主题：【翻译】对朝鲜战争步兵战斗与武器使用的评注（1950冬—1951年)II -- 徐荣

B连

敌人怎样开进这个国家？他用什么方法隐蔽了如此众多的军队？他怎样完成突击部署？他成功地使我军的部分兵力落入圈套是因为我们太冒失还是因为他特别的聪明才智和精心谋划？这些神秘的谜一旦解开，我们就能够合理调整反击行动的形式。

对于战前形势只需简要叙述：11月25日前，第八集团军几乎未遇抵抗地向北推进，偶尔与敌军轻装部队接触。这些交火发生在远距离，敌军的散兵或小型巡逻队迅速地撤退、消失，似乎只顾逃命。这种冲突并无一定规律，没有迹象显示这些敌兵并非散兵游勇，或证明他们是执行指定任务（比如为大军执行侦察和斥候任务）的战术控制部队。大部分交火的距离都太远，不能确定那些步兵是北朝鲜人还是中共士兵。

在最初的接触中，这些游击部队通常在山脊的最高处挖工事，并且在后撤时沿高地撤退。同时，空军发回了许多发现并攻击敌军小部队的报告，这些小部队都在沿着高地挖工事。但是并未发现给人深刻印象的机动部队。空军报告：敌军控制区内通过德川的主要公路被迅速拓宽和轧平，似乎在准备繁忙的运输。除此之外，没有迹象显示第八集团军正在向敌军大部队移动。

尽管还有其他细节，上述这些便是到第八集团军发动进攻时为止出现的主要迹象，这次进攻被形容为结束战争的最后努力。此时，距中共军队在清川江西北地区首次伏击第八集团军纵队，过了约一个月。

11月25日上午10点，第9步兵团B连开始攀登219高地，这是清川江东岸的一个制高点。当该连走完到山顶三分之一的路时，敌军的5枚手榴弹砸向2排1班，炸伤了劳伦斯 史密斯上等兵的大腿和罗伯特 A. 基乔纳斯中尉的脚。尽管该连当时还不知道，这是清川江会战的第一次交火，也是中共军队在主要战线上进行机动、开展大规模反击的开端。

在这里，手榴弹在史密斯和基乔纳斯身边爆炸的那一刻，局势来了个180°的大转弯。前些日子，敌军部队只在远距离开火，然后脱离战斗。这支敌军却等候B连进至短距离内，此后也没有脱离战斗。从早到晚，敌军不断地在20～40码的距离以手榴弹和自动火力向B连射击，在夜幕降临的时候敌军依然占据着219高地，B连在较低的山包整顿队伍，敌军散兵不停地沿着这些山包向B连的环形防御阵地投射袭扰火力。在219阵地上的决斗一直持续到11月26日，当日B连接到团里下达的撤退命令。

但是，（第2步兵师的指挥官们）并没有认识到战役初期B连经验的真正意义。沿着与B连相同路线进军的其他几个连遭遇到掘壕固守的敌军部队的抵抗，这些敌军都展现出了不同程度的决心，（指挥官们）也没有认识到这一点。随后，他们也没有判断出：敌军沿一条特定的战线迅速集结并增强抵抗标志着整个战术形势已完全逆转。直到25日24时左右，师部才感到战事发生了危急的转变，尽管炮兵指挥部在18点左右已得出结论，但它还没有积极向上级反映自己对局势的判断。

到了午夜时分，毫无疑问，军事行动已进入一个全新的周期。该师的整个正面都开始与敌军交战。战地指挥所和一线补给站遭到了侵袭。某些炮兵阵地被突破。某些步兵连被切断，上级对它们境况还一无所知。

在B连前方进行坚守以后，敌军继续有节奏地开展反击，这大体上暗示敌军在根据事态发展调整其行军。中共军队有一项计划；这个计划只有通过这种抵抗才能奏效：在我军主补给线上的高地配置正面宽度窄但抵抗顽强的掩蔽部队。

