西西河

主题:【原创】纳粹鹰犬海德里希 -- 史鉴

共:💬63 🌺65
全看树展主题 · 分页首页 上页
/ 5
下页 末页
家园 期待后续文章

怎么有1年多没有更新过了?那么好的文章,不要变成太监文啊。

家园 他不是技术官僚而是天才!

在任何一个技术官僚的国家都不能32岁做到帝国警察总监,而且还安排的如此井井有条。

家园 因为你身处不同的价值观体系

所以你可以说他信仰不对头。但是反之亦然~

家园 忘了还有精英一早逃到美国去啦-爱因斯坦等
家园 不好意思,这个系列没有下文了。

“纳粹鹰犬”原先是打算写三篇,后面跟着写穆勒和舒伦堡,但阅读材料以后发现这两人经历比较单调枯燥,写出来肯定不好看,于是就毅然挥刀自宫了,呵呵。

家园 不错,所以天妒其才,英年早逝。

此人俨然是纳粹德国第二代领导核心啊,死得这么蹊跷,看来其中确有天意。

家园 神功已成,自宫无妨!哈哈!

其实如果从那两人写起,由枯燥到丰富,由平庸到神奇,也是很好玩的。可惜您已经把群众的胃口吊起来了,再写平淡无奇的恐怕没人会答应。所以此时毅然自宫,不失为高明之举。

家园 唉,真想多看几篇类似的文章。再花下史鉴兄。
家园 没写完阿

捷克的事情似乎没写完阿

家园 是否过分美化了海德里希?

莫拉维奇招募了10名前捷克军人,明白地告诉他们,此次行动生还的希望渺茫。

10个人都愿意不顾生命去刺杀他,而且还有平民愿意提供藏身之地,可能从一个侧面暗示海德里希并不是那么得到捷克人民拥护的。

抗日战争中,日军也有不少模范治安区。

家园 相比较而言。
家园 我倒没有美化海德里希的意思,只不过想还原他的本来面目而已。

他干的事情,板上钉钉,想美化也美化不了啊。海德里希治理捷克的效果是毋庸置疑的,至于他是打算赢得捷克民心,就很难说了,毕竟他的最终目的是确保、提高捷克军工产量,而不是归化捷克民族。刺杀小组完成任务以后未能逃脱,说明抵抗运动的群众基础还是不够深厚啊。

家园 挂一漏万,挂一漏万,兄台来补充一下吧?
家园 史鉴兄的文章一直是很不错的。

当年在文学城我还捧过兄的场子啊,呵呵。

我的这个反面意见没有抬杠的意思,只是觉得文中的反方意见少了一点,正面描述太多了些。不过我也没有去查史料核对。

海德里希做事的出发点当然不会是赢得捷克的民心,但就是他治理捷克的效果,怕也不会有文中描述得那么好。

感觉而已,希望其他有资料的朋友可以核实或否定。

至于刺杀小组不能逃脱,这种事情本身就很难,并不见得能说明抵抗力量不得人心。

记得萨苏写过两个军统特务在北京刺杀了两个日本皇族(XX宫,YY宫什么的),最后也没有逃掉。

刺杀的关键本就在于以命搏命,全身而退是很次要的目标。为什么刺客的别名叫“死士”?

家园 呵呵,咱们是老相识了,所以没跟你玩客套。

关于海德里希治理捷克,当时写文章的时候的确没有查证更多的资料,刚才查了一下,找到一点比较客观中肯的材料,摘录如下(因为字数限制,没法摘录更多),取自英文书籍《Hitler's War Aims: The Establishment of the New Order 》Vol. 2,第三章43页-45页,作者Norman Rich,1974年出版。

On September 27, 1941, Heydrich was officially installed in Prague as acting Reich protector. Frank, although deeply disappointed at not having been offered the post himself, stayed on as executive director of the Office of the Reich Protector and senior SS and police officer. 52

Three days after taking office, Heydrich informed German leaders in the Protectorate of Hitler's most recent directives for the conduct of German policy. These remained the same as before: The ultimate aim was to recover Bohemia and Moravia for Germany, racially and territorially ; the immediate tasks were to preserve order and ensure maximum economic production. To this end the native population was to be treated firmly and all opposition was to be ruthlessly suppressed. 53

