主题：【讨论】美国7000亿救市计划的缺陷和这次金融危机的深化 -- 厚积薄发

厚积薄发兄你好，很感动于你写文章的态度，总希望能帮上点儿忙，但是能力有限所以也没有什么能做的，今天看完你转的那篇：解决这次金融危机的一个十步方案的文章，觉得很好，就尝试自己翻译，但因为经济和金融都不是我的专业，也不是我所擅长的，同时英语也不是我的强项，加上时间仓促，译文中的纰漏疏失一定很多，希望您和熟悉这些话题的朋友能够给予指正，先在这里致谢了。

首先感谢小试牛刀兄帮助我纠正了文中基础错误，并给与了详细的说明，也帮助了我更好地理解原文。小试牛刀:我来作点贡献。

译文如下：

HOME（房屋业主抵押贷款方案）：十个步骤的金融危机解决计划

HOME (Home Owners’ Mortgage Enterprise): A 10 Step Plan to Resolve the Financial Crisis

努鲁比尼 | 2008年9月24日

Nouriel Roubini | Sep 24, 2008

即便能够顺利而高效地执行财政部的救市计划（TARP指美国财政部提出的问题资产拯救计划Troubled Asset Relief Program），美国仍将不可避免地面对严重的金融危机并进入一个为期18个月U型的衰退期：经济的衰退从第一季度就已经开始了，无论财政部和联储如何施展拳脚，严重的金融危机都在所难免。针对这样的情况，妥善的拯救计划应该立足于如何避免让美国经济进入一个L型的长时间的衰退，避免出现像日本在上个世纪九十年代所经历的房地产泡沫破裂之后的经济危机和长达十余年的经济停滞。

Even if the Treasury TARP plan is implemented fairly and efficiently the US will not avoid a severe U-shaped18-month recession and a severe financial and banking crisis: the recession train has already left the station in Q1 and the financial/banking crisis will be severe regardless of what the Treasury and the Fed do from now on. What a proper rescue plan can do is to avoid having the US experience a multi-year L-shaped recession and extreme financial crisis like the one that led to a decade long stagnation in Japan in the 1990s after the bursting of their real estate and equity bubbles.

我认为，仅仅把那些问题资产从金融机构的资产负债表中拿掉（新的RTC【1】），对于解决这场金融危机来说是远远不够的；同时必须通过一个类似1933年大萧条时采用的组建HOLC（Home Owner's Loan Corporation【2】）的方式，大量消减数百万面临破产的贷款购屋家庭的抵押贷款债务；并通过以公共资本持有优先股的方式对资本不足的金融机构进行资本重组（如大萧条时期RFC【3】为4000多家银行提供帮助一样）。一个新的RTC【1】组织中如果没有HOLC【2】和RFC【3】这样的功能模块，那么有两个非常基本的问题将无法解决：以百万计面临破产的家庭无法继续偿还他们的按揭贷款；金融机构资本短缺，可能面临严重的信贷紧缩，迫切需要资本注入以刺激信贷增长。

I have also argued that, in order to resolve this financial crisis it is not enough to take the bad/toxic assets off the balance sheet of the financial institutions (a new RTC); it is also necessary and fundamental to reduce the debt overhang of millions of insolvent households via a significant debt reduction on their mortgages (an HOLC program like the one that was implement during the Great Depression); and also recapitalize undercapitalized banks with public capital in the form of preferred shares (as the RFC did with 4000 banks during the Great Depression). An RTC scheme without an HOLC and RFC component would not resolve two fundamental problems: millions of households are insolvent and unable to service their mortgages; the financial system is vastly undercapitalized and needs capital to avoid an ugly credit crunch and to foster new credit creation that is needed for future growth.

因此我提议采用一个由RTC，HOLC，RFC共同组成的方案：HOME（房屋业主抵押贷款方案）。下面我将会列出方案的关键点，充实我的提案，并与财政部提出的TARP方案的现状进行比较。

That is why I proposed the creation of a HOME (Home Owners’ Mortgage Enterprise) that would be a combination of an RTC, a HOLC and a RFC. Let me flesh out this proposal and its key elements and compare it to the Treasury TARP proposal that in its current form has many flaws.

