主题：中国的政治风险 -- 风烟滚滚来天半

大段讨论辛苦了。

其实美国这里说崩溃论的都说中国是苏联。而且一批批经济学家 当着我的面 说中国就是计划经济。所以我觉得他们还是没懂中国。于是慢慢的只要是有关中国的经济发展讨论，我更愿意看中文的报告了。

恩 nobody knows。这个结论总是对的~不过我得写这方面的report，所以只好给我自己的结论了~我觉得中国的党指挥枪，比苏联的共产党对于苏联国家力量的控制要强力的多。既有精神上的强大，也有组织结构上的严密控制，所以我还是倾向于认为，即使再出一次八九，也不会颠覆政权。况且国家在上升期，明显的上升期，向心力更强的多~

抱歉，英文还是不如中文流利，你勉强看好了~

about China. (Personally, I think he wrote the book just to cash in the very obvious surge of interest in China since the collapse and the whole G-2 brouhaha.)he's more HKC than most Chinese. He argued that China's rise to superpower status would fundamentally change not only the global power balance, but also the very definition of "progress" and "modernization". I don't know how correct his prediction would be, obviously, nobody knows, I don't' think he is as confident in his argument as it appears. Anyway, one of his argument is that we should stop treating China as just another "communist country", obviously China isn't one, and we should not drag the whole debate about China through the whole "democracy vs authoritarianism" mud hole, which is a very recent phenomenon. According to him, China, as of 2009, should be seen more as a modernized version of imperial dynasty, like the dynasties China used to have. I think he makes sense. Another thing I think Western medias get right is their assessment that the very legitimacy of the government and the system lie with the ability of the government to keep economy grow at high rate and improve standard of living, obviously, the government agrees with them, that's the government puts so much stock into protecting 8% growth rate. Right now, obviously the economy is still growing at very high rate, and probably will continue to grow for quite a while. But eventually there will be a crisis, and what happens during the crisis will test if China could successful reclaim what many Chinese believe to be its rightful place in the world. Remember, imperial dynasty always plunge into stagnation, chaos, uprising and civil war after their peak, I don't think China could become the US if the current system could not survive economic calamity as severe as the great depression like the US did. And i don't think Chinese system as of 2009, could survive an economic calamity as severe as the great depression. The bottom line is everybody agrees that China has political risk and several economic crisis could test not just the current crop of leaders but also the political system as a whole while nobody, at least nobody I know of, believes that an severe crisis could fundamentally change American political system. That's the fundamental problem: resilience of society and political system, and that's the reason so many westerners and Chinese, ask the very legitimate question regarding potential system-wrecking instability. Every time somebody conjures up another campaign against what I see, minor, insignificant domestic detractors such as internet, liberal opposition (there is no way they can or should be allowed to, govern China, at least not until they grow an spine in their dealing with the west, nonetheless, I'm dismayed by the fact that the government reacts so strongly to a bunch of basically "useless" talkers who would never possesses the resources and organizational skills to threaten the government.) and even those who, for all I know, were doing the right thing such as demanding answers regarding why so many schools were shoddily built, I find myself less sure of China's future. I have no doubt that China will continue to grow for quite a while, but believe me, eventually, there will be crisis, not just regular crisis, serious crisis, it's statistically inevitable. Then what? I don't see the government preparing itself for the sure-to-come political challenge if crisis indeed broke out, all I see is increasingly intolerant policy against the media, against the internet, against anything and anybody who doesn't sing along with the government. It's really discouraging. And I don't kn ow what to do and how to make of it.

I'm not saying China would plunge into chaos next year, as you said, there are still room to grow out of the problem. But if there were no system change, not outright, not overnight, but gradual change that should have begun NOW, whatever crisis that eventually happens will cost China far more than what we can imagine, just how much more? Just read what happened after the collapse of Han Dynasty, Jin Dynasty, Tang Dynasty and Qing Dynasty. I just hope that China could be a China where, when bad thing happens, people would worry about losing their homes in a foreclosure crisis rather than worrying about losing their lives in a civil war. Again, they should start working on it NOW, however, as far as I can see, the only thing they work on is to spend countless amount of money on coming up better ways to shut people up.

