，以不惹事、不出事、不承担风险和责任为基本原则。
最后，看了你的文章，看到这么多人宝推点赞，实在感慨万千，国人太善良，又太自以为是，对国际政治的本质认识太浅；这种绥靖主义的思路，是成不了事，没有出路的。
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美国放松制裁，伊朗弹冠相庆。从这点看，很难说伊朗是胜利方吧？
美国可是一样封锁了中国30年。
这是往好的地方想，别有居心的话，就不好说了。
我朝连发六道警告而终不发一弹，阿三自觉地卷铺盖，毋须动武就解决纷争，就算老想找中国的茬的老米也无话可说，要自吹自擂的话，中国可以说不动枪炮也可平息纠纷，这是解决国与国纷争的楷模。
刚好有一例子拿来对比， 朝鲜一意孤行既射导弹又核试，老米声色俱厉，经济政治全方位制裁，制裁已达最严厉程度。床破暴跳如雷，说要派三个航母编队对付金三胖，三胖不屑一顾，核试如仪，昨天朝鲜再核爆成功了，老米奈他何 ？我朝的六道警告算啥，人家床破跟金三胖打嘴炮打的山摇地动，连德国默大妈也听得心惊肉跳，大呼 ：你俩别喷口水了，老娘受不了。
金三胖一会说导弹的目标是关岛，一会再说目标是米国本土，指哪打哪的世界老大给一个穷国核讹诈，这是什么世界 ？按你的说法，是不是世界老大米国缺乏意志、决心和勇气去使用武力保护其国家安全 ？ 喷子们老在喷中国丢脸啦，给阿三骑在头上拉屎啦，看看世界老大，给金三胖打完左脸打右脸 ～ 射完导弹再核爆，床破只能说 ： “世界已经明白无误地收到了朝鲜的最新信号：这个政权表明了它的蔑视。” 对，就是蔑视你，咋地 ？ 没见米国屁民嚎哭吠叫不斩朝鲜誓不还。
反观阿三，跑来洞朗打坐，达到什么目的 ？ 水军喷子张口闭口阿三成功令我朝停止修路，喷子却连那是一条什么路丶路在哪也搞不清，扯什么停止修路只是人云亦云，一犬吠影，百犬吠声。
我写错了，就放那不改，毫不避讳，然后重新给你写，如此给你面子，这也叫一稿多发？给你脸了是吧？
我给别人说话，你就认定了是我自己的马甲，连每个人都有不同的遣词造句习惯都不知道，这点基本的文字敏感性都不具备，就这还敢称词宗？妄人！
对文章的内容一个字都不敢提，就知道扣帽子、泼脏水，就这也敢打差评？
拿着赵括的剧本演了这么久都不知道赵奢赵括的差别，就这也敢谈国事？笑话。
有以军事谏者死！原文已经很长，装看不见？那你就装去吧。
你要记得，骂人是违反河规的，不管你骂谁。
洋洋洒洒几万言，不过是为了掩盖你的怯懦。道理几句话就可以说清。象你这种写几万字还说不清的也就是魏晋的＂穷嚼蛆＂可比吧。
至于你的几个笔名是咋回事，大家都看得出来。你就别越描越黑，欲盖弥彰了。
忘记说了，我等你继续写三万字。但你越写越短，而且翻来翻去就这么几句，可见生花笔丢了。
话说，某人玩伦理梗玩成儿子了也是神了，这笑话够笑到年底了。
我们很多认识是一致的， 但发言风格谈论方式完全不同， 明白人稍微关注这个问题，就能体会到，进而打消这个怀疑。 如果还不能， 进家园看看， 就行了。
至于那些拿钱的也好，无脑的也罢，我个人选择首选用事实直接击倒他， 我已经没有耐心去跟那些人讲道理了。
如果有人漏出小流氓行为， 那他赢了， 我个人选择不会再与小流氓讲道理， 有机会， 直接击倒它。
我个人面对小流氓和疯子， 只有一个选择， 避而远之。
观众已经清楚这些人的底子，路数，水平，格局。
竖子不到不足为谋，诚不我欺也。
印度人的一家之言：
大意就是，印军换防。新来的不知前面的人经常干些什么。于是误判了土共军队，误做了不该做的事，结果就是完全丧失了以前的地位与便利（原本就不该有，但是历史的因素被错误地拥有）。
至于土共，压根就没新修路这回事。路早在十多年前就已经在那里了。呵呵呵
The India-China military standoff at Doklam was apparently based on Indian misperception of Chinese intentions.