我的HOME提案共有10个步骤来解决这次严重的金融危机：第一步，和财政部的救市计划一样，买入金融机构的那些问题资产，从资产负债表上将之清除，以此为金融机构注入流动性，促进信贷增长。这里最大的问题，在伯南克和国会议员们在昨天的辩论中也提到，是如何为这些问题资产正确估价定价，以便政府可以以合理的价格买入这些资产（80年代RTC的类似操作没有碰到同样的问题是因为当时RTC处理的是Savings and Loan Associations【4】危机中的资产）；假如政府以过高的价格（相对于面值只有很小的折扣）收购这些资产，就会造成过大的财政开支，同时银行家们和股东们却拿到了过多的补贴；假如政府以过低的价格收购这些资产固然可以减少眼前的财政开支，但很多银行又会因此而倒闭，而到那时政府可能要用更大的财政开支来拯救那些倒闭银行的储户们。关于这些问题资产的定价应该是基于目前的市场价格还是到期价格（伯南克的建议）的争议可以无休止地进行下去，但实际上在目前为这些问题资产的长期价值进行估价是不可能完成的任务，因此，我们只有一种选择来应对这种不确定性：避免政府溢价过高收购问题资产，而让政府拥有一些在拯救计划实施之后，价值会有所提升的银行其他利益，比如，让政府在所收购的银行中占有一定的股份。这一点我们将在第二步中展开。

There are 10 steps in this HOME proposal to resolve this most severe financial crisis. Here they are:

First, like in the Treasury TARP plan you need to buy illiquid/toxic assets and take them off the balance sheet of banks and financial institutions to reliquify them and allow new credit creation. The biggest problem here – as the debate between Bernanke and senators yesterday is one of the proper valuation and the proper price at which the government should buy these assets (the RTC did not have this problem as it was working out assets of failed S&Ls): if the government buys the asset at at price that is too high (too small of discount relative to face value) the fiscal cost will be huge and you massively subsidize reckless bankers and their shareholders. If you buy at a discount that is too high you minimize the fiscal cost in the short run but many banks could go bust and the eventual fiscal cost of bailing out the depositors of failed banks could be large. You can debate endlessly whether such assets should be bought at current market price or at prices closer to hold to maturity values (as Bernanke suggested). Given that these assets are impaired pricing the long run value of them is mission impossible. Thus, there is only one solution to this fundamental uncertainty: avoid the government overpaying by having the government having some of the positive benefits of an upside gain in case the banks’ values recover after the bailout. I.e. you need for the government to have some equity in the banks whose assets are purchased by the government. This leads to step 2 of the proposal.

第二，政府不是去收购那些问题资产（无论以何种价格成交）本身，而是去买入金融机构的优先股，这些优先股比现有的普通股和优先股有更高的优先权，并且能够在未来转换成普通股以便政府可以在未来的盈利中获益。

Second, in exchange for the purchase of illiquid asset (at whatever price it is agreed) the government gets preferred shares in the financial institutions that senior to existing common and preferred shares and that are convertible into common shares to allow government to participate into any future upside.

第三，即便政府通过购买优先股的方式为金融机构注入了一部分资本，但是对于资本缺乏的银行，同时还需要对资产中卖给政府的部分进行资产减记，他们还需要更多的资本注入。而这些资本将通过更多的公共资本以优先股的形式注入（大萧条时期的RFC就是这么干的）。

Third, even if the government gets preferred shares as in step 2, the banks will need more capital if they are undercapitalized and they have not fully reserved/provisioned for the losses coming from writing down the asset being sold to the government. So you will need to inject further actual public capital in the form of preferred shares in the financial institutions ( this is what the RFC did during the Great Depression).