但由于我军“处于攻势”，而且B连的战斗被作为孤立事件，未与敌军态势的主要改变联系起来考虑，各步兵连在当天下午继续沿同一条战线展开。

该师的作战地幅展开过宽，其中部分连队，当中共军队在夜间逼近他们时与最近的友军相距2300码之多。要是敌军真地了解这些情报，并且其勇猛程度有许多新闻记者所形容的一半的话，那么我军的这些部队将无可挽救地片甲不还。

BAKER COMPANY

The mystery of how the enemy had come into the country, by what means he had contrived to conceal himself in such large numbers, how he had managed his shock deployment, and whether the success of his entrapment of part of our force was the consequence of our consummate blundering or of his phenomenal cleverness and a carefully engineered design, was the riddle which, if once solved, would regulate the form of our own counter operations.

The situation requires only this brief summary: Prior to 25 November the Eighth Army had been advancing northward almost unopposed. There had been occasional brushes with light forces of the enemy, such firing as took place occurring at long range, with the enemy skirmishers or small patrols promptly fading back, as if concerned mainly with saving their own lives. There was no general pattern to this interference, no indication that these were not random fragments, or that they might be tactically controlled groups serving an assigned mission, such as reconnaissance or screening for a larger force. Most of these exchanges were at too great range to ascertain whether the riflemen were NK or CCF.

On initial contacts, these guerrilla-type groups were usually dug in along the ridge tops, and when they fell back, they withdrew along the high ground. The air, during this same period, made numerous reports of having sighted and engaged small enemy groups similarly dug in along the heights. But no impressive maneuver bodies were seen. There was nothing to indicate the Army might be moving toward an enemy mass, except several air reports that the main road running through Tokchon in enemy country had been suddenly widened and re-surfaced, as if in preparation for heavy traffic.

Though there are other details, these were the main indications up to the hour when Eighth Army launched its attack which had been described as the final effort which would end the war. Almost one month had passed since the first CCF ambushes were sprung against Eighth Army columns in the area northwest of the Chongchon.

At 1000 on 25 November, Baker Company, 9th Infantry Regiment, started the ascent of Hill 219, a commanding piece of ground just to the east of the Chongchon River. It got one-third way up the hill when five grenades showered down on its 1st squad, 2nd Platoon, wounding Sgt Lawrence Smith, Jr., in the thigh and Lt Robert A. Kjonaas in the foot. Although the Company did not then know it, this was the first fire in the battle of the Chongchon and the beginning of the CCF maneuver to counterattack in mass on one main line.

Locally, the situation took a 180” turn at the moment the grenade exploded near Smith and Kjonaas. In the preceding days the enemy groups had traded fire at long range and then faded back. This body waited until Baker came within a few yards and thereafter did not fade back. Continuing to engage Baker with grenades and automatic fire at 20-40 yards range throughout that morning and afternoon, it was still holding the height of 219 when darkness came, and along the lower knobs, where the Company had fixed itself, its skirmishers were putting a harassing fire upon the perimeter. The duel between the forces on 219 continued until mid-morning of 26 November when Baker withdrew on regimental order.

But the early experience of Baker Company was not seen in its true significance, nor was the fact that other companies moving up toward the same line as Baker became engaged later in the day by dug in enemy groups expressing their force with varying degrees of determination. To rearward it was not appreciated that this sudden coalescing and hardening of resistance along one particular line signaled that the general tactical situation had become wholly transposed. It was not until around 2400 on the 25th that the division command sensed that affairs had taken a critical turn, though the artillery HQ had reached that conclusion by about 1800, still without presenting its conviction forcefully to the higher HQ.

By midnight there was no room for doubt that operations were in a wholly new cycle. The Division had become engaged all along the line. CPs and first-aid stations had been struck. Some artillery positions had been overrun. Some infantry companies had been cut off and their situation remained unknown.

From the holding of Baker Company onward, the enemy’s counter-movement proceeded with a rhythm which suggests mainly that the march was keyed to this event. CCF had a plan; it could have pivoted only upon the resistance offered by a somewhat narrow but unyielding screen manning the heights above our own MSR.

