主题：【整理原创】朝鲜战争中的细菌战（系列终结篇） -- 思炎
家园 给你补充上那个短片中提到美国军方在朝鲜战争期间关于在战场 测试生物武器的命令
A third crucial document – marked “Top Secret” – showed that in September 1951, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff issued orders to begin “large scale field tests… to determine the effectiveness of specific BW [bacteriological warfare] agents under operational conditions.”If these “field tests” were indeed undertaken, then they may have drawn again on the expertise of the Japanese biological warfare team.
在短片中前日军731人员（后为美军服务）也证实了美国征调前日军“731部队”及“100”细菌部队罪恶累累的战犯及成员参与了朝鲜战争细菌战。其中包括， Shiro Ishii、Kitano Misaji、Colonel Ohta等。
家园 请问 请问思炎哪里有这份JCS 1837/26 文件可以叁考？很多东西必须要眼见为实，因为太多这种阴谋论的东西都是跳跃式的结论。
举例来说，您这里引用的英文说这个文件是1951年9月JCS命令进行大规模测试。这很可能是作者耍的手段，拼凑欺骗没有深入思考的人，也就是说哗众取宠。
因为找不到这个文件，只能找找索引。就从google 上找到的注解资料，JCS 1837/26 文件全名应该是
"Biological Warfare: Memorandum by the Joint Advanced Study Committee for the Joint Chiefs of Staff", 21 September 191, JCS 1837/26
根据文志忠一篇文章，JCS 在1952年2月25-26日批准此文件，文号应是JCS 1837/29 （见注48）
http://www.yorku.ca/sendicot/ReplytoColCrane.htm
这里就有好几个问题值得讨论：
第一，这 1837/26 应该是 JASC 就生物战做的研究报告，虽然在1951年9月21日提交，但这并不是命令。为什麽您引用的文字作者要称这是在1951年9月 JCS 的命令？
第二，根据文志忠自己在上面文章引述的，JCS在1952年2月批准这份文件，真正的批令是1952年2月的 1837/29。但是批准的是什麽，再用文志忠自己的话：
In February 1952 when the joint chiefs approved the principle recommendations of its Joint Advanced Study Committee on Biological Warfare, 'that the United States acquire a strong offensive BW capability without delay,' and that, 'a sound military program requires the development of all effective means of waging war without regard for precedent as to their use,' it also approved a recommendation for, 'the adoption of a positive military policy to the effect that the United States will be prepared to employ BW whenever it is militarily advantageous.' The joint chiefs of staff ordered their staffs 'to prepare directives to the Services' to implement their decision.
这是什麽意思？也就是在2月底 JCS 要他们幕僚准备给各军种下有关对生物战做准备的指令。这里代表美国军方开始对生物战进行比较具规模的准备，但这跟生物武器有没有具体足够规模去使用，有没有真的使用无关。
第三，请回想一下，所谓细菌战的宣传什麽时候开始的？1951年5月中，在志愿军第五次战役遇到挫败之际。5月19日、24日和25日，中国政府发表声明说，美国正在准备使用细菌战，并且指责美国在朝鲜战场使用毒气，以便为细菌战做实验检查。连着一堆指控，到了1952年2月22日朝鲜、苏联指控美国使用细菌战，2月24日，周恩来指控美国细菌战。3月8日中国官方新闻媒体开始大规模报道关于美国在朝鲜战场使用细菌战的消息。美国JCS的「指令」都还在草拟阶段，朝鲜战场已经是大规模的使用了？
思炎女士，这样的盲目引用是不太好喔。
本帖一共被 1 帖 引用 (帖内工具实现)- 复 请问
家园 我实在搞不懂质疑的人真的认真看了所有贴吗？ 你说：
思炎女士，这样的盲目引用是不太好喔回答你之前，建议某些ID（不针对你一人），认真的看一下这个系列贴，包括回复，还有贴中的纪录片。
有疑问，没有问题，请发出有建设性的讨论，盲目发问质疑乱引用也是不太好喔。
对于那些故意东一茬，西一棒，混淆视听的ID，我是懒得再浪费时间。
请问思炎哪里有这份JCS 1837/26 文件可以叁考？Anyway，你的贴很令 [ yfb ] 欣赏，并引用你的发问。上来一看，那个[ yfb ]当了搬运工，把这份文件贴上来了。。。很好很好，省我时间了。
外链图片需谨慎，可能会被源头改那么，这里起码可以看到第五条：
A more vigorous test program including large-scale field test should be determine the effectiveness of specific BW agents under operation conditions.