In setting forth his own views in this and subsequent conferences, Heydrich sounded a new note in demanding greater self-discipline from the Germans. Under no circumstances should they allow the Czechs to suspect their long-range aims, so as not to drive them to desperate actions or open revolt; in their daily relationships with the native population they should avoid all behavior likely to arouse unnecessary hostility. To calm the nerves of the Czechs and make certain that they would continue to work for the Germans, the policy of firmness was to be tempered by concessions and incentives. As a first step, Heydrich proposed to increase the fat rations for Czech workers sufficiently so that the threat of lowering them again would have a powerful coercive effect. German policy in general was to be conducted with greater finesse, the propaganda line should be more subtle, more attention should be paid to psychological factors in dealing with national questions. Instead of suppressing the Czech veneration for King Wenceslas, for example, the Germans should divert it to their own purposes by pointing out that his greatness lay in his realization that the existence of the Czechs depended on their living in harmony with the Germans.

While indulging in these subterfuges in carrying out their immediate tasks in the Protectorate, German authorities should at all times keep the long-term aims firmly in mind and make all possible preparations for the final solution of the racial problem. The compilation of the racial register was to continue, but on the basis of more stringent standards of selection and better disguised to conceal its real purpose. Similarly the Land Office, which already managed Czech estates confiscated by the Germans, should go on with its classification of all land on a racial basis and draw up plans for systematic resettlement until complete Germanization had been achieved.

Heydrich attached particular importance to the problem of education, which should be removed from Czech control and made to serve the interests of Germanization. The Czech universities and higher technical schools, closed for three years in November 1939, were never to be reopened. Czechs suitable for Germanization who desired a higher education should be sent to Germany for that purpose, a procedure which would contribute to the Germanization of Czech intellectuals. In the Czech schools the main problem was the teachers, who constituted a veritable training corps for opposition. "We must obviously smash them, and at the same time abolish Czech upper schools," Heydrich said. To remove Czech children from the pernicious influence of their teachers, they would have to be organized outside the schools, perhaps in athletic societies under German leadership.

Older Czechs would not be subject to ordinary educational influences and could probably never be won over to a reliable pro-German attitude in any case. In dealing with them the Germans could only attempt to neutralize them politically by turning their attention to religion, the quest for material advantages, or other nonpolitical matters. To deprive the Czechs of a political organization or rallying point of any kind, the authority of the Czech government should be steadily undermined. However a well-functioning Czech administration was to be preserved as long as the Germans needed it. Meanwhile Czech government organizations, administrative offices, and laws were to be brought as closely into line with those of Germany as possible.

The ultimate goals of German policy were firm, Heydrich said, but he impressed upon his staff the need to be practical in attempting to realize them. If a particular plan did not work, then it just would not work and it would be necessary to try some other method. 54

Heydrich's actual policies in the Protectorate followed closely his ideas on the subject. There was never any doubt about his intention to deal firmly with the Czechs. On the day after his arrival in Prague (September 27) he proclaimed a state of emergency, put a large part of the country under martial law, introduced a curfew, and transferred jurisdiction on political cases to Standgerichte (drumhead courts) where persons accused of treason could be tried immediately and condemned without further legal formality. Alois Eliáš, the Czech prime minister, was arrested, accused of high treason, and later executed. The state of emergency lasted until January 3, 1942, during which time some 10,000 persons were arrested, 1,134 handed over to the Gestapo, and 394 executed. 55 These measures effectively put an end to large-scale, organized Czech resistance during the period of Heydrich's administration. 56

Ruthless repression was accompanied by carrot and stick tactics, or what Czechs in exile called a policy of "bullying, blackmail, and bribery." Seeing in the Czech intelligentsia his most dangerous and uncompromising opponents, Heydrich sought to isolate this group from the rest of the population and concentrated his efforts on the workers and peasants. On a broad scale he introduced social welfare programs that had won the Nazis such favor at home. On October 28 he increased the fat ration for two million industrial workers, two hundred thousand pairs of shoes were distributed to armament workers, wages were raised significantly. The peasants benefited from a rationalized agricultural program and higher food prices. At his offices in the Czernin palace Heydrich received deputations of workers and peasants, listened patiently to their complaints, and treated them with respect. The result of these policies was that production was maintained at a satisfactory level, the industrial peace was undisturbed by strikes, and acts of sabotage declined so as to be only a minor irritation. 57

全看树展主题 · 分页首页 上页
/ 5
下页 末页


有趣有益,互惠互利;开阔视野,博采众长。
虚拟的网络,真实的人。天南地北客,相逢皆朋友

Copyright © cchere 西西河