An alternative narration of events leading to the military standoff suggests that the skirmish might have been blown out of proportion and was completely unnecessary. And even though eventually the standoff was resolved through diplomatic negotiations, India was not a net gainer at the end of it.
The Chinese army personnel are still present at a distance of 250 metres from the site of the confrontation. This is where they were before June 16. The Indian Army meanwhile has vacated the area that the Chinese wanted vacated.
According to sources in the security establishment, the standoff which was projected as a result of Chinese road construction activity in the Doklam area was anything but that. A Chinese motorable road apparently already exists in the area. It has been there since 2003 or 2005, according to different estimates.
The standoff, according to these sources, had its origins not in any road-construction activity in the disputed area between China and Bhutan but in the destruction of two Indian Army bunkers in the area.
There are apparently two dozen bunkers in that area. Known as Self-Help Bunkers (SBH), they are not occupied all the time. The Chinese have for long objected to two bunkers that they claim have been built in an area which is within their perception line of their border with Bhutan.
Although Bhutan claims the area, Indian Army units under the control of 17 Mountain Division at Gangtok in Sikkim, patrol it. This includes the area where the two disputed bunkers are located.
The Chinese periodically use bulldozers to destroy the two bunkers whenever they are unoccupied. The Indian Army units patrolling the area equally periodically reconstruct them. This is not considered unusual activity in a disputed border area. Since this is China’s border with Bhutan but is patrolled by the Indian Army, the issue is never raised to a higher pitch.
In November 2007 also the Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) had moved into Bhutan's Doklam Plateau and demolished a hut close to some Indian bunkers. The hut was apparently a rest house used by the Indian Army. The Indian side kept the matter quiet as the bunkers were located in Bhutan but manned by Indian Army personnel. In July that year, the PLA had also written to the 17 Mountain Division Headquarters about two “illegal” Indian bunkers but they were at Batangla near the disputed tri-junction (where the borders of India, Bhutan and China meet) warning of “adverse consequences” if they were not removed. The matter was swept under the carpet as the two armies were to conduct joint exercises a month later in December 2007. In 2008 also the PLA had destroyed two bunkers in precisely the same area in Doklam where this June’s standoff took place.
Whenever new Indian Army unit are deployed in the area, the outgoing units apparently don’t inform the incoming unit that the breaking and reconstruction of these two bunkers in particular takes place routinely.
According to sources, this summer when a new army unit was deployed for patrolling the area they decided to spruce up the bunkers, including the two disputed ones. The PLA soldiers suddenly saw something new happening– the Indian soldiers were painting the two bunkers in question in regulation brownish-saffron army colour. The PLA soldiers could not comprehend the enthusiasm of the newly deployed Indian army unit and thought that something more permanent was being built.
Predictably, when the bunkers were unoccupied, the PLA brought out its bulldozers and demolished the bunkers. When the Indian patrol discovered this, not knowing the previous history of such demolitions and reconstructions, they informed their superior officers about the aggressiveness of the Chinese.
The message that Chinese bulldozers were in action in Doklam, according to sources, went all the way up to the Major General who is the General Officer Commanding of the 17 Mountain Division based at Gangtok. He in turn informed his bosses in Army Headquarters in Delhi.
Sources claim that the Chinese use of bulldozers was linked to possible road construction activities by the army authorities sitting in Gangtok. They presumed that the Chinese were extending the existing road from Doka La (Doka Pass) through the Doklam Plateau towards the Bhutan Army camp at Zompelri near the Jampheri Ridge.
The senior army officers in Delhi also believed the road construction theory and instructed the local army unit to prevent any road construction and stay put. Bhutan was taken on board and a full-scale military standoff began. General Bipin Rawat in fact visited both the 17 Mountain Division at Gangtok and the 27 Mountain Division at Kalimpong to boost the morale of his forces and take stock of the ground situation.
The Chinese, meanwhile, could not fathom why India was over-reacting. The Chinese media went on the offensive; and on the Indian side, security experts exaggerated and overplayed the strategic threat to India from the Chinese road construction activity. A full-scale propaganda war over claims, counter-claims and charges and counter-charges began.
At the end of it, through a “near-simultaneous” withdrawal of forces to pre-June 16 positions, the standoff was resolved. Both sides claimed victory but the Chinese went back only 250 metres while to maintain peace India had to give up patrolling the area where two destroyed bunkers had existed. The Chinese got what they wanted.
Although the military standoff is behind us, perhaps an assessment still needs to be made of the strategic cost-benefit analysis of the confrontation, the nature of information flow, the response and analysis systems within the Indian armed forces and the wisdom of the current crop of Indian Army commanders.