注意你也犯了个错误，其实不用跟你引用的Endicott文章扯起来的。 我给的是如下，是纪录片《肮脏的小秘密》中的截屏：
A third crucial document – marked “Top Secret” – showed that in September 1951, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff issued orders to begin “large scale field tests… to determine the effectiveness of specific BW [bacteriological warfare] agents under operational conditions.”If these “field tests” were indeed undertaken, then they may have drawn again on the expertise of the Japanese biological warfare team.
还要注意的是，这个文件是第三份秘密文件，有些有关细菌战的文件美国隐藏，没有公布（或可能销毁）。这里还有一个要注意的词是AGAIN。
还有这里用了：determine the effectiveness 一词，细菌武器是否能成为协同全面作战的武器，它的有效性，可行性只有在战场上测试才知道。我主帖中已经写了：
1952年9月，他们向政府报告说，他们把极度致命的、稳定、可行、易传播、成本低、产生疫情的生物武器放置到全面战争能力的计划并不成功并且，就算你引用的Endicott的文章，他的文章中也对文件时间做了说明：
At the meeting for what was described as the covert implementation of Takeoff,on 3 October 1951, the service personnel were hesitant, even a little suspicious. Army General John Magruder confessed that he had delayed forwarding the plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although the documents carried a memo saying that it was an approved plan, the representative of the Pentagon wanted to know why there was no formal indication of this fact on the plan itself. Why was there no box carrying the facsimile signature of the person in authority? Why was there no indication that the plan was a numbered paper in the series of PSB formal papers?' After receiving assurances, General Magruder indicated to the meeting that he would 'probably forward the plan for action tomorrow.' (29) An uneasiness, an air of reluctance, was clearly evident.Four days later, in accordance with 'an oral directive,' three Army colonels left Washington for a top secret trip to see General Ridgway, commander-in-chief of the Far East Command in Tokyo. (30) We do not know whether this trip was part of TAKEOFF. Perhaps it was a chance event. But in another coincidence, when US Air Force Colonel Andrew J. Evans, Jr., who had previously worked in the War Plans Division, was shot down by the Chinese in 1953, he told his captors that planning for the BW campaign in Korea had begun in October 1951. His statement was corroborated by another high ranking POW, Colonel Frank H. Schwable, chief of staff of the Marine air wing when he was shot down in Korea, who added that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had sent [their] directive by hand to General Ridgway in October 1951, ordering the initiation of bacteriological warfare in Korea on an initially small, experimental stage but in expanding proportions.(31)。。。。
。。。。There are further grounds to ask the question whether the anxiety around TAKEOFF related to biological warfare. As nervous rumblings about the operation continued into late November 1951, there was a flap about 'statements concerning Novel Weapons. Some serious reservations about TAKEOFF continued, from Secretary of Defense Lovett down through the military staff. But the director of the Psychological Strategy Board, former secretary of the army Gordon Gray, presumably with presidential backing, continued to push. The Joint Chiefs of Staff eventually approved the plan 21 December 1951 and reported that implementing plans have been prepared and are in the hands of operating agencies. (35)纪录片中还说到：at the time, American was only fighting one war - Korean , if the order by Jiont Chef Staffs obeyed, there was only one battel where the biological weapon could be tested.
