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主题：有人看过最近ECONOMIST的一篇关于新经济秩序的文章 -- 远航
家园 有人看过最近ECONOMIST的一篇关于新经济秩序的文章 The world economy: Surprise!
A survey of the world economy
http://www.economist.com/printedition/index.cfm?d=20060916
数据和分析很不少。
俺有两个初步印象：
1，文章的数据和分析基本支持陈经文章中关于中国发展和实力的主要结论。
2，西方在非常努力的拉抬印度，凡事必拉上小印，不能让中国专美，呵呵。不过提
到具体的实质的东西，基本都是中国的例子。
家园 有人继续为西方人灌迷魂汤对中国总是有好处的 有人继续为西方人灌迷魂汤对中国总是有好处的，只是希望中国的领导人不要被灌晕了就好。
西方的富人与中国人是一条心，正在以损害大多数西方本族人的代价来发家致富。从本质上来说，西方的富人与历史上那些捕捉内地黑人给白人做奴隶的西非海岸的黑人酋长，与拿印第安族人的头皮换白人的玻璃珠的印第安人，没有多少区别。
导致西方白人快速消失的现行的一套经济政治制度是一套自杀的制度。西方的“政治正确”使得西方主流政治家不敢谈论人口问题，只有“新纳粹”或“极右翼”才谈论人口问题。中国人不要重蹈西方的覆辙，日本、韩国经济发展起来了，人口却不可扭转地快速消失中。。。。这两个国家是单一民族国家，目前还问题不大。中国多民族国家，如果步上了日本、韩国的道，国家离分裂就不远了。
家园 “本质论”写得不错，献花 孔兄弟对白人似乎是又恨又爱，嘿嘿，心中端得折磨啊……
家园 这里是英文全文 1 Surprise!
Sep 14th 2006
From The Economist print edition
The balance of economic power in the world is changing. Good
IF ECONOMISTS have a tendency to trust their figures too much, politicians often pay numbers too little
attention; and they do so at their peril. Napoleon dismissed Britain as a nation of shopkeepers, but its
emerging might as a trading power helped fight him off. In the cold war Western strategists probably
spent too much time worrying about the Soviet Union's military clout, and not enough analysing its
commercial frailties. Economics does not determine history, but it does provide the backbeat. And
something dramatic has been happening to the numbers recently.
As our survey this week points out, the emerging world now accounts for over half of global economic
output, measured in purchasing-power parity (which allows for lower prices in poorer countries). Many
economists prefer to measure GDP using current exchange rates (which put the emerging world's
proportion closer to 30%). But even on this basis the newcomers accounted for well over half of the
growth in global output last year. And a barrage of statistics shows economic power shifting away from
the °∞developed°± economies (basically North America, western Europe, Japan and Australasia) towards
emerging ones, especially in Asia. Developing countries chew up over half of the world's energy and hold
most of its foreign-exchange reserves. Their share of exports has jumped from 20% in 1970 to 43%
today. And, although Africa still lags behind, the growth is fairly broadly spread: they may be the most
talked about, yet Brazil, Russia, India and China account for only two-fifths of emerging-world output.
No social or economic change this big takes place without friction. The most obvious sign is the uproar
about jobs being °∞outsourced°± to India and China. The howls will get louder as globalisation affects everricher
voters. But there are wider ramifications too. In Asia China's rise has helped push Japan and India
closer to the United States, and South Korea further away from it. The once-poor world is scouring the
earth for mineral rights, trying to buy Californian oil firms, accounting for ever more carbon emissions
and making its weight felt in international negotiations on everything from trade to proliferation to the
secretary-generalship of the United Nations.
An idea whose time has come, again
There are weaknesses in some of the growth stories. China's population is ageing and India's schools are
rotten. Perhaps the emerging world won't continue to motor along at nearly three times the rich world's
pace. Maybe it will take a little longer than 2040 to fulfil Goldman Sachs's prediction that the world's ten
biggest economies, using market exchange rates, will include Brazil, Russia, Mexico, India and China. But these are arguments about when, not whether, change will happen. And things could speed up: even the
rosiest predictions underestimated Asia's ability to recover from its 1997 financial crisis.
This shift is not as extraordinary as it first seems. A historical perspective shows it to be the restoration
of the old order. After all, China and India were the world's biggest economies until the mid-19th
century, when technology and a spirit of freedom enabled the West to leap ahead. Nor should it be
regarded as frightening. The West, as well as hundreds of millions of people in developing countries, has
benefited from emerging-world growth. Globalisation is not a zero-sum game: Mexicans, Koreans and
Poles are not growing at the expense of Americans, Japanese and Germans. Developing countries already
buy half the combined exports of America, Japan and the euro area. As they get richer they will buy
more. The world is on course for its fastest-ever decade of growth in GDP per head, which has been
powering ahead at an annual rate of 3.2% since 2000°(TM)far faster than during the great period of
globalisation that ended with the first world war.