因为字数的限制，分成两贴来发。

注释：

【1】RTC：Resolution Trust Corporation（资产清理信托公司）这是美国政府拥有的一家资产管理公司，主要是为了应对上个世纪八十年代美国的金融危机而成立的。

【2】HOLC：Home Owners' Loan Corporation（房屋业主贷款机构）这是1933年大萧条期间罗斯福总统倡导成立的一家负责为家庭房屋抵押贷款减免债务的机构，当年为解决大萧条时期的经济危机做出过重要贡献。

【3】RFC： Reconstruction Finance Corporation（复兴金融财团）这是1932年大萧条时期由美国政府建立的一家独立机构，负责向银行企业提供贷款，在大萧条时期为经济复兴做出了重要贡献。

【4】Savings and Loan Associations（储蓄贷款协会）

原文链接原文加了密码，西西河的兄弟应该都能猜到密码，不是拼音，一共7个字符。

zlusc:【原创译文】解决这次金融危机的一个十步方案 II

zlusc:【原创译文】解决这次金融危机的一个十步方案 III

关键词(Tags): #金融危机，#救市计划，#鲁比尼，

本帖一共被 3 帖引用 (帖内工具实现)

复【原创译文】解决这次金融危机的一个十步方案 I

家园

【原创译文】解决这次金融危机的一个十步方案 II

续前文：zlusc:【原创译文】解决这次金融危机的一个十步方案 I

第四，公共资本的注入可能会给政府带来一定的风险，为降低政府所持股份的风险，现有的股东应当首先承担所发生的损失。如何实现呢？首先，暂停给所有的普通股持有人派息分红，甚至是原有的优先股持有者也有可能被停止派息；政府注入资金的同时，强制要求原有一级资本的股东匹配部分注资。【感谢小试牛刀兄】

Fourth, given the risk to the government deriving from the public injection of capital in the financial system the existing shareholders of the banks need to take a first-tier loss to minimize the risks for the government share. How to do that? First, you need to suspend dividend payments on common share and possibly even existing preferred shared; you also need to force to partially match the public capital injection with new Tier 1 capital.

第五，金融机构公共和私有资本的重组为该机构的无担保债权人（所有的债权人，但不包括储户）带来并不均衡的利益，因此必须将一些无担保的债务（分债务和其他无担保债务）转换成股本（债权股本转换）。这样的转换进一步降低了金融机构的杠杆作用（导致更低的债务股本比例）。

Fifth, public and private recapitalization of financial institutions unfairly benefits unsecured creditors (all creditors but insured depositors) of such institutions. So, you also need to convert some of this unsecured debt (the sub debt and other debt unsecured debt) into equity (a debt for equity swap). Such swap further reduce the leverage of the financial system (leading to a lower debt to equity ratio for financial institutions).

第六，当金融危机结束，银行、金融机构可能需要的资本额较危机之前要少，为了避免产生新的资本和信贷泡沫；同时重组之后的银行有更低的杠杆比率有更多的资本出借，这时，应该允许一些仍濒临倒闭的银行和金融机构倒闭。只有健康的机构应该留下。这时应该对整个银行和金融机构进行系统性的甄别，对于虽然资本缺乏、流动性不足，但是能够在公共和私有资本注入和重组之后复苏的机构与始终不能离开濒临破产境地的机构区别对待，应该将后者关闭。我们应当把坏的苹果摘掉，而留给好的苹果和虽然有伤但能自愈的苹果更好的机会去生存和发展。

Sixth, after this crisis is resolved the banking and financial system may need lower capital than before this crisis so as to avoid new asset and credit bubbles; and if you recapitalize some banks that will be able to lend more (still with lower leverage ratios) you still need to let other insolvent banks and financial institutions to go bust and disappear. Only healthier institution should survive. So you need to a systematic triage between banks that are distressed, undercapitalized and illiquid but solvent once the private and public recapitalization occurs from those that are fundamentally insolvent and that need to be shut down. You need to destroy the bad apples to let the good ones or the sick but curable ones survive and thrive.

第七，在RTC中倒闭的银行的资产可以进入HOME计划中寻找其他的解决方案（债务重组和消减债务）。

Seventh, as in the case of the RTC the assets of the banks that are bankrupt and are allowed to fail go to the HOME for workout (debt restructuring/reduction).

