主题：【翻译】对朝鲜战争步兵战斗与武器使用的评注（1950冬—1951年)II -- 徐荣

十一月会战

从步兵那里了解到的真相

获得可靠情报除了能对制定建设性的公共政策产生积极影响以外，还能增强战斗行动中的效率。

步兵，在正常情况下作为战争中的主力，要与敌军的战斗部队做最持久的接触，可以把他比作获取战斗情报的机器的天线。

他最接近敌军，擅长收集各种敌情，并且准备好了应用这项资源使全军尽可能地获益。以上这些步兵的天职应该是不言自明的，完全系统化的，而且应通过在训练中投入更多注意力得到增强。

以下是第27步兵团G连对它在1950年11月清川江以西战斗所作叙述的摘录：

THE NOVEMBER BATTLE

FACTS FROM THE INFANTRY

Quite apart from the effect of sound information procurement upon the forming of constructive public policy is its influence toward increased efficiency in combat operations.

Infantry, being the body which under the normal situation in war maintains the most persistent contact with the fighting parts of the enemy, is the antenna of the mechanism of combat intelligence.

Being closest to the enemy, its receptiveness to all phenomena pertaining to the enemy, and its readiness to use this resource toward the fullest possible benefit to the total force, should be almost axiomatic, thoroughly systematized, and made acute through increased attention to the problem during training.

The following is an extract taken from the narrative of George Company, 27th Infantry Regiment, concerning its operation west of the Chongchon River in November 1950:

马文 P. 马丁上士——1排面对的山坡几乎完全被森林所覆盖，但在我们所在散兵坑的正前方高地有一段距离是无遮蔽的。

SFC MARVIN P. MARTIN - Facing 1st platoon, the slope was almost a forest, but directly in front of our pits, the rise was bare for a short distance.

约翰 F. 兰德中尉——我们都进入工事隐蔽。那里原来有些旧散兵坑，它们太小，美国兵很难钻进去。所以我们拓宽、加深了这些散兵坑。周围的泥土很新鲜。散兵坑的尺寸以及泥土的新鲜程度是告诉我们“敌人就在附近”的第一个警告。

LT JOHN F. LAND- We were well dug in. There were old holes up there. They were too small for a GI to fit in. So we widened and deepened them. The earth around was fairly fresh. The size of the holes and the freshness of the earth was the first tip-off that the enemy must be somewhere close around.

杰克 麦凯利上尉——我开始到处察看。随后，我就发现了树林中驮畜留下的粪便。我曾估计这些散兵坑是五天之前挖的，但这些粪便很新鲜；在当时滴水成冰的天气里，这些粪便还没有冻硬，所以我推断它们是刚刚拉出来的。

CAPT JACK MICHAELY - I began looking around. Then I found dung from pack animals down among the trees. I had estimated that the holes had been dug five days before.But the dung was fresher; the weather was freezing but the dung had not hardened. So I concluded they had pulled out quite recently.

马丁——在我们阵地前方，树林的紧右边，有一幢框架结构的建筑。它伪装良好，看上去像是个观察所。这个区域的某些地方已被凝固汽油弹烧焦。或许这就是敌人被赶走的原因，或者可能是多尔文特遣队迫使他们撤退了。

MARTIN - There was a frame building in front of our position and right next to the trees. It was well camouflaged and looked like an OP. Some of the area had been burned with napalm. Maybe that was what drove them or maybe TF Dolvin had made them retire.

约翰 w. 肯尼迪上士——我们在那幢建筑物里发现了一些葫芦。敌人曾用这些葫芦当碗。几颗米粒还粘在“碗”沿上。我用指头按了按，它们还很柔软。

SFC JOHN w. KENNEDY- We found gourds in that building. They had been using the gourds for eating bowls. There were small particles of rice still clinging to the sides of the bowls. Under the pressure of my fingers they were still pliable.

此次以及其他类似事件，暗示出美军士兵具有出色的但（目前只是）潜在的侦察才能，这种才能可通过在训练中进行某种强化得到发扬。它将在非正规作战中发挥巨大价值。

This incident, and others of the same sort, suggest that in the US soldier there is a marked but latent talent for scouting that could be developed through somewhat more emphasis in training. It would be of great value in irregular-type warfare.

除了在游击战中，我们在本世纪的其他军事行动并不是特别需要侦察才能。因此，在训练中它被给予较少的关注，因此我军将士不得不在很大程度上依靠自己的主动性去发挥搜集情报的本领。

甚至当连级部队已有些明白依靠这些原始的方法获得的情报的重要性时，他们也不大可能向上级报告这些情报。除非通过训练，他们牢记：“当敌军威胁到全军的利益时，无论入伍多久，哪怕是一个新兵都应该去了解关于敌军的出现、移动和习惯的情报”。

我军有一个由来已久的缺点：在战斗中，步兵侦察队所了解到的情报的最至关重要的部分从未反馈到营级。

在野战中，步兵应该是关于敌军战术、武器使用、战勤体系、习惯和一般本性的情报的最具创造性的来源。

陆军是否认识到了步兵这项任务的真正意义并准备好了去有效利用它？这确实是个问题。

我军情报参谋的工作程序是按这种目的设计的：榨干任何一个落入我军步兵手中的敌军士兵所知道的情报。他们几乎没有认识到：要了解敌军，从我军士兵在队伍中看到的、听到的和感觉到的情报中可能会收获更多。

我军在这个情报领域，并没有稳定的析取情报的方法。只有将情报综合，进行图上分析，然后推断出教训。因此就丧失了时间，本来能预测的事物也只能靠碰运气，很多机会也就被浪费了。

在第八集团军内对步兵所获取的情报进行分析最初存在阻碍，但这个阻碍为一个主要的有利因素所补偿。

这个阻碍就是：委员会里只有一名军官负责分析步兵战斗并在十一月会战中迅速地穿行于第八集团军和第十军共六个师的前线，而这项使命本应由至少六名受过专项训练的军官组成的参谋部来完成。有利因素就是第八集团军参谋部，特别是作战部副部长威廉 布洛克上校和情报部副部长兼战斗情报处长罗伯特 G. 弗格森上校无条件的支持。所有的下级军官都全心全意，甚至是狂热地配合工作。

除了更加强调军事行动的后勤方面以及详尽调查我军在战斗中体察到的与敌军有关的一切情报之外，这个工作程序和二战后陆军战史专家们的标准工作程序没什么明显的不同。

步兵连和炮兵连是讯问的主要对象。委员会还会见了负责制定行动计划、作出影响决策的评估的重要高级军官。

要对比步兵和炮兵队伍中发生的真实情况与二线人员对局势的感觉，除此之外别无他法。

首先，在从战斗连队那里了解到的情报的基础上，对中共军队的战术、部署方式、装备、武器使用、火力效能、侦查手段、信号、补给等方面有了确切的评估。这些情报很快由第八集团军司令向所部发布；它们的密级低，所以可以在排级传播，在这一级别可以产生最大利益。除了对中共军队的分析，报告中相当着重与敌军接触过的我军步兵的激烈战斗。因此，第八集团军参谋部认为有必要立即向部队下发这份报告，尽管依照分析家的观点，当时这项工作还远没有完结，这份报告只包含了对战斗中出现的症结所作的一定精度的取样，而不是对整个前线的全面调查。然而，第八集团军参谋部的判断被证明是完全正确的。在以后的军事行动中，更深入地进行分析后，没有使最初的发现的任何关键之处失效的新发现。“歪打正着”。

因为先前出版的备忘录《在朝鲜的步兵战斗注解》中已作了对小战术资料的评价，在这里就没有必要讨论它了。然而，从对第2步兵师的最初讯问中得到了原始状态的情报，它具有某些额外的价值，我们还没有就这次讯问提交完整的记录，因此应当（在下文）摘要复述它。

Except for bush-whacking expeditions, our other operations in this century have not particularly required it. Hence, it is given little training attention, and the men have to develop this intelligence faculty pretty much on their own initiative.

Even when troops at company level have some grasp of the importance of information which they have obtained by these primitive methods, they are not likely to communicate it to higher authority unless through training they are fully impressed with the fact that whatever new a private soldier may learn with respect to the presence, movements, or habits of the enemy becomes of value to the entire Army.

It is a chronic fault in our service that much of the most vital part of what is learned by the infantry screen during combat never gets back as far as battalion.

During field operations, infantry should be the most productive source of information pertaining to the enemy’s tactics, use of weapons, combat supply system, habits, and general nature.

It is a fair question whether the Army recognizes the true significance of this role and is established to make optimum use of it.

Our G-2 processes are designed to drain dry any enemy soldier who falls into infantry hands. They take little cognizance that perhaps more is to be learned of the enemy from what has been seen, heard, and felt by our own soldier in the line.

There is no steady winnowing of this field of information. There is adding it up, analyzing it across the board, and then deducing its lessons. So time is lost, matters which are calculable are left to chance, and many are wasted.

This infantry analysis within Eighth Army had one initial handicap, which, however, was offset by one factor of main advantage.

The handicap was that the Committee comprised one man; to analyze the operations of infantry accurately and expeditiously across the six-division front of the Eighth Army and X Corps in the November battle would have required a minimum staff of six officers already trained in the work. The advantage was the unqualified support given to the project by Eighth Army Staff, in particular, Co1 William Bullock, Asst G-3, and Co1 Robert G. Fergusson, Asst G-2, Chief of Combat Intelligence. All lower commands co-operated fully, and even enthusiastically.

The process was not markedly different from the SOP followed in World War II by the Army combat historians, except for increased emphasis on all logistical aspects of operations, and exhaustive search as to everything which could be learned of the enemy from what our troops had experienced during battle.

Infantry companies and artillery batteries were the main subjects of the interrogations. Higher commanders were interviewed to the extent necessary to develop the general frame of operations and the estimates which led to the taking of decisions.

