主题：【整理】维基解密:09年乌鲁木齐75事件 -- 大漠孤烟远

XINJIANG PARTY CHIEF LIKELY TO STAY ON DESPITE PUBLIC DISCONTENT AND ERODED INTRA-PARTY AUTHORITY, CONTACTS SAY

Identifier: 09BEIJING3127

Origin: Embassy Beijing

Created: 2009-11-16 11:33:00

Classification: CONFIDENTIAL

Tags: PHUM PGOV CH

Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6861

INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE

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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DCC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 003127

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2039

TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, CH

SUBJECT: XINJIANG PARTY CHIEF LIKELY TO STAY ON DESPITE

PUBLIC DISCONTENT AND ERODED INTRA-PARTY AUTHORITY,

CONTACTS SAY

REF: A. BEIJING 2753

B. BEIJING 2183 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor

Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary: Xinjiang Party Secretary Wang

Lequan seems likely to keep his job, several

contacts predict, despite public anger over his

handling of the July riots in Urumqi. A September 3

demonstration, in which thousands of Urumqi

demonstrators demanded Wang's resignation, may have

actually improved his chances at staying on.

According to some observers, the Communist Party

would be reluctant to remove a high-level leader in

response to public pressure for fear of establishing

a precedent that could lead to demonstrations

against other unpopular provincial leaders. Wang

Lequan continues to enjoy the backing of Party

General Secretary Hu Jintao, our sources say,

although his political authority within the Party

has eroded due to perceptions he botched the

response to the July unrest. Two Uighur

intellectuals told us that ethnic tensions have

accelerated a Han exodus from Xinjiang and have

caused Urumqi housing prices to fall sharply.

Scholars at Beijing's Central University for

Nationalities reported that the Chinese government

has commissioned internal academic studies to exam

the causes of the violence in Xinjiang. The

government appears to be focused on reducing Uighur

unemployment as a means to improve stability in

Xinjiang. End summary.

Wang Lequan: So Bad, He's Good

------------------------------

2. (C) In September, several Embassy contacts

predicted Wang Lequan would be removed as Xinjiang

Party Secretary soon after October 1 National Day

celebrations. Wang Chong (protect), a journalist

for the Communist Youth League (CYL)-published news

magazine China Weekly, told PolOff September 15 that

Wang Lequan would soon be named to a new post in

Beijing, most likely vice chairman of the National

People's Congress. Echoing comments we heard from a

range of sources, Wang said such a "promotion" would

give the Party a face-saving way of removing him

from Xinjiang. Many in the CCP leadership,

especially on the left, were "furious" at Wang

Lequan for "losing control" of Xinjiang during the

July unrest, Wang Chong added, but Wang's status as

a Politburo member made his outright dismissal

impossible. Embassy contacts frequently cited

Public Security Minister Meng Jianzhu, Qinghai Party

Secretary Qiang Wei, and Tibet Autonomous Region

Party Secretary Zhang Qingli as possible candidates

to replace Wang Lequan in Xinjiang.

3. (C) As Wang remained in place through late

October and into early November, however, contacts

began to observe that Wang could remain in Xinjiang.

Wang Xiaodong (protect), a well-known nationalist

author who contributed to the best-selling book

"Unhappy China," told PolOffs October 20 that Wang

would likely keep his job. Wang Xiaodong, who also

works for the CYL-operated opinion polling

organization China Youth and Children Research

Center (Zhongguo Qingshaonian Yanjiu Zhongxin), said

the September 3 demonstrations, during which

thousands of Urumqi's Han residents took to the

streets to demand Wang Lequan's resignation,

ironically served to ensure Wang's survival as

Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) Party

Secretary. The CCP, Wang said, had created a

"dangerous precedent" by firing Urumqi Party

Secretary Li Zhi in response to the September 3

demonstrations. Removing Wang Lequan in response to

public pressure, even as part of a nominal promotion

to Beijing, could encourage similar demonstrations

in other provinces. The Party, Wang Xiaodong

warned, could not afford to let the public believe

that mass demonstration was an effective way of

removing an unpopular party secretary. Removing

Wang Lequan from Xinjiang would be difficult, he

added, because after 16 years as Party Secretary

Wang was "deeply entrenched" in the XUAR. Wang

Xiaodong predicted that the CCP was likely to let

Wang Lequan retire quietly in a few years. (Note:

BEIJING 00003127 002 OF 004

Wang Lequan was born in 1944, meaning he will reach

67, the usual retirement age for high-level cadres,

in 2011.)

