主题：【讨论】如果台湾问题被迫在近年内用武力解决，中国美国日本的经济如何变化？ -- 西风陶陶
家园 【讨论】如果台湾问题被迫在近年内用武力解决，中国美国日本的经济如何变化？ 1。美国不参战，速战速决
2。美国使用冲绳基地参战，长期鏖战
虽然非常不希望看到战争，但是形势诡谲，大家一起做些经济演习，如何？
家园 【文摘】同意新华生的观点 - 美国迟早被迫放弃台湾，关键看我综合实力 Collision Course? Taiwan and the Danger of a U.S.-China War
CAPITOL HILL BRIEFING
Friday, July 16, 2004
Featuring Ted Galen Carpenter, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute. (www.cato.org)
台湾中国时报七月十八日报导说，美国着名政论家卡本特十六日指出，台海两岸都试图改变现状，如果美国不改变，可能未来几年内就被迫与中共开战，并付出极高代价。因此他主张美国明确告诉台湾，大国之间，不为无涉关键利益的小国而战。
「卡托（CATO）」研究所副总裁卡本特博士针对国会议员及助理举行记者会，并发表演说，题为《台湾以及美中开战的危险》。他指出，即使中国大陆全面民主，台湾还是有很多人不愿与大陆统一，理由之一是「不愿做很大的国家的很小的一省」。相对的，大陆很多人担心台湾正与大陆愈行愈远，认为北京当局必须在未来数年采取行动。
他表示，美国要维持现状，可是现状真能一直延续下去吗？而且更重要的是：台海两岸都希望维持现状吗？如果现状改变而美国不变，美国的利益是否受损？
中国时报说，这位十三本书的作者指出了多种两岸关系的前景：也许两岸经济密不可分，使台湾愿意统一；也许台湾在军事上无法与中共抗衡，而美国是否驰援又不确定，所以台湾领导人只好接受统一；也许大陆出现西方式的民主政权，对台湾产生重大吸引力；也许全中国民主后，愿意让台湾独立。但是，他说，最后这种可能性就像肯塔基大赛马对冷门马下注一样，赔率可能是七十比一，机会极低。
卡本特表示，中共的经济及军事力量不断增强，美国如果要捍卫台湾，会愈来愈危险，所以必须改弦更张，扬弃多年来的模糊策略。他说，模糊策略的原意，是不明确表示是否协防台湾，所以北京担心美国涉入，北京就会自制；台湾没有把握美国一定出兵，所以台湾也会自制。但是，卡本特说，他经常询问美国官员，如果颠倒过来，「北京认为美国只是虚张声势；或是台湾认为可以倚仗美国；情势会怎么样？那将是灾难一场」。
所以卡本特说，从美国利益着眼，华府要明确告诉北京，「台湾是民主实体，美国不能对台湾施压或告诉台湾怎么做」；同时华府也要同样清晰的告诉台湾，美国愿意继续对台军售，让台湾有自卫能力，也促使北京自制。但是，「不要寄望我们会为保护你而甘冒与中国开战的风险」。卡本特说，美国必须明告台湾，台湾的前途由台湾自己决定，「要统一？要维持现状？要追求进一步独立？都由你们自己决定」，但是，「不论做什么决定，你们自己承担因此而产生的风险」。
报导说，卡本特强调，这个「清晰策略」可使美国避免与中国在未来数年内开战，因此应是美国最优先工作。他说，美国捍卫民主国家，但是，强权之间不应为了与自己关键利益无关的保护国而冒战争风险[B]（Great powers should not risk major wars to protect client states that are not essential to the powers’own security）。[/B]他表示，台湾是美国利益所系但并非关键利益所在，对美国安全并非绝对必要。
卡本特也指出，很多人说，中共要办二○○八年奥运，所以不会在那之前对台动武云云，其实与统一相比，中共会不惜放弃奥运。他说，台湾之于中国，就像耶路撒冷之于以色列，尽管实际统辖时间很短，但却涉及民族情感，所以不可轻忽。
家园 全是正理。只是安全法后，总统权力大了；要国会和总统都听得进才成。 扁阵营好象请了一个LOBBIEST的公司，影响力也很大。大选结果可能也会有影响，KERRY对台海问题的态度，现在能猜得出来么？
家园 【原创】对比布什,我愿意支持克里 - (克里的中国政策,英语,老哥凑合着看) Kerry on China
Senator Kerry has an extensive background and established voting record on China. He has served previously as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific, has visited China several times, and knows the country quite well.