But because we were “on the offensive,” and the Baker Company fight was taken as an isolated incident unrelated to any major change in the posture of the enemy, infantry companies continued to deploy toward this same line during the afternoon.

Such was the overextension required by the width of the division sector that certain of these companies were as much as 2300 yards from their nearest friendly neighbor when the CCF attack closed down around them that night. Had the enemy in fact been well informed, and had he but possessed one-half the ferocity attributed to him by many of the press correspondents, nothing could have saved our forces from being destroyed in whole.

参谋与指挥部门的假定

在研究主力会战开始之前一段时间敌军发起进攻的预兆的基础上，也因为这些行动是以晴天霹雳、暴风骤雨的方式完成的，关于中共军队如何部署以及他们的反击配置怎样达成使我军如此失衡的效果，部队里的高级指挥官们立即推导出了某些假定。

因为通讯系统的崩溃、对指挥体系的直接打击、部队的分散以及迅速展开救援的需要，这场会战伴随着反常的混乱。因此，情报参谋和关于这次战斗的情报非常令人不满，以致这些猜测简直是盲人骑瞎马。不管怎样，在大战术方面，对中共军队的观察着重于以下这些提纲挈领的特点：（1）敌军的战前侦查体系简直是完美无缺；（2）敌军隐蔽在清川江两岸的工事内，美军11月25日晨的进攻触动了敌军防御地带的外壳，给敌军提供了警报。

推导出这些结论的理由也十分清楚。首先，在前些日子观察到的敌军的所有迹象显示，当两军遭遇时他会沿着高地挖工事。其次，在黑暗中，空军无法观察敌军配置，而且总部不得不根据与敌军交战中的几个步兵连得到的有限印象做整体判断，看来中共军队通过高地推进了它的整个正面。第三，中共军队差不多一开始行动，就打击了我军纵深像指挥所、战地救护站、炮兵阵地这样的敏感部位，他们显然蓄意地迂回了这些目标前面的某些步兵连。

得出下面这种完全不正确的结论也是很自然的：中共军队确切了解这些目标的位置，并在指定时间内径直向它们发起进攻，他们精心算计着来自背后出其不意的打击将使进攻中的整个第八集团军瓦解。

因此，一个非常敏感、好斗和反应敏捷的对手的粗略形象就勾绘出来了。但真的是这么一回事吗？那些致力于推测敌军的本性和图谋的人进行了这样的想象，本应立即引起注意和向这种想象提出挑战的是，在山岭并不集中连续的野外，一支沿着高地部署的军队，必然在一个宽正面、大纵深的地区展开。因此，这支军队在整体上动作迟缓，集结缓慢，不能对枪声做出迅速的反应和紧急进军。由于这些基本原因，研究中国人可能收到警报的时间与攻击发起时间的间隔就变得十分重要了。

STAFF AND COMMAND HYPOTHESIS

On the basis of the meager signs seen of the enemy in the days which preceded the main battle, and because of the manner in which the storming occurred in one great thunderclap of action, the higher commanders of the troops which were immediately engaged reached certain tentative conclusions as to how CCF had been disposed and how their counterdeployment had managed to achieve such crippling effects.

The battle had been attended by abnormal confusion, due to breakdown in communications, the direct strike against command structures, the scattering of units, and the subsequent need for quick extrication. It was therefore not unnatural that the G-2 and operational data on the fight proper was quantitatively so unsatisfactory that these surmises were made pretty much in the dark. Be that as it may, the view of CCF effectiveness in grand tactics emphasized the following characteristics, which were held in common by nearly all concerned : (1) The enemy system of reconnaissance prior to combat was little short of perfection itself. (2) The enemy army had been concealed within works on the high ground to either side of the Chongchon, and the American attack on the morning of 25 November had alerted the forward crust of this defensive belt.

The reasoning which led to these conclusions is also substantially clear. First, all that had been seen of the enemy in prior days had indicated that when met, he would be dug in along the high ground. Second, in the darkness, when it was impossible to view the deployment from the air, and the over-all pattern had to be judged from the limited view of what an HQ gets from a few of its rifle companies in the middle of engagement, it had seemed that CCF had moved forward their general front via the high ground. Third, almost at the outset of action, the enemy had struck deep against sensitive points such as CPs, aid stations, and artillery gun positions, while apparently, with full intent, by-passing some of the infantry companies forward of these installations.