从文件的时间1951年九月，到中朝指责美军动员细菌战的时间是从：1952年一月。时间上根本没有你所说的问题，而是吻合。
美国参谋长联席会议的指令是得到执行的，也的确如这份文件中所说的，日本731细菌部队也参与了。
“国际科学委员会”的报告的结论是：“朝鲜及中国东北的人民，确已成为细菌武器的攻击目标；美国军队以许多不同的方法使用了这些细菌武器，其中有一些方法，看起来是把日军在第二次世界大战期间进行细菌战所使用的方法加以发展而成的”。
并且在纪录片中，前日军731人员也证实了美国征调前日军“731部队”及“100”细菌部队罪恶累累的战犯及成员参与了朝鲜战争细菌战。其中包括， Shiro Ishii、Kitano Misaji、Colonel Ohta等。
period！
纪录片《肮脏的小秘密》自己看一下，还有我这个主贴里的美国PBS的纪录片：
[FLASH]http://www.youtube.com/v/ATS4exmEhjY&feature=player_embedded#[/FLASH]
家园 呵呵， MM，都到这份上来还在这里狡辩？真是很有勇气嘛。 真是狗屁不通， LIGHT和我不是问你了吗？那份文件到底是个什么啊？作战指令？怎么不敢答啊？
呵呵， 还什么A third crucial document， 之前的那两个文件是什么啊？ 是不是所谓的美国包庇日本细菌战战犯的文件啊？和这里的参联会文件是一回事吗？ 你在这里刻意强调是第三份文件到底想说明什么啊？ 浑水摸鱼的干活？
呵呵，还什么起码的看到第五条，不是问你很多遍了嘛，看见FIELD就是战场，看见OPERATIONAL就是实战，又不敢讲？ 原来你英文就是扣几个字眼的啊？ 上下文不联系的？ 还吧你那半岛电视台的垃圾搬出来当宝嘛， 不过呢，正好也可以看出这帮人篡改证据的丑态罢了，还什么ISSUED ORDERS 那个是ORDER吗？不过人家都没敢下结论把话说死，最后一句话是用虚拟语态说的，你嘴皮一张就是实干了？无耻的青出于蓝而胜于蓝嘛。
还什么AGAIN，一个词都注意的到哦，来说说这里你想说什么吧？ 这一个词里面有什么千秋大义？ 呵呵，都能注意到一个词，怎么连整个句子是虚拟语态都不知道啊？
还有这里用了：determine the effectiveness 一词，细菌武器是否能成为协同全面作战的武器，它的有效性，可行性只有在战场上测试才知道
这也太扯了一点吧。蠢货，只有在战场上测试才能知道？ 拜托，这么蠢的话请不要讲了好不好？ 原来什么东西都要上战场实战才能检验有效性啊？ 那中国的核武器算什么啊？未经检验？
蠢材， 没看到我贴的东西啊？ 周恩来的声明说的美军在朝鲜使用细菌武器是什么时候啊？ 你在指责周当众撒谎吗？
最后， 还把你那个垃圾纪录片拿出来说事？ 还731参与？ 不是问你了嘛，怎么最简单的细菌弹都没搞掂啊？ 还是用个宣传弹凑合凑合？ 烧个陶瓷很难吗？ 呵呵， 找个垃圾出来说两句话（还是含含糊糊的）就算证实了？ 这种把戏玩的也太低级了一点吧？
家园 请问思炎网友，您到底看过那纪录片没有？ 您说：
注意你也犯了个错误，其实不用跟你引用的Endicott文章扯起来的。 我给的是如下，是纪录片《肮脏的小秘密》中的截屏和旁白：
A third crucial document – marked “Top Secret” – showed that in September 1951, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff issued orders to begin “large scale field tests… to determine the effectiveness of specific BW [bacteriological warfare] agents under operational conditions.”
If these “field tests” were indeed undertaken, then they may have drawn again on the expertise of the Japanese biological warfare team.