As a Senator, John Kerry has been friendly on China regarding trade relations, judged by his voting record:
• In May 1994, he voted NO on the bill that was intended to link China’s human rights condition with grant of the MFN (Most Favorable Nation) trade treatment.
• In Sept. 2000, he voted to kill an amendment that would require sanctions against China or other countries if they were found to be selling illicit weapons of mass destruction.
• Also in Sept. 2000, he voted YES to grant China MFN status during its annual review.
Following a major speech on U.S.-China relations in 2000, Senator Kerry reiterated the importance of the long-standing U.S. “one China” policy to maintaining stability across the Taiwan Strait. While emphasizing the U.S. national interest in preserving democracy in Taiwan, he outlined the dangers of abandoning the strategic ambiguity that serves both to deter a cross-Strait attack by China as well as a precipitous declaration of independence by Taiwan that could provoke a war.
Of course Kerry has used far tougher rhetoric against China during the campaign. His criticism has focused on:
• The bilateral trade deficit. Kerry’s view on this is that the best way to rectify this problem is to take a stronger stand on revaluation of the RMB. Kerry’s economic team has told us that Kerry views China’s currency policy as illegal under article 15 of GATT. They estimate a 15-40% undervaluation. His campaign has indicated that pressuring China to revalue would be a much higher priority than under Bush.
• Job loss due to outsourcing to China. Kerry’s team has indicated that he does not support additional trade barriers, but would want to enforce existing WTO trade regulations. He has suggested that he would engage in a 120 day review of all trading partners, not just China, to see where violations of WTO may be occurring, indicating more of a hard line on this issue than Bush, but not a major swing towards protectionism.
• Lack enforcement of trade agreements with China.
• China’s de facto Dollar-peg currency regime.
• Lack of IPR protection and subsiding momentum for fulfilling WTO commitments.
His campaign has outlined a set of proposed policies on US-China relations:
• Immediate investigation into China’s worker rights abuses.
• More forceful effort to stop currency “manipulation.” Kerry has quoted estimates that the RMB is undervalued by 15 ?C 40%.
• Increased resources for trade enforcement and action at the WTO (for instance, double the USTR’s trade enforcement budget), and aggressive filing of WTO cases with regard to China WTO rule violations; for example, China’s indigenous WAPI wireless encryption standard.
• Providing U.S. manufacturers with more relief through applying special China safeguards, including textiles, more frequently.
• Tougher enforcement on China’s protection of IPR.
It’s worthwhile to point out that almost every U.S. President’s China policy evolves considerably from that of the campaign stage to be more pragmatic. No matter who gets elected in November, with more than US$120 bn bilateral trade surplus over the U.S., China is inevitably going to see its trade relationship with the U.S. become politicized and it’s going to become a source of friction once Chinese exports start to hit key U.S. industries like automobile and computers. But, there won’t be as much antagonism as there was between the U.S. and Japan in the past simply because Chinese “Toyota” and “Sony” have yet to emerge. A substantial trade attack by the U.S. on Chinese trade policies or currency policy is unlikely, because (1) protectionism isn’t in U.S. economic interests, (2) the U.S. government wants Beijing’s cooperation in the war on terrorism and N. Korea nuke crisis, and (3) the business community as a whole won’t support, because they all invest there.
家园 很难说 就拿第一种情况来说，战后怎么处理台湾的经济体系，台湾经济是不是可以完全纳入大陆的经济轨道，是单轨还是双轨制度，美国日本对中国做什么反应？制裁还是无动于衷，甚至加强中国的关系，这些变化太多了，只怕写一本书也写不完，我个人认为，假如第一种情况，美日不做过激反应，那还是保持现状，中国就很难预料了。