It was a natural though wholly erroneous conclusion that CCF must have had exact knowledge of these locations and gone straight to them in the assigned hour, calculating that the blow to the rear would collapse the whole body of attack.

Thus the somewhat sketchy portrait of an unusually perceptive, aggressive, and swiftly reacting opponent.

But was it true to life? What should have immediately drawn the attention and challenged the imaginations of all who were interested in fathoming the nature and design of the enemy was that an Army ，disposed mainly along the high ground in a countryside where the ridges are not continuous or massive, is necessarily spread over a wide and deep area. It is therefore torpid as a whole, slow to assemble, and incapable of swift reaction and immediate march to the sound of fire. For this elementary reason, the study of time intervals between the possible Chinese alert and the onset of attack became all important.

连级研究中收集的资料

从步兵连的战后总结中收集的资料提供了研究和评估敌军战役企图的基础，情况逐渐清楚了：战场真相不仅与参谋和指挥部门的假定有差异，而且和它南辕北撤。

[研究人员]调查了13个步兵连。从幸存的目击者的口述中提取了它们的战斗经历。关于各连遭遇了哪些情况、这支部队作为整体获悉了敌军的哪些情报，他们讲述了相当完整的经历。在这13个连队中，有2个连曾被作为预备队，在中共军队进攻一个炮兵阵地时它们参加了战斗。

在整体上概括地讲，12场局部战斗中（各连的环形防御阵地相距甚远，因此它们的战斗具有孤立的性质），只有两场战斗里中共军队的行动路线和攻击发起方式显示它预先了解目标的位置并被特别派遣去占领该处。

在两个例外情况中，那些连队犯了（违反规定）在宿营的时候点火的错误，并且也没有采取任何防止敌军逼近时发现该连阵地的措施。在其他连队里，毋庸置疑，局部接触都是偶然和意外发生的。敌军是暗中摸索的。有充分的证据证明这一事实。在七个战例中，靠近友军侧翼的前哨向已通过的敌军纵队的末尾射“回马箭”引发了该连的全程战斗。在其他战例中，当敌军误打误撞，闯进我军的散兵坑防线时还保持着纵队队形。总之，在整个步兵防线上发生的战斗具有遭遇战的性质。

敌军对与它最接近的我军单元的移动如此缺乏了解，我军的后方支援单位与其距离更远而且稍后在战场上已进行必要的靠拢，有理由去相信敌军对这些后方支援单位的位置有更精确的认识吗？看来没有。

然而，上述结论有几处看上去与涉及局部防御战斗的资料相冲突。也许最具启发性的事件就是11月25时约18：00敌军对球场（在清川江东岸，所谓“中国帽子”岭正西）以北第61野战炮兵营阵地的进攻。11月25日晨，第61野战炮兵营和其他支援单位从球场向北往该阵地转移，以便给第23步兵团更好的支援，第23步兵团将超越第9步兵团，于11月26日发起进攻。因空间狭小，这些火炮直到当天中午才进入发射阵地。没有它们在第9步兵团前线试射的纪录。

第23步兵团，欠2、3营，在16：00接近了同一地域，并在该炮兵阵地左侧建立了一个改良的环形防御阵地，它基本沿清川江展开。该团处于支援位置，扎营多少有些不严格，但它在该处接受了一条以前的守卫者已挖好的散兵坑防线。