There is no other way than this to contrast the reality of what occurs along the rifle and gun line with the sensings of situation in the rearward echelons.

In the beginning, on the basis of what was learned from the combat companies, certain estimates were arrived at as to the CCF’s tactics, manner of deployment, armament, use of weapons, fire effects, methods of reconnaissance, signals, supply, etc. These were immediately published to the Eighth Army by its commander; the classification was down-graded so that the information could be circulated at platoon level, where it would do the most good. In addition to its analysis of the CCF, the report had put considerable emphasis on the high action of our infantry forces which had engaged the enemy. It was therefore deemed advisable by Eighth Army Staff to rush the report to troops with the least waste of time, although, from the viewpoint of the analyst, the work at that time was far from complete and comprised only a reasonably accurate sampling from the crux of action rather than a comprehensive survey across the front. However, the Staff judgment of what action should be taken proved to be wholly correct. Nothing occurred in later operations, or further along in the analysis, to invalidate any material point in the initial findings. The “shot in the dark” proved to be fairly well on the target.

Because the evaluation of data as to minor tactics which was made in that early period has been published in the Memorandum, “Notes on Infantry Operations in Korea, “there is no need here to discuss it. There were, however, certain additional values of an intelligence nature deriving from the first interrogations of 2nd Infantry Division which have not been wholly committed to writing and which would therefore warrant recapitulation.

• 【整理】永不褪色的抗美援朝战争

B连

敌人怎样开进这个国家？他用什么方法隐蔽了如此众多的军队？他怎样完成突击部署？他成功地使我军的部分兵力落入圈套是因为我们太冒失还是因为他特别的聪明才智和精心谋划？这些神秘的谜一旦解开，我们就能够合理调整反击行动的形式。

对于战前形势只需简要叙述：11月25日前，第八集团军几乎未遇抵抗地向北推进，偶尔与敌军轻装部队接触。这些交火发生在远距离，敌军的散兵或小型巡逻队迅速地撤退、消失，似乎只顾逃命。这种冲突并无一定规律，没有迹象显示这些敌兵并非散兵游勇，或证明他们是执行指定任务（比如为大军执行侦察和斥候任务）的战术控制部队。大部分交火的距离都太远，不能确定那些步兵是北朝鲜人还是中共士兵。

在最初的接触中，这些游击部队通常在山脊的最高处挖工事，并且在后撤时沿高地撤退。同时，空军发回了许多发现并攻击敌军小部队的报告，这些小部队都在沿着高地挖工事。但是并未发现给人深刻印象的机动部队。空军报告：敌军控制区内通过德川的主要公路被迅速拓宽和轧平，似乎在准备繁忙的运输。除此之外，没有迹象显示第八集团军正在向敌军大部队移动。

尽管还有其他细节，上述这些便是到第八集团军发动进攻时为止出现的主要迹象，这次进攻被形容为结束战争的最后努力。此时，距中共军队在清川江西北地区首次伏击第八集团军纵队，过了约一个月。

11月25日上午10点，第9步兵团B连开始攀登219高地，这是清川江东岸的一个制高点。当该连走完到山顶三分之一的路时，敌军的5枚手榴弹砸向2排1班，炸伤了劳伦斯 史密斯上等兵的大腿和罗伯特 A. 基乔纳斯中尉的脚。尽管该连当时还不知道，这是清川江会战的第一次交火，也是中共军队在主要战线上进行机动、开展大规模反击的开端。

在这里，手榴弹在史密斯和基乔纳斯身边爆炸的那一刻，局势来了个180°的大转弯。前些日子，敌军部队只在远距离开火，然后脱离战斗。这支敌军却等候B连进至短距离内，此后也没有脱离战斗。从早到晚，敌军不断地在20～40码的距离以手榴弹和自动火力向B连射击，在夜幕降临的时候敌军依然占据着219高地，B连在较低的山包整顿队伍，敌军散兵不停地沿着这些山包向B连的环形防御阵地投射袭扰火力。在219阵地上的决斗一直持续到11月26日，当日B连接到团里下达的撤退命令。

但是，（第2步兵师的指挥官们）并没有认识到战役初期B连经验的真正意义。沿着与B连相同路线进军的其他几个连遭遇到掘壕固守的敌军部队的抵抗，这些敌军都展现出了不同程度的决心，（指挥官们）也没有认识到这一点。随后，他们也没有判断出：敌军沿一条特定的战线迅速集结并增强抵抗标志着整个战术形势已完全逆转。直到25日24时左右，师部才感到战事发生了危急的转变，尽管炮兵指挥部在18点左右已得出结论，但它还没有积极向上级反映自己对局势的判断。

到了午夜时分，毫无疑问，军事行动已进入一个全新的周期。该师的整个正面都开始与敌军交战。战地指挥所和一线补给站遭到了侵袭。某些炮兵阵地被突破。某些步兵连被切断，上级对它们境况还一无所知。

在B连前方进行坚守以后，敌军继续有节奏地开展反击，这大体上暗示敌军在根据事态发展调整其行军。中共军队有一项计划；这个计划只有通过这种抵抗才能奏效：在我军主补给线上的高地配置正面宽度窄但抵抗顽强的掩蔽部队。

但由于我军“处于攻势”，而且B连的战斗被作为孤立事件，未与敌军态势的主要改变联系起来考虑，各步兵连在当天下午继续沿同一条战线展开。

该师的作战地幅展开过宽，其中部分连队，当中共军队在夜间逼近他们时与最近的友军相距2300码之多。要是敌军真地了解这些情报，并且其勇猛程度有许多新闻记者所形容的一半的话，那么我军的这些部队将无可挽救地片甲不还。

BAKER COMPANY

The mystery of how the enemy had come into the country, by what means he had contrived to conceal himself in such large numbers, how he had managed his shock deployment, and whether the success of his entrapment of part of our force was the consequence of our consummate blundering or of his phenomenal cleverness and a carefully engineered design, was the riddle which, if once solved, would regulate the form of our own counter operations.

The situation requires only this brief summary: Prior to 25 November the Eighth Army had been advancing northward almost unopposed. There had been occasional brushes with light forces of the enemy, such firing as took place occurring at long range, with the enemy skirmishers or small patrols promptly fading back, as if concerned mainly with saving their own lives. There was no general pattern to this interference, no indication that these were not random fragments, or that they might be tactically controlled groups serving an assigned mission, such as reconnaissance or screening for a larger force. Most of these exchanges were at too great range to ascertain whether the riflemen were NK or CCF.

On initial contacts, these guerrilla-type groups were usually dug in along the ridge tops, and when they fell back, they withdrew along the high ground. The air, during this same period, made numerous reports of having sighted and engaged small enemy groups similarly dug in along the heights. But no impressive maneuver bodies were seen. There was nothing to indicate the Army might be moving toward an enemy mass, except several air reports that the main road running through Tokchon in enemy country had been suddenly widened and re-surfaced, as if in preparation for heavy traffic.

Though there are other details, these were the main indications up to the hour when Eighth Army launched its attack which had been described as the final effort which would end the war. Almost one month had passed since the first CCF ambushes were sprung against Eighth Army columns in the area northwest of the Chongchon.

At 1000 on 25 November, Baker Company, 9th Infantry Regiment, started the ascent of Hill 219, a commanding piece of ground just to the east of the Chongchon River. It got one-third way up the hill when five grenades showered down on its 1st squad, 2nd Platoon, wounding Sgt Lawrence Smith, Jr., in the thigh and Lt Robert A. Kjonaas in the foot. Although the Company did not then know it, this was the first fire in the battle of the Chongchon and the beginning of the CCF maneuver to counterattack in mass on one main line.

Locally, the situation took a 180” turn at the moment the grenade exploded near Smith and Kjonaas. In the preceding days the enemy groups had traded fire at long range and then faded back. This body waited until Baker came within a few yards and thereafter did not fade back. Continuing to engage Baker with grenades and automatic fire at 20-40 yards range throughout that morning and afternoon, it was still holding the height of 219 when darkness came, and along the lower knobs, where the Company had fixed itself, its skirmishers were putting a harassing fire upon the perimeter. The duel between the forces on 219 continued until mid-morning of 26 November when Baker withdrew on regimental order.

But the early experience of Baker Company was not seen in its true significance, nor was the fact that other companies moving up toward the same line as Baker became engaged later in the day by dug in enemy groups expressing their force with varying degrees of determination. To rearward it was not appreciated that this sudden coalescing and hardening of resistance along one particular line signaled that the general tactical situation had become wholly transposed. It was not until around 2400 on the 25th that the division command sensed that affairs had taken a critical turn, though the artillery HQ had reached that conclusion by about 1800, still without presenting its conviction forcefully to the higher HQ.

By midnight there was no room for doubt that operations were in a wholly new cycle. The Division had become engaged all along the line. CPs and first-aid stations had been struck. Some artillery positions had been overrun. Some infantry companies had been cut off and their situation remained unknown.

From the holding of Baker Company onward, the enemy’s counter-movement proceeded with a rhythm which suggests mainly that the march was keyed to this event. CCF had a plan; it could have pivoted only upon the resistance offered by a somewhat narrow but unyielding screen manning the heights above our own MSR.

But because we were “on the offensive,” and the Baker Company fight was taken as an isolated incident unrelated to any major change in the posture of the enemy, infantry companies continued to deploy toward this same line during the afternoon.

Such was the overextension required by the width of the division sector that certain of these companies were as much as 2300 yards from their nearest friendly neighbor when the CCF attack closed down around them that night. Had the enemy in fact been well informed, and had he but possessed one-half the ferocity attributed to him by many of the press correspondents, nothing could have saved our forces from being destroyed in whole.