现在一说共产主义信仰，大家谁信呢？现实生活中，大家一切朝钱看。

而地方官员也没有了信仰，所以拼命捞钱。那么更加激化了和民众的矛盾，这样的话，如果矛盾积累到一定程度，就会激化，就会白热化，最后爆发出来。最怕是和民族矛盾结合在一起，例如广东韶关，引发了新疆骚乱呢。

至于最后怎么样，只有天知道呢

但是似乎不是一个能解释问题的理由。在美国，也没谁天天盯着上帝信仰啊。大家还不是信仰自己努力工作，过个好日子。中国也一样。地方官员没信仰，和拼命捞钱，这两个没有直接联系。一切穷国家都是一切朝钱看的，这个不奇怪，也不可怕。我个人还是觉得体制要负一部分责任，现有的社会发展阶段要负另一部分责任。老百姓开始能吃饱了，但又没有既得利益者吃的好，是最容易骂娘的阶段。一旦这个阶段过去，可能社会矛盾会松缓一点了。

经济问题,全是扯淡,就算是玩到最糟糕,无可挽回了,TG还有大杀器---计划经济,委长员的烂滩子都能搞定,何况今非昔比.转型后,穷人不管是计划,还是市场,都还是那点社会资源,穷人稳定了,难道指望书生去造反?还有党指挥枪呢

西方说中国经济衰退就动乱,完全是站在自身的社会立场上说的,这对市场经济国家有普遍意义,可他们不知道,TG的起家理论就是为解决市场问题而诞生的.顶多重头再来.

中国唯一的政治风险,就是TG上层变色,不过这个风险越来越小,老胡退下来后,TG就有两套前任政府存着,就算是中南海突然落下个原子弹,TG也能在短时间内组成一个有治国经验的临时内阁,老胳膊老腿的,临时顶顶还是靠谱的.就算当朝国柱不想玩了,TG也不一定变得了色.除非大家都不想玩,这个可能性相对比较低.

石首,瓮安,起因中国大地上天天发生的事,有人选择拦火车,有人选择去ZF门口,这不都挺正常的嘛,两者唯一的不同,就是石首,瓮安背后,忽隐忽现的宗族势力,这也是为什么这样的事会出现在中国人很少听过的城市,而且很多人都忽略了一个平时被压着的群体---流氓无产者,你们真觉得仅仅是"人民"因为愤怒和ZF的对抗,岂不是太想当然了?

有人说,这是对ZF缺乏信任,我就奇怪了,中国人什么时候信任过政府?是衙门八字朝南开,有理无钱莫进来的,时候信任ZF,还是砸烂公检法的时候,信任政府?中国人有信包青天,孔夫子这样的圣人历史,好像从来没信过ZF的历史.

我写的报告的观点，有关政治风险这部分和你基本一样~~

石首事件背后的宗族势力我还真不了解……如果有的话，那就解答了我长久的一个奇怪……为啥突然跑来那么多人闹……

哈哈 美帝肯定想让上层变色。不过估计失败了无数次……现在隐隐G2了，就更不可能变色了……

据法国内政部统计，12月31日晚烧了1137辆车，比去年降低了0.9%，政府表示满意。

非常凶猛，非常满意。

不过这个阶段迈过去了，就是亚洲四小龙，迈不过去，就是墨西哥，就是拉美化，不管怎么样，承受痛苦的总是老百姓，兴，百姓苦，亡，百姓苦

老百姓都是想过好日子的。谁也不愿意折腾。

有些治理上的问题其实可以通过技术性手段加以解决。

不过堡垒往往最容易从内部攻克，我想如果有风险的话，就是TG自己被既得利益团体绑架，自己的政策出了问题。

98年轮子功之所以闹那么大动静，围攻中南海，就是和当时国企改革导致的工人大规模下岗的大背景分不开的，小李子感觉好像一开始政治野心不够大，理论拼凑出来的，组织也不严密，就那样都让TG大吃一惊，而且在全力打压之下，还有天安门自焚的情况，不得不感叹一旦被极端宗教势力相结合，这个力量有多大。