因此，在炮兵阵地建立与准备在它旁边扎起步兵营帐之间有一个短暂的间隔。

再次列出各事件发生的时间表：

10:00，第9团B连在北面开始与敌军交战。

14:30，第61野战炮兵营在狭小的发射阵地架设好了火炮。

16:00，第23步兵团在第61野战炮兵营旁边扎营。

18:00，第23步兵团和第61野战炮兵营遭受清川江对岸密集的步枪和自动武器火力的压制。

30—40分钟内，炮兵阵地被突破，幸存的炮兵向后方撤退。

敌军的突击部队涉水越过清川江，尽管气温接近零度，但敌军士兵们大部分双腿赤裸，用手提着鞋袜和裤子。

在接下来的一个半小时内，突破炮兵阵地的中共部队，以及在右翼径直闯入第23步兵团营地的中共部队，都已被第23团1营的两个连消灭或驱散了。

这是怎么发生的呢？

DATA FROM COMPANY STUDIES

As the data collected during the infantry company critiques began to provide the base on which to study and evaluate the operational design of the enemy, it soon became apparent that the facts of the battlefield were not only discrepant with but flatly contradictory of the off-hand assumptions of the staff and command.

Thirteen infantry companies were interviewed. Their battle experiences were drawn from the surviving witnesses; they told a reasonably complete story of what had happened to each company, and what the force as a whole had learned of the enemy. Included in the 13 were 2 which had been in reserve and had joined action during CCF attack upon an artillery position.

When the whole was recapitulated, it showed that out of 12 localized actions (the defensive perimeters were so far apart that each company action partook of the nature of an isolated fight) there were only two in which CCF moved in such a way, and fixed its assault in such a manner, as to indicate that it knew beforehand that the target was there and was set to blanket it.

In the case of the two exceptions, the companies had made the error (against orders) of lighting squad fires during bivouac, and there was nothing to prevent the enemy from seeing the position in outline during his approach.

In the other companies, engagement occurred in such way as to leave no room for doubt that the local contact was by accident and not design. The enemy was groping. There was abundant proof of that fact. In several instances, the full-length fight by the company was the consequence of an outpost along the friendly flank taking a Parthian shot at the tail-end of an enemy column which had already gone past. In other instances, the enemy force was still moving in column when it blundered into the defending foxhole line. In sum, when examined superficially, the whole battle along the rifle line partook of the nature of a chance-meeting engagement.

Was it within reason to believe that a force thus badly informed about the movements of the hostile combat elements closest to it would have almost precise knowledge of the locations of the rear support which was farther distant and had necessarily closed somewhat later on the ground where it was attacked? It did not so seem.

However, there were certain points in seeming conflict within the data covering the local defensive actions. Perhaps the most instructive incident is the enemy attack upon the position of the 61st FA Battalion to the north of Kujang-dong (on the east bank of the Chongchon and just west of the ridge called “Chinaman’s Hat”) at approximately 1800 hours on 25 November. The 61st FA Battalion and other supporting units had displaced northward from Kujang-dong to that position during the morning of 25 November in order to give better support to 23rd Infantry Regiment, which was to pass through the 9th Regiment, and attack on 26 November. The guns, seriously cramped for space, did not get in firing position until about mid-afternoon. It is not of record that they registered fires on the 9th Infantry front.

The 23rd Infantry, less its 2nd and 3rd Battalions, closed on this same ground at about 1600 and set up a modified perimeter defense to the left of the artillery position and in general extension of its line along the river. The camp was more or less relaxed, being in a support position, but the infantry took over a line of foxholes dug there by some previous occupant.

There was thus a relatively brief interval between the setting up of the artillery and the preparation of the infantry camp beside it.

To again show the chronology of events:

At 1000 Baker Company, 9th, had become engaged to the northward.

At 1430 the 61st Battalion set up in its cramped fire position.

At 1600 the 23rd Infantry made camp next the 61st.

At 1800 the 61st-23rd area was brought under intense rifle and automatic fire from the far bank of the Chongchon.

Within 30 to 40 minutes the gun positions had been overrun and the surviving artillerymen had taken off to the rear.

The enemy assault force had waded the river; the men, bare-legged for the most part, though the weather was near zero, had carried their footgear and trousers in their hands.

Within the next hour and one-half, the CCF which had overrun the artillery, as well as the Chinese on the right who had come directly into the 23rd’s camp, had been killed or dispersed in total by the action of two of the battalion’s companies.

How had it happened?