4. (C) Ilham Tohti (protect), a Uighur economist at

Beijing's Central University for Nationalities who

was detained for six weeks following the July 5

riots, told PolOffs October 28 that the CCP had been

prepared to recall Wang Lequan from Xinjiang until

the September 3 demonstration caused the Party to

recalculate. Tohti predicted Wang Lequan would

remain in place until at least the "next major CCP

meeting of 2010," such as the Fifth CCP Plenum in

fall 2010. Dildar Eziz (protect), a prominent

Uighur author who works for the Xinjiang Chinese

People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC),

told PolOff November 6 that President Hu Jintao's

late August visit to Xinjiang had served to shore up

Wang Lequan's political position. During the visit,

Hu had praised Wang's rule of Xinjiang during

meetings with Party cadres, which praise was

intended to convey the message that Wang would be

staying put, Eziz said. Ma Rong (protect), a Peking

University sociologist and frequent advisor to the

CCP United Front Work Department, also cited Hu

Jintao's support as the key reason Wang would keep

his post. Wang Lequan, Ma told PolOff November 12,

recently had told his staff that he planned to

remain in Urumqi "for another three years." Ma,

like Wang Xiaodong, predicted the CPP would "handle"

Wang Lequan simply by letting him stay in Urumqi

until he retired.

But Does He Still Call the Shots in Xinjiang?

---------------------------------------------

5. (C) Though most Embassy contacts now predict Wang

Lequan will remain in Xinjiang at least until 2010,

most said his political authority and standing

within the Party had diminished because of a wide-

spread perception that he had botched the early

response to the July 5 riots. Ilham Tohti said

that, following the July unrest, the central

government no longer deferred to Wang Lequan on

policy matters related to the XUAR and ethnic

affairs. "Xinjiang had been the donkey that led the

(central government) camel," Tohti said, "but not

anymore." Similarly, Wang Xiaodong relayed that

Wang Lequan and other high-level Xinjiang leaders

had been severely criticized during internal Party

meetings immediately after the riots, which

criticism had reduced Wang's standing in the CCP.

6. (C) Wang Xiaodong, citing personal contacts in

the People's Armed Police (PAP), added that PAP

commanders in Urumqi had been prepared to move much

faster the night of July 5 to quell the violence but

had found that the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau

paralyzed by indecision. This, according to Wang,

was one reason Xinjiang PSB head Liu Yaohua had been

fired in September, but many PAP officials also

blamed Wang Lequan for delaying the order to

mobilize the PAP. Eziz, however, expressed

skepticism that Wang Lequan's authority had

significantly diminished in the wake of the July 5

riot. "So long as Wang Lequan is physically present

in Urumqi, he will continue to wield power," she

said.

Han Flight

----------

7. (C) Several contacts noted that the July riots

had resulted in a Han exodus from Xinjiang. Dildar

Eziz, who owns several properties in Urumqi, said

the departure of Han from the city had impacted the

housing market. Apartment prices once as high as

RMB 5,000 per square meter had fallen to RMB 2,000

after the July 5 riots. She said property prices

had fallen especially sharply in the Saimachang

district, one of the hotspots of the July riots.

Beijing University's Ma Rong, who specializes in the

study of internal migration to Tibet and other

minority regions, also observed that Han migrant

workers were leaving the XUAR out of fear of further

violence. Ilham Tohti said that well before the

riot Han were already starting to leave Xinjiang in

pursuit of higher-wage jobs in China's coastal

provinces. Han children raised in Han "bing tuan"

BEIJING 00003127 003 OF 004

(the quasi-military Xinjiang Production and

Construction Corps) enclaves were less willing to

remain in Xinjiang than their parents because of

diminished job opportunities. Population dynamics

in Xinjiang were fundamentally different than in

Tibet, where high salaries continued to attract Han

migrants, Tohti observed. Even before the riot the

Chinese government had been having difficulty

maintaining sizable Han populations in Xinjiang

cities and towns outside of Urumqi.