Somme where, over the rainbow
If that comparison raises spectres, so it should. A century ago Edwardian globalists were predicting ever
more peace and prosperity°(TM)only to see those dreams blown apart on the fields of Flanders. The
momentum behind globalisation is considerable; but pushing trade barriers lower depends on political
will. It is doubtful that any American president would follow the example of the Chinese emperor
Qianlong, who announced in 1793 that the then economic superpower had no interest in °∞foreign
manufactures°±, setting his country on the road to two centuries of impoverishment. But there are a few
worrying omens in the air, notably the collapse of the Doha round of trade talks.
家园 这里是英文全文 2 Protectionism and xenophobia should be fought wherever they spring up. But it is also worth
acknowledging that these bumptious new economic powers have made the world more complicated for
Western policymakers. For instance, although they have helped keep inflation and interest rates down,
they have also encouraged asset prices to bubble up. They have allowed America to finance its massive
current-account deficit with apparent impunity. Righting these imbalances will be tricky, even if the
strength of emerging economies makes the world less dependent on America.
But the two main challenges for the West are long-term political ones. One has to do with accepting that
there will be some Western victims of globalisation. Adding 1.5 billion people to the global labour force
has boosted the return to capital and richly rewarded rich Westerners; but in Germany, Japan and the
United States, real wages for the median worker have barely budged. None of this is an excuse for
protectionism°(TM)unless you want to make everybody poorer. But there may be fiercer debates, even in
America, about using the tax and benefits system to redistribute more of the winnings.
The other challenge has to do with geopolitics. As the balance of economic power in the world changes,
mustn't the balance of political power change too?
In time, perhaps. But economic power is not the same as political power. Most developing countries are
still military pipsqueaks: China does not yet own a single aircraft-carrier, and its defence budget is less
than the annual increase in America's. Nor in political terms is there such a thing as an °∞emerging block°±:
no alliance of interests brings all these very different countries together in the way that history and
culture have united America and Europe. In Asia, for example, the rise of China is balanced by the rise of
India, which America is striving to turn into a strategic partner. But there is also plainly a need to fiddle
with some of the global political architecture. The IMF will tinker with the power structure of the fund at
its annual meeting next week. Others should follow. The UN Security Council°(TM)whose permanent
members include Britain and France but exclude Japan, India and Brazil°(TM)has long looked outdated and
will soon look absurd. Similarly, it does not make much sense for the G7, supposedly the world's main
economic club, to discuss currencies when China, which holds the largest official reserves, is not a
member.
Making such adjustments will no doubt be awkward. But these are the problems of success. A world in
which most people enjoy prosperity and opportunity is surely better than one in which 80% are mired in
economic stagnation. Celebrate the riches that globalisation has brought°(TM)and be prepared to defend the
economic liberalisation that underpins it.
家园 谢了！能否把更长的那部分找到？ 即A survey of the world economy，更具体的数据和讨论在里面，挺长。
俺是两个星期前看的杂志，后来想找个网络版总是找不着全的。
家园 是说这个吗? The new titans
Sep 14th 2006
China, India and other developing countries are set to give the world economy its biggest
boost in the whole of history, says Pam Woodall. What will that mean for today's rich
countries?
LAST year the combined output of emerging economies reached an important milestone: it accounted for
more than half of total world GDP (measured at purchasing-power parity). This means that the rich
countries no longer dominate the global economy. The developing countries also have a far greater
influence on the performance of the rich economies than is generally realised. Emerging economies are
driving global growth and having a big impact on developed countries' inflation, interest rates, wages and
profits. As these newcomers become more integrated into the global economy and their incomes catch up
with the rich countries, they will provide the biggest boost to the world economy since the industrial
revolution.
Indeed, it is likely to be the biggest stimulus in history, because the industrial revolution fully involved
only one-third of the world's population. By contrast, this new revolution covers most of the globe, so the
economic gains—as well as the adjustment pains—will be far bigger. As developing countries and the
former Soviet block have embraced market-friendly economic reforms and opened their borders to trade
and investment, more countries are industrialising and participating in the global economy than ever
before. This survey will map out the many ways in which these economic newcomers are affecting the
developed world. As it happens, their influence helps to explain a whole host of puzzling economic
developments, such as the record share of profits in national income, sluggish growth in real wages, high
oil prices alongside low inflation, low global interest rates and America's vast current-account deficit.
Emerging countries are looming larger in the world economy by a wide range of measures (see chart 1).
Their share of world exports has jumped to 43%, from 20% in 1970. They consume over half of the
world's energy and have accounted for four-fifths of the growth in oil demand in the past five years. They
also hold 70% of the world's foreign-exchange reserves.