还要注意的是，这个文件是第三份秘密文件，有些有关细菌战的文件美国隐藏，没有公布（或可能销毁）。这里还有一个要注意的词是AGAIN。
我是蛮惊讶的，因为整个纪录片《肮脏的小秘密》中，并没有您上面提到的所谓第三份秘密文件的英文旁白。您上面引的那段"A third crucial document..."，不就是直接从半岛电视台的网页剪贴下来的吗？那可是网页写的，可不是旁白。
http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/peopleandpower/2010/03/201031761541794128.html
而在这半岛电视台制作的纪录片《肮脏的小秘密》中所谓您截屏的那一段，就正是我这里提到的JASC备忘录 1837/26，哪有另外的秘密命令？
请看片中28:33起的那段，它的旁白是：
.... in late 1951, as the American forces were bogged down in Korea, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a top secret order to begin testing germ weapons on the battlefield. (2nd voice) large-scale field tests should be conducted to determine the effectiveness of the specific BW agents under the operational conditions.
外链图片需谨慎，可能会被源头改
外链图片需谨慎，可能会被源头改
外链图片需谨慎，可能会被源头改这三个截屏正是我前面讨论的JCS 1837/26 备忘录，也就是 yfb 贴的那个东西（第5条不是看得很清楚吗？），不是命令。JCS批准这个文件的命令是在1952年2月25/26日，前面引文忠志的话已经说过了。这个文件批准了，才让各军种开始写指令以进行对生物战的准备，但连这个文件都还没批下来，中朝已经大肆指控美军进行大规模的细菌战。
思炎网友连自己引的东西都没看，就剪贴半岛电视台的东西人云亦云，然後发明了这第三个秘密命令的说法，这不就是您前面开了洋洋洒洒4个帖子，却被人一问就倒的悲剧重演吗？
然後呢，思炎网友又来随便乱套，把文忠志补风追影的东西也拿来证明这个9月命令。
并且，就算你引用的Endicott的文章，他的文章中也对文件时间做了说明：
At the meeting for what was described as the covert implementation of Takeoff,on 3 October 1951, the service personnel were hesitant, even a little suspicious. Army General John Magruder confessed that he had delayed forwarding the plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although the documents carried a memo saying that it was an approved plan, the representative of the Pentagon wanted to know why there was no formal indication of this fact on the plan itself. Why was there no box carrying the facsimile signature of the person in authority? Why was there no indication that the plan was a numbered paper in the series of PSB formal papers?' After receiving assurances, General Magruder indicated to the meeting that he would 'probably forward the plan for action tomorrow.' (29) An uneasiness, an air of reluctance, was clearly evident.
Four days later, in accordance with 'an oral directive,' three Army colonels left Washington for a top secret trip to see General Ridgway, commander-in-chief of the Far East Command in Tokyo. (30) We do not know whether this trip was part of TAKEOFF. Perhaps it was a chance event. But in another coincidence, when US Air Force Colonel Andrew J. Evans, Jr., who had previously worked in the War Plans Division, was shot down by the Chinese in 1953, he told his captors that planning for the BW campaign in Korea had begun in October 1951. His statement was corroborated by another high ranking POW, Colonel Frank H. Schwable, chief of staff of the Marine air wing when he was shot down in Korea, who added that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had sent [their] directive by hand to General Ridgway in October 1951, ordering the initiation of bacteriological warfare in Korea on an initially small, experimental stage but in expanding proportions.(31)。。。。
。。。。There are further grounds to ask the question whether the anxiety around TAKEOFF related to biological warfare. As nervous rumblings about the operation continued into late November 1951, there was a flap about 'statements concerning Novel Weapons. Some serious reservations about TAKEOFF continued, from Secretary of Defense Lovett down through the military staff. But the director of the Psychological Strategy Board, former secretary of the army Gordon Gray, presumably with presidential backing, continued to push. The Joint Chiefs of Staff eventually approved the plan 21 December 1951 and reported that implementing plans have been prepared and are in the hands of operating agencies. (35)
这文忠志整段东西里到底讲了 Operation Takeoff 是什麽？完全没有，全都是猜测。连那3个上校在干什麽都不知道，就推测他们是跟 Operation Takeoff 有关，然後後面就把这所有跟 Operation Takeoff 当成细菌战了。还真有这种论证的方法哦？
像这种 JCS 跟 FEC 间派高级信差的事所在多有，很多意见用文件或电报讲不清楚，都会派一些幕僚去把事情讲清楚。就如李奇微接任 FEC 後，为了把自己职责搞清楚，并且让意见上达沟通，就多次派过属下幕僚到华府当面解释。文忠志把东西拼凑在一起，开始还假意说一句不晓得是不是 chance event，接下来就直接说这些人是跟 Operation Takeoff 有关。一不知道 Operation Takeoff 到底是什麽，也不知道这些上校是否真的传达了 Operation Takeoff 的信息，然後就直接说 Operation Takeoff 跟生物战有关，这真的是非常瞎搞的论证。
请问思炎网友，Operation Takeoff 到底是在讲什麽？文忠志拿到这文件（杜鲁门图书馆可取得），请问他引出了多少有实质的内容？
还是一句话，自己看都没看过，盲目的引用是不行的。
家园 你才混水摸鱼。说废话，美军要把细菌武器放置为全面战争 能力的武器，当然是要在战场上测试。。。并且，
如纪录片中还说到：at the time, American was only fighting one war - Korean , if the order by Jiont Chef Staffs obeyed, there was only one battel where the biological weapon could be tested.