8. (C) Not all Embassy contacts viewed the Han

exodus as a serious problem. He Weifang (protect),

a liberal Beijing University legal scholar currently

teaching at a university in Shihezi, about 100 miles

northwest of Urumqi, told PolOffs October 21 that he

knew of some Han leaving Xinjiang because of the

July 5 riot, including a colleague at Xinjiang

Normal University who was seeking job opportunities

in Guangzhou in an attempt to leave the region.

However, Professor He said he believed that Han

migration from the XUAR was a temporary phenomenon.

He noted that housing prices in Shihezi were

actually rising, which he attributed to the city's

strong local economy and majority Han ethnic makeup.

The Search for Answers

----------------------

9. (C) Tohti said that a major difference between

views on the July unrest in Xinjiang and those on

the March 2008 unrest in Tibet was the rejection, by

both the general public and elites, of the official

propaganda on the Urumqi riots. In the Tibet case,

most Han accepted the government version, which

blamed the 2008 violence on a small number of

separatists working on the orders of the Dalai Lama.

However, nobody, according to Tohti, believed

official statements that World Uighur Congress

President Rebiya Kadeer had masterminded the July

riots. The Xinjiang riots, he said, had created a

rift between the Communist Party and Han residents

in the XUAR that did not exist in Tibet. Ma Rong

said that the public skepticism had been caused by

Wang Lequan's attempts to manage Han anger by

covering up the extent of the violence. The actual

death toll from the July riots, Ma asserted, "was

nearly one thousand," of whom "95 percent" were Han,

mainly migrant workers. (Note: The official death

toll is 197.) Authorities, Ma Rong said, could not

reveal the real figures for fear they would spark a

new round of Han reprisals against Uighurs.

10. (C) Several academic contacts told us that the

Xinjiang unrest had prompted numerous government

agencies to commission "internal" (neibu) academic

studies to examine the underlying causes of the

Urumqi riots. Wang Xiaodong said a colleague

working with the Xinjiang People's Armed Police had

told him of opinion polls commissioned by the PAP

that sought to clarify the causes of the violence.

Ma Rong said that he had been invited to attend a

major conference on bilingual education in Xinjiang

the week of November 16, which he characterized as

part of the government's response to worsening

ethnic tensions. Pan Jiao (protect), a sociologist

at Central University for Nationalities, told PolOff

November 13 that many academics specializing in

minority affairs had been tasked to work on internal

research projects, which reflected the Party's

genuine surprise over the Xinjiang unrest. "The

leadership," Pan said, "could not believe something

like this could happen at a time when China is doing

so well overall."

Focus on Employment as Key Issue

--------------------------------

11. (C) According to Pan Jiao and other academic

sources, many internal studies were focusing on high

Uighur unemployment as a factor contributing to

ethnic tensions. Tohti told PolOffs that, despite

his status as an outspoken critic of Chinese policy

in Xinjiang, friends in the State Ethnic Affairs

Commission had been sharing internal reports on the

July riots with him and asking for his comments.

Tohti said the main policy proposal to emerge in the

wake of the July riots was a plan to limit

importation of Han workers to the XUAR by requiring

BEIJING 00003127 004 OF 004

that Xinjiang companies hire at least 50 percent of

their workers from the local community. Although

the policy did not include hiring quotas for

Uighurs, the 50-percent regulation would, if

implemented, increase Uighur employment. Dildar

Eziz said that while she had heard of similar ideas

to improve Uighur employment, she doubted the

proposals would have any meaningful impact since few

large companies operated in predominantly Uighur

cities like Hotan (Hetian) and Kashgar (Kashi). She

predicted the programs would have many loopholes and

would not change the fact that Han employers only

hired Uighurs "as a last resort." Tohti said that

the Han out-migration from Xinjiang was providing

more job opportunities for Uighurs and more space

for minority-owned businesses to develop. Eziz,

though acknowledging these developments, said the

changes would be temporary. Uighurs remained on the

economic margins, she said, doing the most difficult

jobs for the least pay.