发起卷击

按照我军步兵的说法，多数越过清川江的敌军士兵并未装备轻武器，但携带了用来炸毁火炮的不同型号的特制炸药包。当敌军士兵发现自己闯入我军步兵的营帐，紧接着又遭到步兵反击时，他们大惑不解，而且也没有进行有效的抵抗。

中共军队以七路纵队越过清川江，最初投入的兵力约为共军第94团的两个营。我军抓获了数十名俘虏。他们讲自己曾被告知此次行动的目标是“破坏火炮”，但没料到会碰到步兵。他们并未被指派冲破炮兵阵地之后应去完成的第二任务。因为他们没有料到会与步兵交战，（据他们讲）只有一半突前人员携带了轻武器。这次讯问处处显示这些俘虏或派遣他们的人掌握了美军火炮架设在“中国帽子”高地附近的确切情报。然而，在回顾中，这可被视作关键性的疑点。第八集团军的前线到此时仍不知道整体形势已发生突变。如果这次表面上针对炮兵的局部推进实际上是中共军队的固有计划的一部分，那么对形势的评估就会有极大的不同。

然而，在这次战斗后十天，以肤浅的信息和此次行动自身的外观为基础，对“中国帽子”高地事件发生的原因，我军的参谋和指挥部门仍然坚持以下分析：（1）关键在于中共军队在高地上良好的观察（2）敌军发现火炮抵达（3）敌军未能发现步兵扎营（4）中共军队安排了一次带有明确目标——打击第61野炮营的特别行动（5）由于敌军的目标是局部性的，我军步兵的抵达对于（炮兵阵地）的防御者是一个幸运的转折。

炮兵战报总结道：“当第61野炮营抵达时敌人正好俯视着那条隘路，敌人通过出色的观察了解到何时应向该阵地进攻。”简言之，甚至在“中国帽子”高地上的步炮协同行动实施之后，情况看上去与主要的假定（敌人在局部探测我军当时构成的战线上的缺口和弱点之后，以一种“抓到什么就是什么”的方式发展进攻）并不矛盾。

我军认为中共军队向“中国帽子”高地的进攻只具有局部意义，而与中共军队当时已开始执行的整体计划没有联系，这种有些狭隘的见解可能是正确的。

但是由于缺乏任何明显的证据，其他可能也不应排除——敌军已经发起卷击，其总攻开始的时间选择正好与美军进入“中国帽子”地区的时间相符。

指向这个方向的证据中主要的一项是：中共军队进攻炮兵阵地的钟点与中共军队的机动打击部队向我第9、第38步兵团的前线发起总攻的时间是一致的。我军在清川江东西两岸的一般阵地在此前并没有受到来自正面的沉重压力。

当天，在第2步兵师和第25步兵师正面相距很远的三处，拒绝放弃山顶堑壕阵地的中国人进行了激烈的战斗，并以肉搏战来抵抗。但敌军从这些阵地后方向前席卷、沿最短路线淹没整个地区的第一波反击没有持续到18时和19时之间。

值得注意的是这些机动部队是刚抵达现场的生力军，他们绝不是那些沿山顶组成坚强的防御屏障的部队自身的预备队。

因此，关于“中国帽子”高地的战斗，疑点在于：这支突击部队的行动更像对当天黄昏敌军所取得进展的扩张，而不符合一项预定的全面反攻计划的特征。中共军队选择的主战场明显缺乏草场和其他平地。在另一方面看，在上述平坦地形出现的敌军人员出于巧合构成了对我军的欺骗。尽管中共军队的观察所没有发现任何东西，但带着特制炸药包被派去进攻炮兵阵地的营可能对这些火炮的位置就在 “中国帽子”高地附近充满信心。

（中共军队）联系到第八集团军的步兵已展开进攻，考虑到在步兵战线后面缺乏其他平坦的空地，（他推断出）美军支援炮兵便别无选择——不得不在清川江和“中国帽子”高地之间建立阵地。

此次战斗的整体表现显示敌人尽管在某些方面是二流对手，但他足够机敏，能认识到上述情况。

SET TO ROLL

By the account of our own infantry, the greater number of enemy soldiers who had crossed the Chongchon were not equipped with small arms, but were carrying special charges of varying types expressly to destroy the artillery pieces. When they found themselves in the infantry camp, and were in turn counterattacked by infantry, they became completely nonplused and offered no effective resistance.