Of course there is more than one respectable way of doing the sums. So although measured at
purchasing-power parity (which takes account of lower prices in poorer countries) the emerging
economies now make up over half of world GDP, at market exchange rates their share is still less than
30%. But even at market exchange rates, they accounted for well over half of the increase in global
output last year. And this is not just about China and India: those two together made up less than one-quarter of the total increase in emerging economies' GDP last year.
There is also more than one definition of emerging countries,
depending on who does the defining (see article). Perhaps some
of these countries should be called re-emerging economies,
because they are regaining their former eminence. Until the late
19th century, China and India were the world's two biggest
economies. Before the steam engine and the power loom gave
Britain its industrial lead, today's emerging economies
dominated world output. Estimates by Angus Maddison, an
economic historian, suggest that in the 18 centuries up to 1820
these economies produced, on average, 80% of world GDP (see
chart 2). But they were left behind by Europe's technological
revolution and the first wave of globalisation. By 1950 their
share had fallen to 40%.
Now they are on the rebound. In the past five years, their
annual growth has averaged almost 7%, its fastest pace in
recorded history and well above the 2.3% growth in rich economies. The International Monetary Fund
forecasts that in the next five years emerging economies will grow at an average of 6.8% a year,
whereas the developed economies will notch up only 2.7%. If both groups continued in this way, in 20
years' time emerging economies would account for two-thirds of global output (at purchasing-power
parity). Extrapolation is always risky, but there seems every chance that the relative weight of the new
pretenders will rise.
Faster growth spreading more widely across the globe makes a
huge difference to global growth rates. Since 2000, world GDP
per head has grown by an average of 3.2% a year, thanks to
the acceleration in emerging economies. That would beat the
2.9% annual growth during the golden age of 1950-73, when
Europe and Japan were rebuilding their economies after the
war; and it would certainly exceed growth during the industrial
revolution. That growth, too, was driven by technological
change and by an explosion in trade and capital flows, but by
today's standards it was a glacial affair. Between 1870 and
1913 world GDP per head increased by an average of only
1.3% a year. This means that the first decade of the 21st
century could see the fastest growth in average world income in
the whole of history.
- 复 是说这个吗?
家园 续 Financial wobbles this summer acted as a reminder that
emerging economies are more volatile than rich-country ones;
yet their long-run prospects look excellent, so long as they
continue to move towards free and open markets, sound fiscal
and monetary policies and better education. Because they start
with much less capital per worker than developed economies, they have huge scope for boosting
productivity by importing Western machinery and know-how. Catching up is easier than being a leader.
When America and Britain were industrialising in the 19th century, they took 50 years to double their real
incomes per head; today China is achieving the same feat in nine years.
What's new
Emerging economies as a group have been growing faster than developed economies for several
decades. So why are they now making so much more of a difference to the old rich world? The first
reason is that the gap in growth rates between the old and the new world has widened (see chart 3). But
more important, emerging economies have become more integrated into the global system of production,
with trade and capital flows accelerating relative to GDP in the past ten years.
China joined the World Trade Organisation only in 2001. It is
having a bigger global impact than other emerging economies
because of its vast size and its unusual openness to trade and
investment with the rest of the world. The sum of China's totalexports and imports amounts to around 70% of its GDP,
against only 25-30% in India or America. By next year, China is
likely to account for 10% of world trade, up from 4% in 2000.
What is also new is that the internet has made it possible
radically to reorganise production across borders. Thanks to
information technology, many once non-tradable services, such
as accounting, can be provided from afar, exposing more
sectors in the developed world to competition from India and
elsewhere.
Faster growth that lifts the living standards of hundreds of
millions of people in poor countries should be a cause for
celebration. Instead, many bosses, workers and politicians in
the rich world are quaking in their boots as output and jobs
shift to low-wage economies in Asia or eastern Europe. Yet on
balance, rich countries should gain from poorer ones getting
richer. The success of the emerging economies will boost both
global demand and supply.
Rising exports give developing countries more money to spend on imports from richer ones. And
although their average incomes are still low, their middle classes are expanding fast, creating a vast new
market. Over the next decade, almost a billion new consumers will enter the global marketplace as
household incomes rise above the threshold at which people generally begin to spend on non-essential
goods. Emerging economies have already become important markets for rich-world firms: over half of
the combined exports of America, the euro area and Japan go to these poorer economies. The rich
economies' trade with developing countries is growing twice as fast as their trade with one another.
The future boost to demand will be large. But more important in the long term will be the stimulus to the
world economy from what economists call a “positive supply shock”. As China, India and the former
Soviet Union have embraced market capitalism, the global labour force has, in effect, doubled. The
world's potential output is also being lifted by rapid productivity gains in developing countries as they try
to catch up with the West.