HUNTSMAN

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

尽管公众的不满和侵蚀党内权力，可能留新疆市委书记，联系人说

标识符：09BEIJING3127

原产地：驻北京大使馆

创建时间：2009-11-16十一时33分00秒

分类：保密

标签：PHUM PGOV CH

节录：这条电缆是没有删节Wikileaks的。

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信息RUEHOO /中国职位集体

RHEHNSC /国科会WASHDC

RUEAIIA / CIA华盛顿DCC ONFIDENTIAL第04 01北京003127

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E.O. 12958：DECL：2039年11月16日

标签：PHUM，PGOV，CH

主题：新疆可能留尽管市委书记

公众的不满情绪和侵蚀党内的权威，

联系人说

编号：A.北京2753

B.北京2183“和”上一页

分类：政治公使衔参赞

奥布里卡尔森。原因1.4（b）和（D）。

1。 （三）总结：新疆党委书记王

王乐泉似乎有可能保住自己的工作，有几个

接触预测，尽管在他的公愤

处理7月在乌鲁木齐的骚乱。九月3

示威，数千乌鲁木齐

示威者要求王某的辞职，可能有

确实改善了他留任的机会。

据一些观察家，共产党

将不愿意删除一个高层次的领导者，在

回应公众的压力建立的恐惧

一个先例，可能会导致示威

对其他不受欢迎的省级领导。王

王乐泉继续享受党的支持

胡锦涛总书记，我们的消息来源说，

虽然他在党的政治权威

已侵蚀由于看法，他拙劣的

七月动荡。两名维吾尔族

知识分子告诉我们，种族关系紧张

加快了来自新疆的汉族外流和

造成乌鲁木齐房价大幅下跌。

学者们在北京的中央大学

民族报，中国政府

已委托国内学术研究，以考试

在新疆的暴力事件的原因。 “

政府似乎集中在减少维吾尔

失业的一种手段，以提高稳定性

新疆。年终总结。

王乐泉：如此糟糕的是，他的好

------------------------------

2。 （三）九月，几个大使馆接触

预测王乐泉新疆将被删除

市委书记后不久，10月1日国庆

庆祝活动。王充（保护），记者

共产主义青年团（共青团）发布的新闻

中国周刊杂志，告诉PolOff 9月15日

王乐泉将很快任命一个新职位

北京，最有可能的副委员长，全国

人民代表大会。赞同的意见，我们听到了

来源范围，王在希说，这样的“推广”

给一个面子的方式消除他的党

来自新疆的。许多在共产党的领导，

尤其是在左边，“愤怒”在王

王乐泉为“失去控制”在新疆

七月动荡，王充说，但王的地位，

政治局委员，他断然解雇

不可能的。大使馆的接触经常被引用

公安部部长孟建柱，青海党

局长强卫，西藏自治区

党委书记张庆黎作为可能的候选人

王乐泉在新疆，以取代。

3。 （三）正如王留在地方，通过后期

十月到十一月初，但接触

开始观察，王可留在新疆。

王晓东（保护），一个著名的的民族主义

作者谁贡献的畅销书

“中国不高兴”，告诉PolOffs 10月20日，王

可能会保住自己的工作。王晓东，谁也

工程团经营的民意调查

组织中国青年和儿童的研究

中心（记者Qingshaonian厌旧忠信）说，

9月3日的示威活动，在此期间，

乌鲁木齐的汉族居民，上千人走上

街头，要求王乐泉下台，

具有讽刺意味的服务，以确保王的生存

新疆维吾尔族自治区（新疆维吾尔自治区）党

局长。王先生说，中共创造了一个

射击乌鲁木齐党的“危险的先例”