你跟我扯“field”“operation”。。。少来。
还有这里用了：determine the effectiveness 一词，细菌武器是否能成为协同全面作战的武器，它的有效性，可行性只有在战场上测试才知道。我主帖中已经写了：
1952年9月，他们向政府报告说，他们把极度致命的、稳定、可行、易传播、成本低、产生疫情的生物武器放置到全面战争能力的计划并不成功美国没在战场上测试，怎么得到以上结果的？你以为，美军跟你一样，张嘴就来。是你自己，无知无畏。
国际科学委员会”的报告的结论是：“朝鲜及中国东北的人民，确已成为细菌武器的攻击目标；美国军队以许多不同的方法使用了这些细菌武器，其中有一些方法，看起来是把日军在第二次世界大战期间进行细菌战所使用的方法加以发展而成的”。
并且在纪录片中，前日军731人员也证实了美国征调前日军“731部队”及“100”细菌部队罪恶累累的战犯及成员参与了朝鲜战争细菌战。其中包括， Shiro Ishii、Kitano Misaji、Colonel Ohta等。
我是不会给你胡搅蛮缠的手法影响的！
回复你是看我心情。。。早跟你说了这种水准在河里，没几个人吃你这套。你就继续白费力吧。
家园 蠢材，我问你的问题怎么从头至尾一个都不不敢答啊？ 来说一说嘛， 就从那个文件是不是参联会作战指令开始？ 怎么，说不出来还是说不出口啊？
呵呵。原来一定要在战场上测试才知道玩不转的啊？这到底是什么逻辑啊？ 文学者的下面不是有一段吗，好像冰箱不够也可以导致玩不转的哦.
The Air Force was assigned the primary operational role in biological warfare. The directorate of the air force biological weapons program during the Korean War was divided into two parts, both parts reporting separately to Lt-Gen. T. D. White, deputy chief of staff for operations. The task of the first part, known as the US Air Force BW-CW Division (with an acronym AFOAT-BW) under Colonel Frank Seiler, was to establish an overt biological warfare capability for the emergency general war plan against the Soviet Union referred to earlier. (19) Initial capability within this plan was phased in by March 1952 but it was plagued with difficulties, shortage of refrigeration facilities for the brucellosis pathogen and fell short of expectations. (20) This is the part of the program that Professor Crane discusses when he concludes that the US lacked capabilities in the field.
另外，现在又说不可行了？ 当初我不是贴过文老先生的书上面写在朝鲜实验大获成功，所以大规模推广，甚至批准侵入中国领空投掷嘛。你这么干倒是光屁股拉磨，转着圈的丢人哦。
家园 前苏联和中国的细菌武器什么时候在战场上测试过？ 我国和前苏联都生产储存过生物武器。
美国二战时生产存储了几千枚炭疽炸弹。从来没听说在战场测试过。
家园 少跟我扯前苏联 这里，是美国是要测试，生物细菌武器是把极度致命的、稳定、可行、易传播、成本低、产生疫情的生物武器放置到全面战争能力的计划是否可行。