第八，现在需要一个类似HOLC的计划来为美国的家庭消减债务。美国家庭的负债实在是太多了（次贷，准优质贷款【感谢小试牛刀兄】，优质贷款，房屋净值贷款，信用卡，汽车贷款，学生贷款）而他们的资产（房屋和股票的价值）却大幅缩水造成净资产的快速下滑。美国的家庭正在被如山一般并日渐增长的债务和偿债负担所淹没。无论是家庭，金融机构、公司还是地方政府都需要债务减免。当一个国家（比如俄国、厄瓜多尔或者阿根廷）负债过多而资不抵债的时候，拖欠或者减免债务才能让这些国家重新回到快速发展的轨道上；当一家公司被巨大的债务所折磨，他需要进入破产法庭，申请破产保护以减免债务，从而继续生产经营；同样一个家庭在入不敷出的财政窘境之中，也需要减免债务来获取更多可以自由支配的收入；所以，任何难以为继的债务问题都需要债务减免来解决问题。对于身处窘境的家庭而没有债务减免，是目前金融危机不断深化、经济衰退，尤其表现在个人消费支出的快速萎缩并不断恶化的原因。而目前财政方面的行动（通过退税进行的收入补助）以及解救被困的金融机构（救援贝尔斯登的债权人，接管两房和美国国际集团）并没有解决最为根本的债务问题，其中的原因有二：首先，你自己无法把自己救出债务的大坑，当债务/可支配收入的比例太高，依靠退税来增大分母是远远不够的，也是暂时的，你更需要减小分子（债务）。其二，救援金融机构而不去减少借贷者的债务，无法从根本上解决债务人资不抵债的问题，从而限制了他们的消费能力，进而将整个经济拖进衰退当中。五个可以利用的金融政策和工具：家庭收入补助（2008年的退税），救援金融机构（救援贝尔斯登的债权人，接管两房和美国国际集团），收购无法运作的金融机构的资产（类似RTC的机构），对资金匮乏的机构注入资金进行资本重组（类似RFC的机构），政府收购可能出现问题的抵押贷款为陷入困境的家庭减免债务（类似HOLC的机构）。这最后的一项是最为重要也最为有效的解决这次金融危机的步骤。在大萧条时期，政府建立了HOLC（Home Owner's Loan Corporation），用较低的折扣价格从银行中购买抵押贷款，并进一步减少这些抵押贷款的面值，然后重新用更低面值和更低的固定利率为陷入困境的家庭做再次融资。这项庞大的计划使数百万家庭保住了自己的房子。HOLC以相对较低的成本在两年中不断买进抵押贷款，并管理这些资产长达18年。一个新的HOLC从宏观上看等同于建立一个大的银行专门收购金融机构手中的不良资产，把它们从资产负债表上清除出去，从而进行重组。