参谋与指挥部门的假定

在研究主力会战开始之前一段时间敌军发起进攻的预兆的基础上，也因为这些行动是以晴天霹雳、暴风骤雨的方式完成的，关于中共军队如何部署以及他们的反击配置怎样达成使我军如此失衡的效果，部队里的高级指挥官们立即推导出了某些假定。

因为通讯系统的崩溃、对指挥体系的直接打击、部队的分散以及迅速展开救援的需要，这场会战伴随着反常的混乱。因此，情报参谋和关于这次战斗的情报非常令人不满，以致这些猜测简直是盲人骑瞎马。不管怎样，在大战术方面，对中共军队的观察着重于以下这些提纲挈领的特点：（1）敌军的战前侦查体系简直是完美无缺；（2）敌军隐蔽在清川江两岸的工事内，美军11月25日晨的进攻触动了敌军防御地带的外壳，给敌军提供了警报。

推导出这些结论的理由也十分清楚。首先，在前些日子观察到的敌军的所有迹象显示，当两军遭遇时他会沿着高地挖工事。其次，在黑暗中，空军无法观察敌军配置，而且总部不得不根据与敌军交战中的几个步兵连得到的有限印象做整体判断，看来中共军队通过高地推进了它的整个正面。第三，中共军队差不多一开始行动，就打击了我军纵深像指挥所、战地救护站、炮兵阵地这样的敏感部位，他们显然蓄意地迂回了这些目标前面的某些步兵连。

得出下面这种完全不正确的结论也是很自然的：中共军队确切了解这些目标的位置，并在指定时间内径直向它们发起进攻，他们精心算计着来自背后出其不意的打击将使进攻中的整个第八集团军瓦解。

因此，一个非常敏感、好斗和反应敏捷的对手的粗略形象就勾绘出来了。但真的是这么一回事吗？那些致力于推测敌军的本性和图谋的人进行了这样的想象，本应立即引起注意和向这种想象提出挑战的是，在山岭并不集中连续的野外，一支沿着高地部署的军队，必然在一个宽正面、大纵深的地区展开。因此，这支军队在整体上动作迟缓，集结缓慢，不能对枪声做出迅速的反应和紧急进军。由于这些基本原因，研究中国人可能收到警报的时间与攻击发起时间的间隔就变得十分重要了。

STAFF AND COMMAND HYPOTHESIS

On the basis of the meager signs seen of the enemy in the days which preceded the main battle, and because of the manner in which the storming occurred in one great thunderclap of action, the higher commanders of the troops which were immediately engaged reached certain tentative conclusions as to how CCF had been disposed and how their counterdeployment had managed to achieve such crippling effects.

The battle had been attended by abnormal confusion, due to breakdown in communications, the direct strike against command structures, the scattering of units, and the subsequent need for quick extrication. It was therefore not unnatural that the G-2 and operational data on the fight proper was quantitatively so unsatisfactory that these surmises were made pretty much in the dark. Be that as it may, the view of CCF effectiveness in grand tactics emphasized the following characteristics, which were held in common by nearly all concerned : (1) The enemy system of reconnaissance prior to combat was little short of perfection itself. (2) The enemy army had been concealed within works on the high ground to either side of the Chongchon, and the American attack on the morning of 25 November had alerted the forward crust of this defensive belt.

The reasoning which led to these conclusions is also substantially clear. First, all that had been seen of the enemy in prior days had indicated that when met, he would be dug in along the high ground. Second, in the darkness, when it was impossible to view the deployment from the air, and the over-all pattern had to be judged from the limited view of what an HQ gets from a few of its rifle companies in the middle of engagement, it had seemed that CCF had moved forward their general front via the high ground. Third, almost at the outset of action, the enemy had struck deep against sensitive points such as CPs, aid stations, and artillery gun positions, while apparently, with full intent, by-passing some of the infantry companies forward of these installations.

It was a natural though wholly erroneous conclusion that CCF must have had exact knowledge of these locations and gone straight to them in the assigned hour, calculating that the blow to the rear would collapse the whole body of attack.

Thus the somewhat sketchy portrait of an unusually perceptive, aggressive, and swiftly reacting opponent.

But was it true to life? What should have immediately drawn the attention and challenged the imaginations of all who were interested in fathoming the nature and design of the enemy was that an Army ，disposed mainly along the high ground in a countryside where the ridges are not continuous or massive, is necessarily spread over a wide and deep area. It is therefore torpid as a whole, slow to assemble, and incapable of swift reaction and immediate march to the sound of fire. For this elementary reason, the study of time intervals between the possible Chinese alert and the onset of attack became all important.

连级研究中收集的资料

从步兵连的战后总结中收集的资料提供了研究和评估敌军战役企图的基础，情况逐渐清楚了：战场真相不仅与参谋和指挥部门的假定有差异，而且和它南辕北撤。

[研究人员]调查了13个步兵连。从幸存的目击者的口述中提取了它们的战斗经历。关于各连遭遇了哪些情况、这支部队作为整体获悉了敌军的哪些情报，他们讲述了相当完整的经历。在这13个连队中，有2个连曾被作为预备队，在中共军队进攻一个炮兵阵地时它们参加了战斗。

在整体上概括地讲，12场局部战斗中（各连的环形防御阵地相距甚远，因此它们的战斗具有孤立的性质），只有两场战斗里中共军队的行动路线和攻击发起方式显示它预先了解目标的位置并被特别派遣去占领该处。

在两个例外情况中，那些连队犯了（违反规定）在宿营的时候点火的错误，并且也没有采取任何防止敌军逼近时发现该连阵地的措施。在其他连队里，毋庸置疑，局部接触都是偶然和意外发生的。敌军是暗中摸索的。有充分的证据证明这一事实。在七个战例中，靠近友军侧翼的前哨向已通过的敌军纵队的末尾射“回马箭”引发了该连的全程战斗。在其他战例中，当敌军误打误撞，闯进我军的散兵坑防线时还保持着纵队队形。总之，在整个步兵防线上发生的战斗具有遭遇战的性质。

敌军对与它最接近的我军单元的移动如此缺乏了解，我军的后方支援单位与其距离更远而且稍后在战场上已进行必要的靠拢，有理由去相信敌军对这些后方支援单位的位置有更精确的认识吗？看来没有。

然而，上述结论有几处看上去与涉及局部防御战斗的资料相冲突。也许最具启发性的事件就是11月25时约18：00敌军对球场（在清川江东岸，所谓“中国帽子”岭正西）以北第61野战炮兵营阵地的进攻。11月25日晨，第61野战炮兵营和其他支援单位从球场向北往该阵地转移，以便给第23步兵团更好的支援，第23步兵团将超越第9步兵团，于11月26日发起进攻。因空间狭小，这些火炮直到当天中午才进入发射阵地。没有它们在第9步兵团前线试射的纪录。

第23步兵团，欠2、3营，在16：00接近了同一地域，并在该炮兵阵地左侧建立了一个改良的环形防御阵地，它基本沿清川江展开。该团处于支援位置，扎营多少有些不严格，但它在该处接受了一条以前的守卫者已挖好的散兵坑防线。

因此，在炮兵阵地建立与准备在它旁边扎起步兵营帐之间有一个短暂的间隔。

再次列出各事件发生的时间表：

10:00，第9团B连在北面开始与敌军交战。

14:30，第61野战炮兵营在狭小的发射阵地架设好了火炮。

16:00，第23步兵团在第61野战炮兵营旁边扎营。

18:00，第23步兵团和第61野战炮兵营遭受清川江对岸密集的步枪和自动武器火力的压制。

30—40分钟内，炮兵阵地被突破，幸存的炮兵向后方撤退。

敌军的突击部队涉水越过清川江，尽管气温接近零度，但敌军士兵们大部分双腿赤裸，用手提着鞋袜和裤子。

在接下来的一个半小时内，突破炮兵阵地的中共部队，以及在右翼径直闯入第23步兵团营地的中共部队，都已被第23团1营的两个连消灭或驱散了。

这是怎么发生的呢？

DATA FROM COMPANY STUDIES

As the data collected during the infantry company critiques began to provide the base on which to study and evaluate the operational design of the enemy, it soon became apparent that the facts of the battlefield were not only discrepant with but flatly contradictory of the off-hand assumptions of the staff and command.

Thirteen infantry companies were interviewed. Their battle experiences were drawn from the surviving witnesses; they told a reasonably complete story of what had happened to each company, and what the force as a whole had learned of the enemy. Included in the 13 were 2 which had been in reserve and had joined action during CCF attack upon an artillery position.

When the whole was recapitulated, it showed that out of 12 localized actions (the defensive perimeters were so far apart that each company action partook of the nature of an isolated fight) there were only two in which CCF moved in such a way, and fixed its assault in such a manner, as to indicate that it knew beforehand that the target was there and was set to blanket it.

In the case of the two exceptions, the companies had made the error (against orders) of lighting squad fires during bivouac, and there was nothing to prevent the enemy from seeing the position in outline during his approach.

In the other companies, engagement occurred in such way as to leave no room for doubt that the local contact was by accident and not design. The enemy was groping. There was abundant proof of that fact. In several instances, the full-length fight by the company was the consequence of an outpost along the friendly flank taking a Parthian shot at the tail-end of an enemy column which had already gone past. In other instances, the enemy force was still moving in column when it blundered into the defending foxhole line. In sum, when examined superficially, the whole battle along the rifle line partook of the nature of a chance-meeting engagement.

Was it within reason to believe that a force thus badly informed about the movements of the hostile combat elements closest to it would have almost precise knowledge of the locations of the rear support which was farther distant and had necessarily closed somewhat later on the ground where it was attacked? It did not so seem.