局长李贽在9月3日

示威游行。王乐泉在回应删除

公众的压力，甚至标称推广的一部分

北京，可能会鼓励类似的示威

在其他省份。党，王晓东

警告说，买不起，让公众相信

该大规模示威游行的有效途径

删除一个不受欢迎的党委书记。删除

王来自新疆的王乐泉会有困难，他

补充说，因为16年后，党委书记

王是“根深蒂固”，在新疆维吾尔自治区。王

晓东预测，中共很可能让

王乐泉退休几年悄然。 （注：

北京00003127 002，004

王乐泉出生于1944年，这意味着他将达到

67，高层次的干部通常的退休年龄，

在2011年。）

4。 （三）伊尔哈姆托乎提（保护），维吾尔族经济学家

北京的中央民族大学世界卫生组织

被关押了6个星期后，7月5日

暴乱，告诉PolOffs 10月28日，中共已经

准备从新疆召回王乐泉，直到

9月3日的示威造成党

重新计算。托乎预测王乐泉

留在原地，直到至少“下一个主要的中共

2010年会议“，如第五中共十六届五中全会

2010年秋季。 Dildar Eziz（保护），一个突出的

中国新疆维吾尔族作者

人民政治协商会议（简称人民政协），

告诉PolOff 2007年11月6日，国家主席胡锦涛

曾于八月下旬访问新疆托

王乐泉的政治立场。访问期间，

胡锦涛称赞王的统治新疆期间

党的干部会议，其中赞扬

旨在传达的讯息，王会

Eziz说，原地踏步。马戎（保护），北京大学

大学的社会学家和频繁顾问

中共统战工作部，还列举了胡锦涛

胡锦涛的支持下，王会不断的关键原因

他的职务。王乐泉，马告诉PolOff 11月12日

最近曾告诉他的员工，他计划

保持“在乌鲁木齐又三年”。马，

王晓东一样，预测的CPP会“处理”

王乐泉简单地让他留在乌鲁木齐

直到他退休。

但他仍然可以调用在新疆的镜头吗？

---------------------------------------------

5。 （三）虽然，现在大多数的大使馆接触预测王

王乐泉将继续留在新疆，至少要等到2010年，

最说，他的政治权威和地位

党内有所减少，因为宽

他拙劣的早期传播感知

7月5日的骚乱。伊尔哈姆托乎提说

，继7月动乱，中央

政府不再推迟到王乐泉

新疆维吾尔自治区和民族有关的政策事宜

事务。 “新疆已导致的驴

（中央政府）的骆驼，“托乎提说，”但不

了。“同样，王晓东转述，

王乐泉和其他高层次新疆领导人

在党内受到严厉批评

骚乱结束后立即举行会议，这

批评减少了汪氏在中国共产党的地位。

6。 （三）王晓东，理由是在个人接触

人民武装警察部队（PAP），补充，人民行动党

在乌鲁木齐的指挥官已准备提出多

7月5日晚，以平息暴力，但

发现，新疆公安厅

瘫痪犹豫不决。据王，

是一个原因，新疆公安厅负责人刘耀华已

9月发射，但许多人民行动党官员也

为了拖延归咎于王乐泉

调动人民行动党。 Eziz，但表示

王乐泉的权威的怀疑，

在7月5日之后大幅缩水

骚乱。 “只要王乐泉是实际存在

在乌鲁木齐，他将继续掌权，“她

说。

韩飞行

----------

7。 （三）几次接触指出，七月骚乱

导致汉从新疆外逃。 Dildar

Eziz，谁拥有几个属性，在乌鲁木齐，说

汉城市出发产生了影响

住房市场。一次高的公寓价格

每平方米5000元下降到2000元人民币

7月5日的骚乱之后。她说，楼价

尤其是大幅下降的Saimachang

区，七月骚乱的热点之一。

北京大学马戎，专门在

内部迁移的研究西藏和其他

少数民族地区，还观察到，汉族农民

工人离开新疆维吾尔自治区进一步的恐惧

暴力行为。伊尔哈姆托乎提说，前

防暴汉已经开始离开新疆

追求更高工资的工作，在中国沿海

省份。汉族儿童提出在汉“兵团”