Eighth, you need an HOLC-like program for debt reduction of the household sector. Households in the US have too much debt (subprime, near prime, prime mortgages, home equity loans, credit cards, auto loans and student loans) while their assets (values of their homes and stocks) are plunging leading to a sharp fall in their net worth. And households are getting buried under this mountain of mounting debt and rising debt servicing burdens. Thus, a fraction of the household sector – as well as a fraction of the financial sector and a fraction of the corporate sector and of the local government sector – is insolvent and needs debt relief. When a country (say Russia, Ecuador or Argentina) has too much debt and is insolvent it defaults and gets debt reduction and is then able to resume fast growth; when a firm is distressed with excessive debt it goes into bankruptcy court and gets debt relief that allows it to resume investment, production and growth; when a household is financially distressed it also needs debt relief to be able to have more discretionary income to spend. So any unsustainable debt problem requires debt reduction. The lack of debt relief to the distressed households is the reason why this financial crisis is becoming more severe and the economic recession - with a sharp fall now in real consumption spending – now worsening. The fiscal actions taken so far (income relief to households via tax rebates) and bailouts of distressed financial institutions (Bear Stearns creditors’ bailout, Fannie and Freddie and AIG) do not resolve the fundamental debt problem for two reasons. First, you cannot grow yourself out of a debt problem: when debt to disposable income is too high increasing the denominator with tax rebates is ineffective and only temporary; i.e. you need to reduce the nominator (the debt). Second, rescuing distressed institutions without reducing the debt problem of the borrowers does not resolve the fundamental insolvency of the debtor that limits its ability to consume and spend and thus drags the economy into a more severe economic contraction. So of the five possible uses of fiscal policy – income relief to households (the 2008 tax rebate), rescue/bailout of financial institutions (Bears Stearns, Fannie and Freddie, AIG), purchase of assets of failed institutions (an RTC-like institution), recapitalization of undercapitalized financial institutions (an RFC-like institution), government purchase of distressed mortgages to provide debt relief to households (an HOLC-like institution) – the last option is the most important and effective to resolve this severe financial and economic crisis. During the Great Depression the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation was create to buy mortgages from bank at a discount price, reduce further the face value of such mortgages and refinance distressed homeowners into new mortgages with lower face value and lower fixed rate mortgage rates. This massive program allowed millions of households to avoid losing their homes and ending up in foreclosure. The HOLC bought mortgages for two year and managed such assets for 18 years at a relatively low fiscal cost (as the assets were bought at a discount and reducing the face value of the mortgages allowed home owners to avoid defaulting on the refinanced mortgages). A new HOLC will be the macro equivalent of creating a large “bad bank” where the bad assets of financial institutions are taken off their balance sheets and restructured/reduced.

第九，我们应当尽力避免在对银行进行资本重组和解决这次金融危机的时候，引起信贷和资产泡沫的出现。为避免这一风险，我们有很多事情需要去做，巴塞尔协定对资本充足率的规定仍然不尽合理，迅速调整这一规定对于减少银行对经济周期的推动作用至关重要。【感谢小试牛刀兄】。

Ninth, we need to avoid a situation where the recapitalization of the banks and the resolution of this financial crisis leads to another credit and asset bubble. Many things need to be done to avoid this risk but a rapid change of the Basel II capital adequacy ratios to reduce their the pro-cyclicality would be essential.

字数限制，再分一贴。

原文链接

zlusc:【原创译文】解决这次金融危机的一个十步方案 III

关键词(Tags): #金融危机，#救市计划，#鲁比尼，

本帖一共被 2 帖引用 (帖内工具实现)

复【原创译文】解决这次金融危机的一个十步方案 II

家园

【原创译文】解决这次金融危机的一个十步方案 III

续前文：zlusc:【原创译文】解决这次金融危机的一个十步方案 I

zlusc:【原创译文】解决这次金融危机的一个十步方案 II

第十，在金融全球化的条件下，应当尽快实施对金融机构管理和监督系统的改革。随着影子银行系统的瓦解，绝大多数的影子银行都已经被纳入到传统银行的体系中，必将象传统银行一样被监管。事实上，所有重要的大的金融机构（商业银行，投资银行，非银行的抵押贷款公司，对冲基金，私人股权基金等）都应当以同样的方式被监管。为确保金融体系更加稳定，避免出现象目前这样的严重的经济危机出现，应该加强对传统银行和过去的影子银行的监管，而不能延续过去十年中那种松懈的管理。然而，传统银行在这次金融危机中的表现是一样的差，有些甚至更差，损失了比影子银行更多的资金。对传统银行松懈的监管以及对影子银行缺乏合理的规范使得整个监管的体系远远地落在时下的金融危机的后面。因此，只有合理的改革现行的金融机构监管制度，才能将影子银行并入传统银行系统的行动转化成稳定整个金融体系的结果。这一重要内容正是我为最近出版的世界经济论坛所作的金融发展报告中一个章节的主题（题目是：“金融全球化之下的金融危机，金融市场的稳定和金融系统监管的改革。”）。