However, there were certain points in seeming conflict within the data covering the local defensive actions. Perhaps the most instructive incident is the enemy attack upon the position of the 61st FA Battalion to the north of Kujang-dong (on the east bank of the Chongchon and just west of the ridge called “Chinaman’s Hat”) at approximately 1800 hours on 25 November. The 61st FA Battalion and other supporting units had displaced northward from Kujang-dong to that position during the morning of 25 November in order to give better support to 23rd Infantry Regiment, which was to pass through the 9th Regiment, and attack on 26 November. The guns, seriously cramped for space, did not get in firing position until about mid-afternoon. It is not of record that they registered fires on the 9th Infantry front.

The 23rd Infantry, less its 2nd and 3rd Battalions, closed on this same ground at about 1600 and set up a modified perimeter defense to the left of the artillery position and in general extension of its line along the river. The camp was more or less relaxed, being in a support position, but the infantry took over a line of foxholes dug there by some previous occupant.

There was thus a relatively brief interval between the setting up of the artillery and the preparation of the infantry camp beside it.

To again show the chronology of events:

At 1000 Baker Company, 9th, had become engaged to the northward.

At 1430 the 61st Battalion set up in its cramped fire position.

At 1600 the 23rd Infantry made camp next the 61st.

At 1800 the 61st-23rd area was brought under intense rifle and automatic fire from the far bank of the Chongchon.

Within 30 to 40 minutes the gun positions had been overrun and the surviving artillerymen had taken off to the rear.

The enemy assault force had waded the river; the men, bare-legged for the most part, though the weather was near zero, had carried their footgear and trousers in their hands.

Within the next hour and one-half, the CCF which had overrun the artillery, as well as the Chinese on the right who had come directly into the 23rd’s camp, had been killed or dispersed in total by the action of two of the battalion’s companies.

How had it happened?

发起卷击

按照我军步兵的说法，多数越过清川江的敌军士兵并未装备轻武器，但携带了用来炸毁火炮的不同型号的特制炸药包。当敌军士兵发现自己闯入我军步兵的营帐，紧接着又遭到步兵反击时，他们大惑不解，而且也没有进行有效的抵抗。

中共军队以七路纵队越过清川江，最初投入的兵力约为共军第94团的两个营。我军抓获了数十名俘虏。他们讲自己曾被告知此次行动的目标是“破坏火炮”，但没料到会碰到步兵。他们并未被指派冲破炮兵阵地之后应去完成的第二任务。因为他们没有料到会与步兵交战，（据他们讲）只有一半突前人员携带了轻武器。这次讯问处处显示这些俘虏或派遣他们的人掌握了美军火炮架设在“中国帽子”高地附近的确切情报。然而，在回顾中，这可被视作关键性的疑点。第八集团军的前线到此时仍不知道整体形势已发生突变。如果这次表面上针对炮兵的局部推进实际上是中共军队的固有计划的一部分，那么对形势的评估就会有极大的不同。

然而，在这次战斗后十天，以肤浅的信息和此次行动自身的外观为基础，对“中国帽子”高地事件发生的原因，我军的参谋和指挥部门仍然坚持以下分析：（1）关键在于中共军队在高地上良好的观察（2）敌军发现火炮抵达（3）敌军未能发现步兵扎营（4）中共军队安排了一次带有明确目标——打击第61野炮营的特别行动（5）由于敌军的目标是局部性的，我军步兵的抵达对于（炮兵阵地）的防御者是一个幸运的转折。

炮兵战报总结道：“当第61野炮营抵达时敌人正好俯视着那条隘路，敌人通过出色的观察了解到何时应向该阵地进攻。”简言之，甚至在“中国帽子”高地上的步炮协同行动实施之后，情况看上去与主要的假定（敌人在局部探测我军当时构成的战线上的缺口和弱点之后，以一种“抓到什么就是什么”的方式发展进攻）并不矛盾。

我军认为中共军队向“中国帽子”高地的进攻只具有局部意义，而与中共军队当时已开始执行的整体计划没有联系，这种有些狭隘的见解可能是正确的。

但是由于缺乏任何明显的证据，其他可能也不应排除——敌军已经发起卷击，其总攻开始的时间选择正好与美军进入“中国帽子”地区的时间相符。

指向这个方向的证据中主要的一项是：中共军队进攻炮兵阵地的钟点与中共军队的机动打击部队向我第9、第38步兵团的前线发起总攻的时间是一致的。我军在清川江东西两岸的一般阵地在此前并没有受到来自正面的沉重压力。

当天，在第2步兵师和第25步兵师正面相距很远的三处，拒绝放弃山顶堑壕阵地的中国人进行了激烈的战斗，并以肉搏战来抵抗。但敌军从这些阵地后方向前席卷、沿最短路线淹没整个地区的第一波反击没有持续到18时和19时之间。

值得注意的是这些机动部队是刚抵达现场的生力军，他们绝不是那些沿山顶组成坚强的防御屏障的部队自身的预备队。

因此，关于“中国帽子”高地的战斗，疑点在于：这支突击部队的行动更像对当天黄昏敌军所取得进展的扩张，而不符合一项预定的全面反攻计划的特征。中共军队选择的主战场明显缺乏草场和其他平地。在另一方面看，在上述平坦地形出现的敌军人员出于巧合构成了对我军的欺骗。尽管中共军队的观察所没有发现任何东西，但带着特制炸药包被派去进攻炮兵阵地的营可能对这些火炮的位置就在 “中国帽子”高地附近充满信心。

（中共军队）联系到第八集团军的步兵已展开进攻，考虑到在步兵战线后面缺乏其他平坦的空地，（他推断出）美军支援炮兵便别无选择——不得不在清川江和“中国帽子”高地之间建立阵地。

此次战斗的整体表现显示敌人尽管在某些方面是二流对手，但他足够机敏，能认识到上述情况。

SET TO ROLL

By the account of our own infantry, the greater number of enemy soldiers who had crossed the Chongchon were not equipped with small arms, but were carrying special charges of varying types expressly to destroy the artillery pieces. When they found themselves in the infantry camp, and were in turn counterattacked by infantry, they became completely nonplused and offered no effective resistance.

The CCF had crossed the Chongchon in seven columns, total initially committed strength being about two battalions from the 94th CCF Regiment. Several score prisoners were taken. They said they had been told “to destroy artillery” at the objective, but hadn’t expected to find infantry. No secondary mission had been assigned them toward which to turn after overrunning the artillery. Because they had not expected to engage infantry (they said) only about half of them had carried small arms in the advance. The interrogations nowhere reveal that these prisoners or those who sent them forth had acted on the basis of positive intelligence that American guns were setting up near Chinaman’s Hat. Yet in retrospect this can be seen as the decisive question. The Eighth Army front was as yet unapprised that its general situation had radically changed. If the seemingly local advance against the artillery was in fact part of a “set piece,” that made a vital difference in the reckoning of situation.

However, ten days after the battle, on the basis of surface information and the look of the action itself, our staff and command still held to the following analysis of why things had happened as they did at Chinaman’s Hat : (1) CCF’s superior observation from the high ground was the key. (2) The enemy had seen the artillery arrive. (3) He had missed seeing the infantry make camp. (4) CCF had mounted a special expedition with the express object of hitting 61st FL4 Bn. (5) Since the enemy object was localized, the arrival of the infantry was just a lucky break for the defender.

Said the artillery operations report in summing up: “They were looking right down the throat of 61st FA Bn when it arrived and because of superior observation they knew how and when to advance on the position.” In brief, even after the minutiae of the infantry-artillery action at Chinaman’s Hat had been examined, it did not appear to conflict with the major assumption that the enemy had developed his onfall in a catch-as-catch-can manner after a local sensing of gaps and weaknesses in the battle line which we were then forming.

It is perhaps possible that this somewhat narrow view of the CCF attack on the position at Chinaman’s Hat, which gives it a purely local significance unrelated to a general plan of the enemy already then in execution, is the correct one.

But in the absence of any clear proof, the other possible alternative should not, be excluded - that the enemy force was already set to roll, and, its timing being part of a general movement, just happened to coincide with the arrival of the American force in the Chinaman’s Hat area.

One main item in proof points straight in this direction: The CCF attack against the artillery position coincided to the hour with the initiation of the general assault by the mobile hitting forces of CCF against the forward line manned by the ,9th and 38th Infantry Regiments. In the general position lying west and east of the Chongchon River, there had been felt no heavy forward pressure from the enemy until that time.

During the day, at three widely-separated points along the front of 2nd and 25th Divisions, there had been hard fighting by Chinese who refused to yield their dug-in positions on the hill crests and accepted hand-to-hand combat. But it was not until between the hours of 1800 and 1900 that the first main wave of the enemy’s counter-offensive rolled forward from behind these positions and proceeded by the shortest routes to inundate the whole area.

It is noteworthy that these maneuver bodies were fresh arrived on the scene and were not simply local reserves of the units forming the rigid defensive screen along the hilltops.

Therefore, as to the fight at Chinaman’s Hat, the question is whether the attacking force wasn’t committed in conformity with an already set, general counter-offensive plan, rather than being an improvization based upon the developments of the late afternoon. That it looked otherwise to the men on the ground could have been a deception arising from sheer coincidence. CCF had chosen a general battlefield notably short of any meadowland or other flat spaces. The battalions which had been sent forward with special charges to attack an artillery position at Chinaman’s Hat could have proceeded with full confidence that the guns would be there, even though their OPs hadn’t seen a thing.

In relation to the Eighth Army infantry attack which was already unfolding, and in view of the lack of any other flat spaces to the rear of the infantry line, there was no alternative for the supporting artillery-it had to take position between the River and Chinaman’s Hat.

The general appearance of the battle suggests that the enemy, though in some respects a second-rate opponent, was smart enough to realize that.