The CCF had crossed the Chongchon in seven columns, total initially committed strength being about two battalions from the 94th CCF Regiment. Several score prisoners were taken. They said they had been told “to destroy artillery” at the objective, but hadn’t expected to find infantry. No secondary mission had been assigned them toward which to turn after overrunning the artillery. Because they had not expected to engage infantry (they said) only about half of them had carried small arms in the advance. The interrogations nowhere reveal that these prisoners or those who sent them forth had acted on the basis of positive intelligence that American guns were setting up near Chinaman’s Hat. Yet in retrospect this can be seen as the decisive question. The Eighth Army front was as yet unapprised that its general situation had radically changed. If the seemingly local advance against the artillery was in fact part of a “set piece,” that made a vital difference in the reckoning of situation.

However, ten days after the battle, on the basis of surface information and the look of the action itself, our staff and command still held to the following analysis of why things had happened as they did at Chinaman’s Hat : (1) CCF’s superior observation from the high ground was the key. (2) The enemy had seen the artillery arrive. (3) He had missed seeing the infantry make camp. (4) CCF had mounted a special expedition with the express object of hitting 61st FL4 Bn. (5) Since the enemy object was localized, the arrival of the infantry was just a lucky break for the defender.

Said the artillery operations report in summing up: “They were looking right down the throat of 61st FA Bn when it arrived and because of superior observation they knew how and when to advance on the position.” In brief, even after the minutiae of the infantry-artillery action at Chinaman’s Hat had been examined, it did not appear to conflict with the major assumption that the enemy had developed his onfall in a catch-as-catch-can manner after a local sensing of gaps and weaknesses in the battle line which we were then forming.

It is perhaps possible that this somewhat narrow view of the CCF attack on the position at Chinaman’s Hat, which gives it a purely local significance unrelated to a general plan of the enemy already then in execution, is the correct one.

But in the absence of any clear proof, the other possible alternative should not, be excluded - that the enemy force was already set to roll, and, its timing being part of a general movement, just happened to coincide with the arrival of the American force in the Chinaman’s Hat area.

One main item in proof points straight in this direction: The CCF attack against the artillery position coincided to the hour with the initiation of the general assault by the mobile hitting forces of CCF against the forward line manned by the ,9th and 38th Infantry Regiments. In the general position lying west and east of the Chongchon River, there had been felt no heavy forward pressure from the enemy until that time.

During the day, at three widely-separated points along the front of 2nd and 25th Divisions, there had been hard fighting by Chinese who refused to yield their dug-in positions on the hill crests and accepted hand-to-hand combat. But it was not until between the hours of 1800 and 1900 that the first main wave of the enemy’s counter-offensive rolled forward from behind these positions and proceeded by the shortest routes to inundate the whole area.

It is noteworthy that these maneuver bodies were fresh arrived on the scene and were not simply local reserves of the units forming the rigid defensive screen along the hilltops.

Therefore, as to the fight at Chinaman’s Hat, the question is whether the attacking force wasn’t committed in conformity with an already set, general counter-offensive plan, rather than being an improvization based upon the developments of the late afternoon. That it looked otherwise to the men on the ground could have been a deception arising from sheer coincidence. CCF had chosen a general battlefield notably short of any meadowland or other flat spaces. The battalions which had been sent forward with special charges to attack an artillery position at Chinaman’s Hat could have proceeded with full confidence that the guns would be there, even though their OPs hadn’t seen a thing.

In relation to the Eighth Army infantry attack which was already unfolding, and in view of the lack of any other flat spaces to the rear of the infantry line, there was no alternative for the supporting artillery-it had to take position between the River and Chinaman’s Hat.

The general appearance of the battle suggests that the enemy, though in some respects a second-rate opponent, was smart enough to realize that.