Tenth, start implementing rapidly a reform of the system of regulation and supervision of financial institutions in a world of financial globalization. With the collapse of most of the shadow banking system most of these shadow banks are now being folded in the traditional banks and will be regulated like banks. Indeed all institutions of large size and that are systemically important (commercial banks, investment banks, non-bank mortgage lenders, hedge funds, private equity funds, etc.) should be supervised and regulated in a similar way. To make the financial system more stable over time and avoid severe financial crises like the current one will require that both banks and former shadow banks be regulated and supervised better than they have been in the last decade. After all traditional banks have performed as poorly – and some more poorly – and have lost more money than shadow banks during this severe financial crisis. So both the poor regulation and supervision of banks (as regulators were asleep at the wheel while the laissez fair ideology and voodoo-cult of self-regulation and market discipline and internal risk management became dominant) and the lack of sensible regulation of shadow banks lies behind the current financial disaster. Thus, folding shadow banks back into the traditional banking system will make the overall financial system more stable only if the proper reform of the regulation and supervision of financial institutions in a world of financial globalization will be undertaken. This important matter is the subject of the chapter (titled “Financial Crises, Financial Stability, and Reform: Supervision and Regulation of the Financial System in a World of Financial Globalization”) that I have written for the recently published World Economic Forum’s Financial Development Report.

这一章详细分析了新兴市场经济金融危机的一些重要事件；探讨了这一危机的原因和后果，评估了此次危机的经济和财政成本；讨论了货币和信贷政策是否应针对资产价格和资产泡沫；研究了导致此次金融危机的脆弱的金融监管系统；最后分析了在金融全球化条件下，为防止未来的危机的出现，对金融机构管制系统进行改革的11个重要问题。这11个问题是金融监管改革的关键点：银行家，交易商的不合理的薪酬系统以及相关金融机构股东和他们的经理人之间的问题；证券模型的产生和传播中的缺陷；监管套利，依赖于短期流动资金融资，高杠杆和长期流动资金贷款给影子银行系统带来的不稳定性；自我调节的弱点，市场准则和严格规章的监管；周期性的资本需求以及Basel II资本需求相关的问题；对信用评级机构不合理的奖励；合理价值法对低流动性资产的价值评估；缺乏透明性的金融市场；缺乏监管制度；缺乏国际合作的监管政策；以及谁来监管监管者的问题，即如何避免金融行业的监督者和管理者出现监管俘获（Regulatory Capture）的现象。

This chapter analyzes in detail the episodes of financial crisis in emerging market economies and advanced economy; discusses the causes and consequences of such crisis; measures the economic and fiscal costs of such crises; discusses the debate on whether monetary and credit policy should target asset prices and asset bubbles; studies the weaknesses of financial regulation and supervision in advanced economies financial systems that led to the recent crises; and finally considers eleven separate key issues in the reform of the regulation and supervision of financial institutions in a world of financial globalization that are necessary to prevent future crisis and make them less virulent. These eleven issues that are key in reforming financial regulation and supervision are: the distorted compensation system of bankers/traders and the related agency problems between financial institutions shareholders and their managers; the flaws of the originate and distribute securitization model; regulatory arbitrage and the instability of the shadow banking system given its reliance on short term liquid financing, high leverage and long term illiquid lending; the weaknesses of self-regulation and market discipline and the need of greater rules-based regulation; pro-cyclical capital requirements and other issues with the Basel II capital requirements; the distorted incentives of credit rating agencies; asset valuation and fair value accounting in a world where assets can be highly illiquid and hard to price; the lack of transparency in financial markets; the inadequate regulatory regime; the lack of international coordination of regulatory policies; and the issue of who will regulate the regulators, i.e. how to avoid the regulatory capture by the financial industry of the regulators and supervisors of financial institutions.

现在影子银行系统已经并入了常规的银行系统，也正是我们可以重新思考如何妥善地监管不同的银行和以前的那些非银行的金融机构的时候了。

So now that the shadow banking system is being folded in the formal banking system it is high time to rethink how both banks and the former non-bank financial institutions should be properly regulated and supervised.

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复【原创译文】解决这次金融危机的一个十步方案 I

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复【原创译文】解决这次金融危机的一个十步方案 I

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