每个时期都有热点问题，90年代末是工人下岗，本世纪初，是农民上访，到了现在，我想最大的隐患，是大学生失业问题，wxmang在河里已经有一个帖子说的比较详细了。如果按照河里葡萄的说法，金融危机仍未过去，可能会出现二次探底，那么未来还是不容乐观。

小资产阶级永远在资产者和无产者之间摇摆：一方面希望跻身于资产阶级的行列，一方面惧怕堕入无产者的境地；一方面希望参加一份对公共事物的领导以保障自己的利益，一方面唯恐不合时宜的对抗行为会触怒政府。小资产阶级内部从经济地位看，有上、中、下三个阶层，其对待革命的态度也相应地取右、中、左三种立场。

他们的思想不能越出小资产者的生活所越不出的界限，因此他们在理论上得出的任务和作出的决定，也就是他们的物质利益和社会地位在实际生活上引导他们得出的任务和作出的决定。一般说来，一个阶级的政治代表和著作方面的代表人物同他们的阶级间的关系，都是这样。”（同上）

　　马克思曾经为小资产阶级社会主义的代表人物蒲鲁东先生描绘了一幅维妙维肖的画像：他“极其无聊地胡扯‘科学’和错误地以‘科学’自夸”，“甚至把他仅仅重复旧东西的地方也看做独立的发现；他说的东西，对他自己说来都是新东西而且是被他当做新东西看待的。”他的所有著作都“暴露出矛盾的、双重的性质”（马克思：《论蒲鲁东》，《马恩选集》第2卷第145、141、147页）。

蒲鲁东认为，资本主义社会的每一种经济关系都有其好的方面和坏的方面。“好的方面由［资产阶级］经济学家来揭示，坏的方面由社会主义者来揭发。他从经济学家那里借用了永恒经济关系的必然性这一看法；从社会主义者那里借用了使他们在贫困中只看到贫困的那种幻想。他对两者都表示赞成，…蒲鲁东先生自以为他既批判了政治经济学，也批判了共产主义；其实他远在这两者之下。说他在经济学家之下，因为他作为一个哲学家，自以为有了神秘的公式就用不着深入纯经济的细节；说他在社会主义者之下，因为他既缺乏勇气，也没有远见，不能超出（哪怕是思辩地也好）资产者的眼界。他希望成为一个合题，结果只不过是一种总和的错误。他希望充当科学泰斗，凌驾于资产者和无产者之上，结果是一个小资产者，经常在资本和劳动、政治经济学和共产主义之间摇来摆去。”（马克思：《哲学的贫困》，《马恩选集》第1卷第122页）

“蒲鲁东是天生地倾向于辩证法的。但是他从来也不懂得真正科学的辩证法，所以他陷入了诡辩的泥坑。实际上这是和他的小资产阶级观点有联系的。小资产者象历史学家劳麦一样，是由‘一方面’和‘另一方面’构成的。”（《马恩选集》第2卷第147页）

一切向钱看，那么只要让人们能弄到钱能致富就可以了。中国二十年来在某些人的呶呶不休中挺立不倒而且越来越强，就是因为多数人一切向钱看并且能挣到钱。

政府官员就拼命捞钱吧，贪污腐败那有什么，只要给钱，国家利益，军事机密都可以出卖吗，一切向钱看吗,就像潜伏里面的谢若林“如果你一枪打不死我，我又活过来了，咱俩还能做生意，只要价格公道”