敌军进攻的特点

根据我军步兵连的战斗经验的描述，中共军队的进攻在运转中有这些共同点，所有这些特点当相互联系起来分析时显得特别重要：（1）中共军队总是从北面沿倾斜方向接近美军的环形阵地；（2） 我军发现中国人在接敌行动中行军方向与河床、公路或小径平行；（3）他们以密集纵队接敌；（4）在许多情况下，虽然这些纵队保持快步行进，但看上去仍十分有活力；（5）每个敌军士兵都是自给自足的个体，携带自身的给养；（6）敌军通过低地实施战术退却；（7）在整条战线上，他们的几次总攻都发生一个相当短的时间段内。

当中共军队向横跨清川江两岸的第八集团军进攻时，敌军看上去是沿从西北到东南的轴线运动的。在局部攻势中，由于地势走向和初战有时以意外方式爆发，他们在战术上可能背离这一方向， 但这种背离出现的次数极少。在第八集团军作战地幅的最右端，南朝鲜第二军崩溃之后，（中共军队）从北、东北和东面向我第38步兵团施加压力。但当主力会战开始后，敌军也是按照规定好的路线行军的。

参照地图（图块“德川 6433-IV”），清川江谷地从东北向西南割裂该地区，直达黄海。在紧靠球场北面的村庄——第2步兵师的炮兵基地——西侧的支流向东南方汇入清川江。但在清川江东岸，支流和谷地向西北方汇入干流。

敌军在清川江西侧支流河谷并在第八集团军西北方的任何集结、增援和脱离（如11月25日的情况），是沿流向清川江的水流方向的，并且敌军在横越该河时，将继续沿着最有利于徒步行军的方向前进，通常沿东南走向的轴线，这样他们一开始就将同时打击第2步兵师的步兵和炮兵阵地。

至此，讨论到的这些战术现象清楚地揭示了中共军队是如何发动及发展进攻的。关于中共军队迂回第2步兵师右翼之前粉碎该师正面的首次突击，不存在相抵触的资料。在当天同一小时，中共军队对第25步兵师位于上九洞以北的正面发动的攻击从相反方向施加压力的，这是他们发动协同攻击的又一项情报。上九洞差不多在球场正西，位于清川江的一条主要支流——九龙江附近。隐蔽在这两条河谷中的中共军队向同一条分水岭的两侧发动了方向完全相反的卷击。

下图是概略图而不是地理意义上的地图，绘出它的目的也仅在于粗略地揭示中共军队酝酿其攻势时最可能采用的手段：

第八集团军正面几个地段上的战术发展同时发生，在回顾中考虑到这一点特别给人以启发。11月25日10时，位于第2步兵师最前线的第9步兵团B连遭遇到了坚定顽强、寸步不让的中共掩蔽部队。在同一小时内，第25步兵师的前锋游骑兵连进攻清川江西岸的8号目标时也有同样的经历。游骑兵连到黄昏仍未夺取该高地，最后我军不得不以密集炮火轰击敌军的堑壕阵地，才击破他们的固守。此外，敌军机动打击部队突破第25步兵师正面的进攻发生在当天18时，与此同时，敌军也攻击了第2步兵师。

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ENEMY ATTACK

From the descriptions of the combat experience of the infantry companies there were drawn these other common denominators of CCF movement in the attack, all highly significant when related one to the other: (1) CCF almost invariably approached at an oblique to the northward-facing American perimeters; (2) when seen in movement during the approach, the Chinese were following stream beds, or roads or paths parallel to them; (3) they made the approach in solid columns; (4) these columns, though in instances proceeding at double time, appeared fairly fresh; (5) each was a self-sufficient unit, carrying its own supply; (6) when in tactical retrograde, they withdrew via the low ground; and (7) along the whole front, their several general offensive movements all occurred within a relatively limited time bracket.

In the CCF attack against Eighth Army astride the Chongchon, the enemy appeared to be moving generally on an axis running from NW to SE. In the local attack, there would be tactical deviations from this, according to the fall of the ground and the accidental manner in which initial engagement sometimes took place, though these deviations were relatively few in number. On the far right of the sector, after the collapse of II ROK Corps, attack against the 38th Infantry was pressed from the North, Northeast, and East. But when the main battle opened, the line of march was as stated.

Referring to the map (map sheet Tokchon 6433-IV), it will be seen that the Chongchon River trench cuts through this area running from Northeast to Southwest all the way to the Yellow Sea. In the country immediately to the North of Kujangdong -2nd Div’s Arty base - the Chongchon’s feeder valleys to the westward run Southeast toward the river. But along the east bank, the feeder valleys and streams run Northwest to their confluence with the main river.

Thus if any enemy concentration, built up and hidden away in the feeder valleys west of the stream and to the Northwest of the Eighth Army’s northward-facing front as on 25 November, was to proceed via the line of water flow toward the Chongchon and, on crossing the river, was to continue its advance along the avenues most favorable for quick movement by foot, it would proceed always on a Southeast-running axis, and so doing would come in against both the infantry and artillery positions of 2nd Infantry Division initially at a Northwest to Southeast oblique.

The tactical phenomena heretofore discussed suggested clearly that this was how CCF had mounted its attack and then proceeded to execute it. As to the opening blow which crushed the front of 2nd Division prior to the turning movement against its right flank, there are no discrepant data. That the attack against the 25th Division front North of Ipsok, on the same day at the same hour, was pressed from the opposite direction is one more item in corroboration. Ipsok is almost due west of Kujang-dong, near the Kuryong-gang - a main tributary of the Chongchon. The CCF, from their hidings in the feeder valleys of the two streams, were simply rolling down the opposite side of the same watershed.

The following chart is diagrammatic rather than geographical and its purpose is only to give a rough indication of the manner in which the CCF offensive is most likely to have matured:

The coincidence of tactical developments along the several parts of Eighth Army’s front becomes especially instructive when considered in retrospect. It was at 1000 on 25 November that Baker of the 9th Infantry, in the forefront of 2nd Division, encountered the tough, unyielding screen of Chinese which fought for its last yard of ground. At exactly the same hour, the Ranger Company, at the forefront of 25th Division, was having an identical experience in its attack on objective No. 8 west of the Chongchon. The Rangers did not take the hill until just before dark, and finally the Chinese hold had to be broken by an intense artillery shelling against the enemy’s dug in positions. Again, the attack of the mobile hitting forces of the enemy broke against 25th Division’s front at 1800 hours on that same day, just as it did against 2nd Division.

完全从研究步兵连战斗经验而得出的这些资料和一般性现象，（使得研究人员）做出了下列试验性的推论，并将其呈递，供高层司令部考虑：

研究人员）做出了下列试验性的推论并将其呈递，供高层司令部考虑：

（1）中共军队的主要作战兵力并未配置在高地，而是组成了一个机动集群，这个集群在夜间沿主要公路推进，隐蔽在主攻击线两侧的支流河谷中，并在那里准备应对我军向干流河谷的进攻（或前进）。

（2）这个集群可能由许多散布在相当广大地区的小型机动部队组成，但在任何情况下单个部队都保持紧密集中，准备就绪，可迅速运动。

（3）他们未被我军的空中侦察发现，由此显示他们系统地运用了某种形式的表面掩护。

（4）因为缺少茂密的林区，北朝鲜的村庄看来是唯一适合达成此目的的掩护。

（5）中共军队的纪律或许要求所有的机动打击部队在分段进军期间白天都要保持隐蔽。

（6）（中共军队）很可能也以同样的方式利用了矿坑、洞穴等地形。

（7）中共军队实施了与其机动集群具有战术联系的掩蔽防御，这些掩蔽部队在干流两岸的高地或其他通道上驻守。

（8）因此，中共军队沿特定战线的抵抗突然增强意味着：进攻者进入了危险的时刻和区域，面临着向心攻击的威胁。

（9）中共军队的这道防御屏障既是发起进攻的“击发装置”又是迟滞部队，为它的主力提供了出发和推进所需的时间间隔。

（10）我军未发现任何证据支持以下假定：中共军队的机动反击部队在集结起来准备进攻之前，是部署在山顶的守军的一部分。

（11）对时间间隔的研究显然排除了上述假定成立的任何可能。

（12）因此，比起散布在山顶和岭脊的工事，更应当到低地去寻找敌军主力。尽管失败会削弱中共军队攻势的机动性和信心，但敌军是会逐渐恢复过来的。

（13）这项关于敌军可能采取的总体部署的展望暗示了我军空中行动应采取的方式。

（14）在我军侧翼实施远距离巡逻行动的必要性一目了然。

（15）关于中共军队是否集中在村庄地区，（指挥官）应慎重对待空军提交的否定的报告，空军的报告只有通过战术检验才能作为最终结论加以采纳。

From these data and general indications, arrived at exclusively from the study of infantry company experience, the following tentative deductions were made and forwarded for the consideration of higher command:

(1) CCF’s main battle strength was not being disposed to the high ground but was composed of a maneuver mass, which, being brought forward by night along the main roads, was at the appropriate point marched by the flank, concealed in the feeder valleys off the MSR and there held in readiness for our attack (or advance) up the main river valley.

(2) This mass was probably composed of numerous small maneuver groups distributed over a fairly wide area, but in any case the individual groups remained closely concentrated and ready for prompt movement.

(3) They had not been detected by our air reconnaissance; therefore the systematic employment of some form of surface cover was indicated.

(4) In the absence of any thickly forested area, NK villages seemed to be the only cover suitable to this purpose.

(5) CCF discipline probably required that all such mobile hitting forces remain under cover throughout daylight during the staging period.

(6) Mine shafts, caves, etc., were likely to be employed in the same manner.

(7) CCF employed a screen defense put forth in practical tactical relationship to this maneuver mass and established on the high ground on both sides of the main river valley - or other approach avenue.

(8) Any sudden hardening of CCF resistance along one definite line was therefore a signal that the attacker was in the danger hour and area, under threat from concentrations drawn up off his flanks.