北京的004 00003127 003

（半军事及新疆生产

建设兵团）的飞地不太愿意

不是因为他们的父母留在新疆

减少就业机会。人口动态

新疆从根本上比在不同的

西藏，高薪继续吸引韩

移民，托乎观察。即使前骚乱

中国政府一直有困难

在新疆保持可观的汉族人群

乌鲁木齐市以外的城市和城镇。

8。 （三）并非所有的大使馆接触看待汉

外流作为一个严重的问题。贺卫方（保护），

北京一个自由大学的法律学者目前

在石河子大学的教学，约100英里

乌鲁木齐市西北，告诉PolOffs 10月21日，他

一些离开新疆的汉族，因为知道的

7月5日的骚乱，包括在新疆的同事

师范大学是寻求就业机会

在广州试图离开该地区。

然而，教授他说，他相信，韩

从新疆迁移是一种暂时现象。

他指出，在石河子市的房价

实际上上升，这是他归因于城市的

强大的地方经济和多数的汉族妆。

寻找答案

----------------------

9。 （三）托乎提说，一个主要区别

7月在新疆动乱和那些意见

2008年3月西藏骚乱被拒绝，

一般公众和精英，官方

乌鲁木齐骚乱的宣传。在西藏的情况下，

大多数汉接受了政府的版本，

归咎于一个小数目，2008年暴力事件

分裂主义分子在达赖喇嘛的订单工作。

然而，没人，托乎提，相信

世界维吾尔代表大会的正式声明

热比亚总统曾策划了7月

骚乱。新疆骚乱，他说，创造了一个

共产党和汉族居民的裂痕之间

在新疆，西藏不存在。马戎

说，已引起公众怀疑

王乐泉管理汉愤怒的尝试

掩饰暴力的严重程度。实际

马宣称，死亡人数从7月的骚乱，“

近千个，“其中”95％“是汉族，

主要是外来务工人员。 （注：官方公布的死亡

收费为197）。当局，马戎说，不能

揭示担心他们会引发一场真正的数字

韩报复的新一轮打击维吾尔人。

10。 （三）几个学术交往告诉我们，

新疆动乱，促使众多的政府

委员会“内部”（neibu）学术机构

研究，探讨的根本原因

乌鲁木齐骚乱。王晓东说，一个同事

新疆人民武装警察工作的人

告诉他的PAP委托进行的民意调查

寻求澄清暴力的原因。

马戎说，他已获邀出席

新疆双语教育的重要会议

11月16日的一周，他定性为

部分政府的回应恶化

种族关系紧张。潘娇（保护），社会学家

在中央民族大学，告诉PolOff

11月13日，许多学者专门从事

负责少数民族事务的内部工作

研究项目，反映了党的

在新疆动乱的真正的惊喜。 “

领导“，潘石屹表示，”不能相信的东西

这样可能会发生一次，当中国正在

如此出色的整体。“

就业重点关键问题

--------------------------------

11。 （三）根据潘教及其他学术

来源，许多内部的研究都集中在高

维吾尔人的失业率为一个促进因素

种族关系紧张。托乎提告诉PolOffs，尽管

他的状态作为一个中国的政策直言不讳的批评

在新疆，在国家民委的朋友

委员会已共享的内部报告

7月与他并询问他的意见骚乱。

托乎提说，主要的政策建议，出现在

七月暴乱之后的计划限制

到新疆的汉族工人，要求进口

北京00003127 004，004

新疆公司雇用至少50％的

他们从当地社区工作者。虽然

政策没有包括雇用配额

维吾尔人，50％的监管，如果

实施，提高维吾尔人就业。 Dildar

Eziz说，虽然她听说过类似的想法

提高维吾尔人就业，她怀疑

建议有任何有意义的影响，因为很少

在主要维吾尔经营的大公司

城市像和田（和田），喀什噶尔（喀什）。她

预计方案将有许多漏洞，

不会改变的事实，韩雇主只

聘请“作为最后的手段。”维吾尔人托乎提说，

来自新疆的汉族向外迁移提供

维吾尔族和更多的空间更多的就业机会

为少数族裔企业发展。 Eziz，

虽然承认这些事态发展，他表示，

变化将是暂时的。维吾尔人仍然在

她说，经济利润，做最困难的

至少要就业。

亨斯迈