This increased vitality in emerging economies is raising global growth, not substituting for output
elsewhere. The newcomers boost real incomes in the rich world by supplying cheaper goods, such as
microwave ovens and computers, by allowing multinational firms to reap bigger economies of scale, and
by spurring productivity growth through increased competition. They will thus help to lift growth in world
GDP just when the rich world's greying populations would otherwise cause it to slow. Developed countries
will do better from being part of this fast-growing world than from trying to cling on to a bigger share of
a slow-growing one.
Stronger growth in emerging economies will make developed countries as a whole better off, but not
everybody will be a winner. The integration of China and other developing countries into the world
trading system is causing the biggest shift in relative prices and incomes (of labour, capital, commodities,
goods and assets) for at least a century, and this, in turn, is leading to a big redistribution of income. For
example, whereas prices of the labour-intensive goods that China and others export are falling, prices of
the goods they import, notably oil, are rising.
- 复 续
家园 再续 In particular, the new ascendancy of the emerging economies has changed the relative returns to labour
and capital. Because these economies' global integration has made labour more abundant, workers in
developed countries have lost some of their bargaining power, which has put downward pressure on real
wages. Workers' share of national income in those countries has fallen to its lowest level for decades,
whereas the share of profits has surged. It seems that Western workers are not getting their full share of
the fruits of globalisation. This is true not just for the lowest-skilled ones but increasingly also for more
highly qualified ones in, say, accountancy and computer programming.
If wages continue to disappoint, there could be a backlash from workers and demands for protection from
low-cost competition. But countries that try to protect jobs and wages through import barriers or
restrictions on offshoring will only hasten their relative decline. The challenge for governments in
advanced economies is to find ways to spread the benefits of globalisation more fairly without reducing
the size of those gains.
The high share of profits and low share of wages in national income are not the only numbers that have
strayed a long way from their historical average. An alarming number of economic variables are currently
way out of line with what conventional economic models would predict. America's current-account deficit
is at a record high, yet the dollar has remained relatively strong. Global interest rates are still historically
low, despite strong growth and heavy government borrowing. Oil prices have tripled since 2002, yet
global growth remains robust and inflation, though rising, is still relatively low. House prices, however,
have been soaring in many countries.
Puzzling it out
This survey will argue that all of these puzzles can be explained by the growing impact of emerging
economies. For instance, low bond yields and the dollar's refusal to plunge are partly due to the way
these countries have been piling up foreign reserves. Likewise, higher oil prices have mostly been caused
by strong demand from developing countries rather than by an interruption of supply, so they have done
less harm to global growth than in the past. And their impact on inflation has been offset by falling prices
of goods exported by emerging economies. This has also made it easier for central banks to achieve their
inflation goals with much lower interest rates than in the past.
All this will require some radical new thinking about economic policy. Governments may need to harness
the tax and benefit system to compensate some workers who lose from globalisation.
Monetary policy also needs to be revamped. Central bankers like to take the credit for the defeat of
inflation, but emerging economies have given them a big helping hand, both by pushing down the prices
of many goods and by restraining wages in developed countries. This has allowed central banks to hold
interest rates at historically low levels. But they have misunderstood the monetary-policy implications of
a positive supply shock. By keeping interest rates too low, they have allowed a build-up of excess
liquidity which has flowed into the prices of assets such as homes, rather than into traditional inflation.
They have encouraged too much borrowing and too little saving. In America the overall result has been
to widen the current-account deficit.
The central banks' mistake has been compounded by the emerging economies' refusal to allow their
exchange rates to rise, piling up foreign-exchange reserves instead. Bizarrely, by financing America's deficit, poor countries are subsidising the world's richest consumers. The opening up of emerging
economies has thus not only provided a supply of cheap labour to the world, it has also offered an
increased supply of cheap capital. But this survey will argue that the developing countries will not be
prepared to go on financing America's massive current-account deficit for much longer.
At some point, therefore, America's cost of capital could rise sharply. There is a risk that the American
economy will face a sharp financial shock and a recession, or an extended period of sluggish growth. This
will slow growth in the rest of the world economy. But America is less important as a locomotive for
global growth than it used to be, thanks to the greater vigour of emerging economies. America's total
imports from the rest of the world last year amounted to only 4% of world GDP. The greater risk to the
world economy is that a recession and falling house prices would add to Americans' existing concerns
about stagnant real wages, creating more support for protectionism. That would be bad both for the old
rich countries and the new emerging stars.
But regardless of how the developed world responds to the emerging giants, their economic power will go
on growing. The rich world has yet to feel the full heat from this new revolution.
家园 打不开，可否把内容转过来？ 家园 有人看过最近ECONOMIST的一篇关于新经济的文章吗？ 标题太长，问号被切掉了。^_^