(9) The defensive screen was in effect both a trigger mechanism and a delaying force, providing the main body with the interval needed to mount up and get forward:

(10) No warrant was to be found for any assumption that CCF counter-hitting mobility derived from garrisons which had been disposed along the ridge tops prior to assembly for the attack.

(11) The study of time intervals appeared to exclude any such possibility.

(12) The main body of the enemy army was therefore to be sought on low ground, rather than in works scattered among the hilltops and ridge crests, though as defeat began to reduce CCF offensive mobility and confidence, the pendulum would swing gradually in the other direction.

(13) This outlook as to the probable general dispositions of the enemy suggested the pattern which should be taken by our air operations.

(14) The need for wider-ranging patrol actions toward the flanks was plainly indicated.

(15) Negative air reports concerning CCF concentrations in village areas should be treated with a considerable reserve, and should be accepted as conclusive only when confirmed by tactical proof.

这个“案例”的论据最初是由军事行动研究中心主任埃利斯 约翰逊博士口头提出，他随后又将它简化成著述。后来，对陆战1师在长津湖附近与中共军队的历次战斗的研究以更完整的细节证实了该理论。因为长津湖会战是一个漫长的事件，（研究人员）有充足的机会去观察中共军队各机动部队之间的关系，中共军队沿高地构筑的工事形成了一道防御屏障，中共机动部队驻守在这道屏障附近的村庄内。我们的北朝鲜间谍前来报告中共士兵楔入了村舍内，好像鱼进了罐头。尽管如此，空军侦查了这些位置，报告“未发现目标”。最终，由于地面部队指挥官们确信：关于村子的情形这些北朝鲜当地人肯定讲了实话，他们命令实施针对这些村庄的轰炸。当炸弹开始落下，村子像花盆一样被掀开，到处暴露出敌军士兵。中共士兵如此顽强地坚持村庄掩护，以至于飞行员观察到：甚至在执行轰炸任务的飞机返航之前，幸存的敌军士兵就返回了被炸坏的临时营房。

最后，再次强调：这些主张属于对地面战斗中的敌军的更进一步的判读，它们完全是在步兵排级单位收集和核对的情报基础上加工成形的。

而且，它们逐渐演变为事后的反思和对一项分析步兵线上直接交火的战斗中敌我效能的研究的副产品。从我方情报来源了解到的处于原始状态的情报与从中共军队战俘那里得到的战场情报并不完全吻合。这项工作无人可用，而且(指挥官们)还没有完全预见到该项工作的重要性。因此，审问工作并未侧重于这项特定目标，而且我方很多可能的丰富情报来源（例如，在德川以南被击败的南朝鲜部队）还未被发掘。

因此，（研究人员）认为该项工作呈现出的情况是不完整和令人不满的。尽管连队的资料都具有相同的指示性，但关于敌军如何集结的真实情况，它们还不是最终结论，还有很多问题没有得到解答。

The argument for this “case” was first presented orally and was then reduced to writing by Dr. Ellis Johnson, Director of ORO. Subsequently, the study of operations by the 1st Marine Division against CCF in the vicinity of the Chosen Reservoir substantiated the theory in rather complete detail. Because the battle there was a prolonged affair, there was ample opportunity to observe the relationship of the maneuver groups which holed-up in the nearby villages to the defensive screen dug in along the high ground. NK agents (friendly to us) came forward and reported that CCF troops were wedged into the village huts like fish in a can. Still, the air, reconnoitering these locations, reported “negative.” Finally, air bombing operations were ordered against the villages because the ground commanders became convinced that the Korean natives must be telling the truth about the situation. When the bombs began to drop, the villages opened up like flower pots, spilling enemy troops in all directions. CCF’s hold on village cover was so tenacious that pilots observed surviving enemy soldiers returning to the bomb-shattered hutments even before the planes used in the strike had withdrawn from the vicinity.

In conclusion, it is reemphasized only that these propositions, appertaining to the larger design of the enemy in ground operations, were formed exclusively on the basis of information collected and reconciled at the level of the infantry rifle platoon.

Furthermore, they evolved only as an afterthought and as the minor by-product of a search which was pointed directly at the analysis of enemy and friendly effects in the direct-fire engagement along the rifle line. What was learned from our own sources was, in the nature of the case, imperfectly integrated with the battlefield information gained from CCF POWs. There was no personnel available for the work and, furthermore, the importance of the object had not been adequately foreseen. Hence interrogations were not slanted to the serving of this specific end, and many perhaps fertile sources of information on our side (for example, the ROK units which had been beaten south of Tokchon) were not explored.

The exposition of the subject is therefore considered incomplete and unsatisfactory. Though the company data all point in one direction, in so far as the nature of the enemy buildup is concerned, they are not conclusive, and many questions remain unanswered.

战术协同

对连队的采访也揭示出第八集团军某些步兵部队采取的主要安全措施中存在一项由来已久的弱点——没有对前线和第一线编队侧后实施协调、有力的巡逻。前哨不切实用，徒有虚名。部队所谓的“前哨阵地”在主要散兵坑防线前仅15到20英尺也不经常设置。在行军中，距先导步兵排如此之近的尖兵并不会使主力更安全。

这些显而易见的缺点在该战区的记录汇编中引起了司令部的关注。营级部队同样地缺乏机动也是我军防御战术中被指出的一项固有弱点，步兵连之间的间隙（经常是没有有效联络的无人区）经常出现以致各连实际在战斗中不能相互支援，这只能意味着分离的部队将被各个击破。

一个固守在棱线上的营，如果所有武器对地面战斗的准备均已就绪，它就很有可能抵挡敌军一个师三天以上。同样的一支部队如果分割成连级单位，配置在不能阻止敌军进入其间低地的分离的高地上，那么很难指望它扛过一个晚上。

朝鲜战争的整个进程强调了战术协同和完整的通信联络的决定性作用，二者共同组成了行动自由的必要条件。但是和其他时期的其他军队一样，第八集团军只能通过自己艰苦的经历掌握这门课程。

一般情况下伸展过度是较常出现的情形，在这种情形下如何最佳配置各战术单位？这个主要问题的复杂性可能要求所有相关人员更认真回顾，更认真地回顾比以朝鲜战争的经验重新评估任何参谋作业更为必要。这个问题的本质涉及到各级别、各院校和各兵种。从以下陈述可以看出，许多在朝战中指挥有方的军官也还是不清楚真正的答案，他们也不确定战术研究是否作到了理论联系实际。

一位团长这样说：“我在朝鲜参加的每次行动中始终迷惑不解，问题在于以一个完整的团或三个分立的营防御指定地段，哪种部署效果更好。我知道别的团长规定他们手下的营应防守较小的营级环形阵地，从而在该团的防御地段的正面留下了宽广的缝隙。我们的策略正相反，始终保持翼侧间紧密联系，通常需要在主防线上配置两个营的6个步兵连，作为预备队的那个营在后方支援。通过这种手段，我们能够阻止敌军的夜间渗透，我们很少在后方不必要地东奔西跑或麻烦我们的支援炮兵营。我很不愿意以部署小型营级环形阵地的方法防守团级防御地段。除非在绝对必要的情况下，我不会要求支援炮兵像步兵一样作战，而采用部署营级环形阵地的方案就会导致这种类型的战斗。当然，将防线上的兵力密度稀释到这个程度是有缺点的，但是，相当奇怪，从高地上被赶下来的一个排或连如果反击迅速，就能很容易地恢复阵地。有许多次，在我看来，北朝鲜人和中国人未能扩张局部战果，他们进攻缓慢或缺乏纵深，使得我们能够从他们手中夺回主动权。”

一位营长也作了如下评论：“在朝鲜，我军一个步兵营负责的平均正面宽度为4000到5000码。十一月以后，我们认为这是正常的。无论是为了控制更大的地域接受防线上的缝隙，还是以紧密编队部署，决定如何防守这个正面都很花时间。现在我仍然没有什么好主意，采取两种方法都有很大的风险。当我与任何人讨论起这个问题时，我总是得到令人震惊的答复：“噢，那是朝鲜！”但我预见不到将来美军在人力上会拥有优势，足以使我们以野战条令中所谓的“常规正面”作战。现在的陆军军官没有如何防御延伸正面的足够知识。1946—47，在本宁堡步校的一年，预科班有一个关于延伸正面的8小时课题。现在，在利文沃斯（指挥与参谋学院），大多数课题都是基于野战条令规定的理想的常规正面。难道没有理由相信未来在攻防作战中延伸正面都将成为我们的标准吗？这项建议会使我们的军校加大战术教学的力度吗？”

TACTICAL UNITY

The company interviews also revealed a chronic weakness in major security measures by some Eighth Army infantry forces. There was no consistent and vigorous patrolling, either to the front, or laterally by the frontline formations. There was no real use of outposts, worthy of the name. What the troops called “outposts” were not infrequently positioned only 15 or 20 feet forward of the main foxhole line. On the march, the point moved in such close juncture to the lead rifle platoon as to provide no additional margin of safety to the main body.

These obvious shortcomings were called to the attention of command in the notes compiled within the Theater. It was also pointed out as an inherent weakness in our defensive tactics that battalions were not being maneuvered as such, and that the space between companies (often a void with no viable communications) was frequently such that the companies could not actually operate in support each of the other, which meant only that the separate units were asking to be destroyed one at a time.

One battalion, solidly fixed on a ridgeline, with all of its weapons prepared to fight for the ground, might well hold out against an enemy division for three days or more. The same force, divided into company units and so positioned on separate hills that the enemy could not be denied entry into the low ground in between, could hardly be expected to survive one night.

The whole course of the Korean War has emphasized the decisive importance of tactical unity and full communications, which together compose the sine qua non of freedom of action. But as with other armies in other times, Eighth Army could only master the lesson out of its own hard experience.

The complex nature of the main question-how best to deploy component tactical bodies when over-extension is the dominant condition in the general situation perhaps calls for more earnest review by all concerned than any staff matter to be reevaluated on the basis of the Korean experience. The problem, by its nature, concerns all levels, all schools, and all arms. That many of those who commanded successfully in Korea are still in doubt about final answers, and not less so as to whether the search is being conducted in a wholly practical light, is suggested by the following statements.

This from a regimental commander : “I was puzzled through every Korean action in which I participated. The question was whether it was better to defend an assigned sector as a regiment, or as three separate battalions. I know that other regimental commanders prescribed that their battalions would defend in relatively small battalion perimeters, thus leaving wide gaps across the front of the regimental sector. Our policy, on the other hand, was always to tie in from flank to flank, which frequently required positioning of six rifle companies of two battalions on the MLR, backing that up with the reserve battalion. By this means we were able to stop night infiltration by the enemy, and seldom did we have any unwanted characters running around in our rear area or harassing our supporting artillery battalion. I would be very reluctant to defend a regimental sector by means of small battalion perimeters. I don’t like to ask my supporting artillery to fight as infantry any more than is absolutely necessary, and the battalion perimeter plan will result in that type of action. Of course there are disadvantages to thinning your line to the extent that you have to eliminate the battalion reserve position, but, oddly enough, it was our experience on many occasions that a platoon or company driven from a hill will readily regain its position if it counterattacks promptly. On numerous occasions, it seemed to me that the North Koreans and Chinese failed to follow up any initial advantage which they gained locally, and their slowness or lack of depth in their attack permitted us to regain the initiative from them.”

And this from a Battalion Commander: “The average frontage assigned to an Infantry battalion in Korea was between 4000 and 5000 yards. After November, we regarded that as normal. It took a long time to decide how to defend that frontage, whether to accept gaps for the sake of reserves, or try to play it tight. I still don’t have a good idea how I would do it today; there are great risks either way. When I talk to anyone about this problem, I get the stock answer, ‘Oh! That was Korea!’ But I can’t see that in the future the American Army will have such a preponderance of manpower that, should war come, we will fight on what the FMs call ‘normal frontages.’ The Army officer today does not have informed knowledge about how to defend on an extended front. In one year of school at Benning, 1946-47, the Advance Class had one eight-hour problem on extended frontage. At Leavenworth today, most of the problems are based on the ideal of FM normal frontage. Isn’t it reasonable to believe that for us the norm of the future is the extended front both in attack and on defense, and that this proposition should weight the teaching of tactics in our service schools?”

噪音：信号与武器

本战区发布的战地记录中简要论述了中共军队动用号手制造恐怖气氛和使用多种管乐器发出战斗信号的情况。

音响的战术使用

如何削弱敌军这些手法产生的效果，使我军士兵较容易应对？这个问题给作者留下了深刻印象，对十一月会战的研究告一段落以后，解决它立即成为头等大事。不同级别的指挥和参谋部门还没有了解到解决该问题的迫切需要，在这方面还无所作为。他们的消极反应无非厚非。他们被紧张的战斗搞得精疲力竭，而且要全神贯注于恢复经历过苦战的部队的战斗力以及保存战斗力完好的部队。没有在第八集团军中服役的任何团队或个人被特别指派收集和整理来自我军步兵队伍、与敌军战术特点有关的战场情报，了解更多有关与敌军（噪音战术）程序的知识，有助于我军采取措施压制它的作用。

上述意见不包含一丝一毫的诡辩，相反，它是坦诚的批评。作者相信美军参谋系统中一项固有弱点是由于环境的影响。我们实际上忽略了完善我军战斗情报系统的一条主要途径。

《朝鲜战争步兵战术注解》这份文件简要涉及了敌军是如何使用制造噪音的器械对付美军的问题，并提供了敌军使用这些器械作为战场信号的某些细节。敌军主要出于以下三个目的制造噪音（1）制造普遍的恐怖（2）疑兵之计（3）控制己方部队。这份报告中包括敌军信号的实例和含义。

然而，这份报告遗漏了任何这些奇袭手段对我军士兵影响的描述，而且它也未详细说明关于中共军队噪音战术的资料是如何收集的。

在十一月会战中，对中国人这种古老战术，普通美国连队非常的恐怖和惊慌。

关于这一点，毋庸置疑。我军士兵不习惯在战场上听到军号、牧羊人的号角、长笛、刚果鼓和卡嗒声。当敌军在夜间进攻中使用这些乐器时，主要由于这些声音附加的神秘性，严重挫伤了我军的士气。

在敌军进攻下生还的步兵连后来在集合的时候坦白地承认了这一情况。这些连队中的大部分都曾表现坚强甚至英勇。据信，连队一般水平上的管理并不逊色于我军年报上的纪录。但当他们讨论起敌军进攻的哪些特点导致了他们最严重的灾难时，他们最经常以下列语言概括对敌军制造噪音的诡计的反应：“那使我们毛骨悚然。”这是精神饱满地脱离战斗的人员的证词，他们是在本连其他人员在场的情况下作上述陈述的。因此，尽管第八集团军已经开始适应中共军队的古怪战法很久了，这些证词也应被不折不扣地认真对待。

这些士兵中的95%以上回忆不起中共军队怎样、何时（在战斗的哪个阶段，在什么战术形势下）使用任何制造噪音的器具的细节。大多数人只能回忆起他们听到了多种噪音，例如喇叭和口哨，而且这些噪音使他们精神极度紧张。只有不到1%的士兵能回忆起号声或牧羊人号角发出的“鸡鸣”的曲调。

各连集合起来就这一争论焦点进行回忆，这些明确的数据就来自于多次集合的记录汇编。这项工作不得不逐连重复完成。在集合中，一名士兵回忆起当战斗进行到特殊时刻响起了号声。其他众多士兵愿意证实他的回忆。那么，为使所有士兵专心回忆号声本身，应该询问这样一个问题：“你听到的确切是什么？”

许多次，（士兵们的）回答是否定的。但是调查仍在继续，直到偶尔发现少数士兵通过集中注意力能够使记忆重现，并且能用口哨吹或用嘴唱出（中共军队的）号声。这些士兵这么做了以后，在集合现场的所有其他士兵也会回忆起来，并赞同证人所说是准确的。然后，（研究人员）便作了记录。

几乎以同样的方法，研究人员也调查清楚了中国人使用噪音制造恐怖与使用乐器进行指挥两种情况之间的区别。

还剩最后一步——获取乐器本身，如此即可通过训练使第八集团军的部队了解中共军队的信号，适应它制造恐怖的战术，最终或许还能“以其人之道，还治其人之身”。

当时，这些制造噪音的乐器简直成了无价之宝。然而，作者完全肯定：把它们作为纪念品收集是很容易的，即使是从丢失的阵地撤退的我军士兵也成功地缴获了中共军队的乐器。所以，（研究人员）进行了调查。在每个连队，他们都向士兵们解释：这些战利品对陆军相当重要，只需暂时借用，每个缴获者都将得到收条。士兵们很不情愿地翻开他们的行军背包和铺盖卷，交出了所需数量的中共军号、牧羊人号角、铜哨子等等。

十一月会战结束之后两周，训练第八集团军的步兵抵抗中共军队噪音战术的工作充分开展起来了。在阵线后方的夜间演习中，扮演“进攻者”一方的部队使用了中共军队的噪音战术和信号器械。到了1951年1月中旬，敌军这种手法给我军士兵带来的刺激就已被消除了。

然而，考虑到中共军队在十一月会战中使用噪音战术所取得的显著效果，（研究人员）相信并建议我军自己的训练机构也采取此类改革，使部队适应噪音的这种奇特用途也应当成为准备战斗的标准操作程序。

NOISE:

SIGNAL AND WEAPON

TACTICAL USE OF SOUND

The field notes published in the Theater dwell briefly upon CCF’s use of noisemakers to create terror and the use of various wind instruments for giving combat signals.

The problem of reducing these techniques to a pattern which would become comprehensible to our troops impressed the writer as being of prime importance immediately after the study of the November battle was undertaken. Command and staff at the various levels were not as yet concerned about the acuteness of this need and had taken no action with respect to it. Their negative reaction was but natural. They were worn from the strain of battle and engrossed with the problem of rehabilitating the units which had been hardest used in the fighting and conserving those which were still combat-worthy. It was not specifically the assigned task of any group or individual serving with Eighth Army to collect and correlate battlefield information originating in our own infantry line, pertaining to the tactical characteristics of the enemy, toward the end that by more perfect knowledge of his procedures we would take steps toward their neutralization.

This statement is not made in any spirit of apology but to the contrary is frankly critical; the writer belives that the condition reflects an inherent weakness in the staff system of the US Army. We are in fact overlooking a main avenue toward the perfecting of our combat intelligence.

The document, “Notes on Infantry Tactics in Korea, deals briefly with the matter of how the enemy used noise-making instruments against American forces and supplies some detail on the use of these instruments in the sounding of signals on the battlefield. It is set forth that the enemy’s noise effects were directed toward (1) the creation of a general terror, (2) the simulating of a more extended deployment than in fact occurred, and (3) the control of his own forces. Examples of signals and their meaning were included in the report. The report omitted, however, any description of the effect on our troops consequent to these surprise methods, and it did not specify how the data on CCF noisemaking tactics were collected.

In the November battle, the reaction of the average American company to the Chinese use of this centuries-old technique was one of exaggerated fear and alarm.

Of that, there can be no question. Our troops were not conditioned to the expectation of hearing such instruments as bugles, shepherds’ horns, flutes, Congo drums, and rattles on the field of battle. When they were employed initially in the night attack, the effect was greatly unnerving, mainly because of the attendant element of mystery.

Infantry companies which had survived the attack, when later assembled, admitted this frankly. What the enemy had done was not offered as an excuse for their own conduct. None such was needed. Most of these companies had faced the unknown strongly and even heroically; it is believed that the general level of company conduct will compare favorably with anything in our annals. But when they discussed the features of the enemy attack which caused them the greatest distress, the common reaction to the enemy’s noise-making tricks was most frequently summed up in these words: “That was what made our hair stand on end.” These were the expressions of men freshly delivered from battle; they were spoken in the presence of other men of the company. For that reason, they should not be discounted, though Eighth Army has long since become conditioned to CCF eccentricities.

At least 95 percent of these same men could remember none of the pertinent details of how and when (at what stage of combat and under what tactical conditions) CCF had used any of the noise-making instruments. The majority could report only that they had heard various noises such as bugles and whistles and that the sounds had impacted strongly on their emotions. Less than percent could remember the sequence of notes in any of the bugle calls or the sound of the “rooster call” blown from the shepherd’s horn.

Such specific data as were developed from the numerous assemblies came finally from requesting the companies to concentrate on the point at issue. This had to be done repeatedly, from company to company. One man in the assembly might remember that a call was heard at a particular point in the fight. Numerous of the others would confirm his recollection. Then all hands would be asked to concentrate on the call itself, the question being asked : “Exactly what did you hear?” Many times the result would be negative. But the search was continued until finally here and there were found the few individuals who through concentration could refresh their memories and either

whistle or sing the call. Once that was done, the others in the assembly would all remember it and agree that the witness was accurate. The score was then written down.

In much the same way, the distinction was finally made between the Chinese use of noise for the creation of terror and the conditions under which noise-making instruments were being used for control purposes.

There remained the final step - the procurement of the instruments themselves, so that in training exercises Eighth Army formations could be conditioned to the enemy signals and terror-creating techniques and in the end might be able to turn these same devices against CCF.

At the time the noise-making instruments seemed almost priceless. However, the writer was perfectly sure that with their usual penchant for souvenir-hunting, our troops, even in withdrawing from a lost field, had managed here and there to possess themselves of the CCF instruments. Search was therefore instituted. At every company formation it was explained that these prizes would be of great value to the Army, that they were needed only temporarily, and that the owner would be given a receipt. With a manifest reluctance, soldiers dipped down into their barracks bags and bedrolls and brought forth CCF bugles, shepherds’ horns, bronze whistles, etc., in the required number.

Within two weeks after the conclusion of the November battle, the business of indoctrinating Eighth Army infantry against CCF noise-making tactics was well begun. In the conducting of night exercises back of the line, CCF noise and signal instruments were used by the side playing “aggressor.” By mid-January, 1951, the sting had been removed from this part of the enemy technique.

However, in view of the marked effects achieved by CCF with noise-making tactics during the November battle, it is believed, and is recommended, that such innovations should be anticipated by our own training establishment, and that conditioning troops to the eccentric use of noise should be SOP in preparation for combat.

我对本文预定的翻译计划已经完成，现在回过头来介绍研究背景，下一阶段将补充翻译前面一些因篇幅较长而暂时跳过的战例，并对全文进行整体修订。

————————————————————————————————

研究背景

这份关于步兵和支援武器的报告，包括一些针对战术和训练的应用及存在问题的评论，它们是以对1950年11月1日到1951年3月1日期间第八集团军和第十军在朝鲜的战斗行动的研究为基础的。

研究人员研究的这些战斗主要来自我军在清川江边、长津湖畔与中共军队交锋的十一月会战和使第八集团军重返汉江一线的二月攻势。这项调查并不涉及参加这些行动的所有部队，在有限时间内，以有限人力不可能调查所有部队。然而，这次调查涉及了直接参加十一月会战中的大多数战斗和二月攻势中的关键战斗的全部细节。在十二月和一月，第八集团军主要把时间花在脱离战斗和重新整编上，双方并无决定性的交火，因此可认为这次调查的发现对于冬季的军事行动具有相当的代表性。

对十一月会战的调查涉及了第2步兵师、陆战1师和第25步兵师的全部军事行动，也有第7步兵师军事行动的某些细节。这四个师承受了敌军进攻的主要压力。在对二月战斗的研究中，第25步兵师处于焦点；在调查中，也有与第3步兵师和第1骑兵师的指挥官们反复核对后确认资料真伪的机会，尽管没有对这两个师的连级部队进行研究。

研究中取得的发现基于50场个别战斗，在这些战斗中，每个步兵连或炮兵连在作战中都遭受着严重压力。此外，在七场战斗中，规模大于连级的部队在公路上以纵队队形行进时遭遇了伏击，不可能再编组战术单位并将它们成建制地展开迎敌，研究人员也对这些战斗进行了细致的研究。在朝鲜，从此类事件中，我军吸取了许多经验教训。

获取并综合朝鲜战争中军事行动的资料的方法依据“岛屿上的胜利”一书描述的标准操作程序，该书包括指导二战战史专家开展工作的备忘录。

如果一个步兵连或炮兵连经历过关键、危急或有启发性的战斗，采访者一到达该部队，就应该集合当前该部队所有的生还者，包括该部队的军官，最好还有其直接上级的指挥官。

采访者不断提出问题，连队的所有成员都集合起来作为见证人，对于他们的参与，研究人员的人为操纵程度只需达到保证陈述能以时间顺列排列就可以了，于是，对这场战斗就可以进行从头到尾的史实重建。在讯问中，涉及战前阶段的相关细节如装备、单兵负载、单位弹药储备、任务、行军后的疲劳程度、防御部署、警报系统等。讯问也要延伸到战后阶段，在总结中将包括部队重整的情况、伤亡率、弹药和武器的缺陷等。

在研究现场是可以发现这些记录的，所有相关信息应在报告中具体表达。在对小部队的采访之前或结束以后，应询问师以上的高级参谋和指挥部门，因此指挥层人员对战斗的意见就能反映在报告中。

到目前为止，在这次分析中作为样本采集的所有的战斗，都以叙述形式记录下来了。这些叙述严密地描述了该部队遭遇到了什么情况，从排级到单兵彻底地说明该部队的战斗经历。

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

This report on infantry and supporting weapons, including some comment on the tactical and training application and problems thereof, is based upon study of the combat operations of the Eighth Army and X Corps, in Korea, during the period 1 November 1950 to 1 March 1951.

The actions taken under study were in the main those incident to the November battle with CCF (Chinese Communist Forces) along the Chongchon River and around the Chosen Reservoir and the February offensive by which the Eighth Army returned to the line of the Han River. The survey did not include all forces engaging in either of these operations; this was not possible within the limits of time and personnel available for the work, It did, however, cover in rather complete detail the preponderant part of the United States forces directly engaged by the November battle and the pivotal actions of the February offensive. As the months of December and January were devoted by the Eighth Army mainly to disengagement and reforming, with no decisive exchange of fire between the opposing sides, the findings are therefore considered fairly representative of winter operations as a whole.

From the November battle, the operations of 2nd Infantry Division, 1st Marine Division, and 25th Infantry Division were covered in full; there is also some detail on operations of 7th Infantry Division. These four sustained the main weight of the enemy attack. In the February fighting, 25th Infantry Division was the focal point of study; there was also opportunity to cross-check certain data with commanders in 3rd Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division, though no company studies were made within these organizations.

The findings are based upon the evaluation of approximately 50 separate actions in which either infantry companies or artillery batteries were fighting under conditions of exceptional stress. But in addition, there was close study of several actions in which forces of larger-than-company size became ambushed while traveling as a road column under conditions where it was no longer possible to form tactical units and deploy them organically against the enemy. Many of the major lessons from our experience in Korea are to be drawn from incidents of this character.

The method of procuring and co-relating the data in Korean operations was according to the SOP described in the book, “Island Victory,” which includes the memorandum written for the guidance of World War II combat historians.

A company or battery has been through a pivotal, critical, or instructive experience in battle. As promptly as the interviewer can get to the unit, it is formed with all survivors present, including its officers, and preferably, the commander at the next level up.

Under questioning by the interviewer, with all members of the assembly appearing as witnesses, and their participation being steered only to the extent which will enable the statements to be composed in chronological order, the action is then reconstructed from beginning to end. The interrogation covers the pre-combat period so as to include such pertinent detail as armament, individual load, unit ammunition reserve, missions, state of fatigue after approach march, defensive installations, system of alert, etc. It also extends into the post-combat phase so that the summary will include condition at reassembly, evacuation of casualties, ammunition and weapons shortages, etc.

Such records as are available in the field are studied on the spot, and all pertinent information is embodied in the report. Either prior to, or following the interviewing of the small units, the staff and command at all higher levels, up to and including Division, are interrogated so that the report will be furnished with that view of operations which obtains within the control echelons.

All of the unit actions from which this analysis was extracted have by now been written in narrative form. The narratives describe exactly what happened to the unit, accounting for its experience right down to the squad and individual level.

科目：步兵

Project DOUGHBOY

1951年10月27日，约翰 霍普金斯大学军事行动研究中心收录

Received 27 Oct 19 51，OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE，The Johns Hopkins University

1953年6月军事行动研究中心第二次印刷

Second Printing June 1953 By OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE

地址：马里兰州切维蔡斯市康涅狄格大道6410号

6410 Connecticut Avenue Chevy Chars, Maryland

原文目录页上的备注：

This Document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

1998年4月18日解密

对比双方资料，我发现您文中老邓对机枪的描述十分准确，志愿军老军人竟然和本文作者美军准将S L A Marshal 不谋而合，令我非常佩服他对问题实质的把握能力。

虽然这段看上去挺可笑。不知道我军这方面有没有类似的系统总结资料，反正没见曝光。