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主题:【原创】石油―――太平洋战争中日本致命的软肋 -- 忘情

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      • 好文
        家园 这里的缺油感觉是两个概念

        美军是没都有油,日军是都没有油

        电影里winters一连长出来都是开吉普的,日军出来个师团长弄不好还是骑马的

        奢侈啊,这么弄能不缺油么

        • 家园 不是的

          夏威夷是美國至東南亞間除了荷屬東印外最大的儲油設施。夏威夷最大的作用是油站及補給站。

          美國軍方評價日本當年的失策的文章笑稱日方只著重戰艦等武器,純屬近視行為。如果當年他們只毀掉夏威夷的儲油及泊於珍珠港內那數艘太平洋艦隊的油補給船而對太平洋艦隊其他艦隻一毫不損,太平洋艦隊都要打道回美國西岸。

          至於夏威夷外,盟軍當年在東南亞的儲油是極惡劣的。

          The state of Allied oil supplies in the rest of the Pacific theater was extremely poor. ....... A sampling of four other ports in the Pacific highlights this problem. Brisbane had 12,000 tons of fuel available in January 1941, Sydney and Melbourne both had 8,000, and Port Moresby had none. Other bases, in the Netherlands East Indies, for example, could not be counted on for oil supplies because of their proximity to Japanese airpower and imminent Japanese invasion.

          Once the Japanese seized the oilfields in the Netherlands East Indies and Burma, they eliminated all potential oil supplies in the Pacific between the Americas and the Middle East. (90)

          日本當年真的是買櫝還珠!!

          • 家园 那我们做一个假设,如果日军把油料库炸毁

            有一点我同意,至少半年内太平洋舰队没办法前出。

            那么后面呢,军方一定会重新评估日军的实力,甚至存在可能将欧洲第一改为太平洋第一。

            那么这半年内日军能做到什么?攻占澳大利亚危险,攻占夏威夷还是有些可能,我们假设他们搞定了夏威夷。

            这时应为没有珊瑚海中途岛,联合舰队的航母数量大概在15,6的样子,美国方面,埃塞克斯级开始服役,出于美军一贯的对补给的重视,珍珠港损失的油料补给船应该可以补充回来,如果再推迟在欧洲开辟第二战场,那么美军的油料补给完全可以做到充足。同时期爪哇的油田开始工作,日本当年的油料有保证。

            日军的造舰能力上的差距,没道理说联合舰队这时候的实力高于太平洋舰队。

            下面就是大决战了美军再推回夏威夷,囤积补给。同时期假设澳大利亚攻陷。

            下面的话就好办很多了,造成的结果是,战争于1947左右结束,欧洲战场就是苏联德国pk。

            根据莱特湾海战的双方的参战部队,你把美军的参战数量削一半,数量也是极其可观,但就补给而言,补给能力应该是够了吧?

            太平洋战场在战争中优先级别低于欧洲战场,这个级别施根据当时的形势和轴心个国的实力所决定的

            太平洋战场美国简直是在一只手和日本玩,真要惹火了美国全力打击日本,估计日本就玩了。

            如果战争真的拖延到1947年,弄不好有机会看到联合舰队在原子弹的突袭下一击毙命,呵呵

            总的来说缺油打德国和日本,板桥相信,但单独打日本,油料大大的有的

            所以太平洋上美军只要愿意,是不会有缺油的问题的。

            • 家园 一花双宝

              恭喜:你意外获得【西西河通宝】一枚

              谢谢:作者意外获得【西西河通宝】一枚

              鲜花已经成功送出。

              此次送花为【有效送花赞扬,涨乐善、声望】

            • 家园 因為日方指導思想

              沒有好好利用其潛艇艦隊來封鎖夏威夷。如果山本知道補給是戰爭成敗關鍵的話,當天雖然沒有炸毀美方油庫,但只要以後以其潛艇強力封鎖夏威夷的運輸,夏威夷的存油還有用罄的一天。

              就讓我們回到當年,看看那時的情況。

              太平洋艦隊夏威夷基地的最大作用是美國艦隊到亞洲間的唯一加油及補給站。沒有夏威夷這補給站(被日軍佔領)或補給站設施被破壞至不能使用,對太平洋艦隊來說,維持作戰及保存實力,只有返回美國西岸。想向亞洲出發的話,就首先要收復及確保這個補給站的安全。那樣的話,大戰就會在夏威夷附近。但龐大艦隊迢迢千里從聖迭戈出發。其困難度可想而知。美國能產多少石油及造艦能力多高,對解決這困難,短期來說,幫助都不大。尤其是戰爭初起那關鍵的一兩年。

              下面的是美方對這的評估:

              In the years from 1925 to 1940, the quantity of most surface combatants in the Navy had doubled in size; the size of the auxiliary force had not. Although there had been an increase in the number of fleet oilers, they were all kept busy ferrying fuel between bases. (95) On 7 December, the Pacific Fleet had two oilers in Pearl Harbor and three at sea and six others in ports on the west coast; only four of these were capable of at-sea refueling. (96) This shortage of tankers effectively limited the radius of the Pacific Fleet. (97) It was also a key reason so many ships were located in Pearl Harbor on 7 December. Kimmel was unable to keep less than half his fleet at sea without starting to deplete the oil reserves at Pearl Harbor; his limited supply of oilers could not keep up with the deficit. (98)

              Because of this lack of oilers, the fleet could not have even exercised its primary war plan (even if most of its battle line was not at the bottom of Pearl Harbor). The total capacity of the Pacific Fleet's oilers was 760,000 barrels of oil. In the first 9 days after Pearl Harbor, the fleet had expended 750,000 barrels of this sum. Thus, the fleet was tied to its oil supply at Pearl Harbor, (99) and if the Japanese had attacked the oil storage and the associated oilers at Pearl Harbor on 7 December, they would have driven the Pacific Fleet back to the west coast. (100)

              If the Pacific Fleet had been forced back to the west coast, would it have been effective in opposing the Japanese? The short answer is no, especially if the Japanese began targeting oilers. To give an example, the USS Lexington was dispatched from California to assist in the search for Amelia Earhart in July 1937. First, the Lexington had to top off its bunkers on the west coast. (101) It then proceeded on a high-speed run of about 30 knots to the Hawaiian Islands. Here, it had to refuel again from the fleet oiler USS Ramapo off Lahaina Roads, Maui. The result was that the Lexington did not arrive in the search area off Howland Island until 11 days after its departure from the west coast and could not even have done that without the support of the Ramapo. (102)

              Ships sortieing from the west coast would be adding 2,000 nautical miles to their patrols into the Pacific just to get to Hawaii. (103) This number would have to be doubled, obviously, because these same ships would have to get back to the west coast if no oiler support were available and the oil storage at Pearl Harbor no longer existed.

              The cruising ranges of the Pacific Fleet simply could not meet this necessity. The best range of the Yorktown-class carriers was 12,000 nautical miles at 15 knots, while older carriers had even less endurance. (104) Battleships had much less endurance and were slower. They averaged out at 8,000 nautical miles at 10 knots. (105) Cruisers were a little better off than the carriers; they averaged 14,000-14,500 nautical miles at approximately 15 knots. Destroyers, depending on their class, could go 6,000-9,000 plus nautical miles at 15 knots. (106) Looking at the carders' and cruisers' endurance capabilities, the situation does not seem so bad. However, there are other factors that need to be thrown into the equation.

              First, ranges needed to be decreased by a minimum of 15 percent whenever antisubmarine steering measures were taken. (107) Also, a prudent commander might want to avoid a suspected submarine-operating area altogether, if time and circumstances permitted such a detour. This too, would decrease overall endurance. Another factor was ship speeds. Higher speed means more fuel burned. Task force operations require much high-speed steaming for the launch and recovery of aircraft, search tasks, antisubmarine patrol, and so forth. This process, as can be seen by the previous Lexington example, burns a prodigious amount of fuel. (108)

              The equation all boils down to the availability of oil and sufficient tankers to transport this precious commodity. Kimmel summed up this essential truth when he testified:

              A destroyer at full power exhausts its fuel supply in 30 to 40 hours, at medium speed in 4 to 6 days. War experience has proven the necessity of fueling destroyers every third day, and heavy ships about every fifth day to keep a fighting reserve on board. To have kept the entire fleet at sea for long periods would not have required 11 tankers but approximately 75, with at least one-third of them equipped for underway delivery. (109)

              有朋友認為,這難度對日本來說是同樣的。因為從距離來說,日本至夏威夷是遠於美國至夏威夷的。但這些朋友忽略了一點。日方艦隊是不需要從本土直至夏威夷的。

              自一戰後日方取得了德國在太平洋諸群島的托管權。Carolines, Marianas, Paulas 及Marshall諸島已經在日本統治下二十多年了。而日本亦利用了這些群島作為其艦隊的前進補給站。此所以珍珠港被襲前,美方情報機關千方百計地意圖瞭解這些被日本封閉了的群島的情況。而在珍珠港被襲後,太平洋艦隊第一想到的就是日艦隊是從這裏出發,所以將那兩個空母戰鬥群,調往珍珠港東南方,意圖找出日方艦隊所在來報仇。但當然是撲空了。事實上12月7日那天,那兩個空母戰鬥群不在珍珠港的原因,就是負責運送飛機至威克島及中途島,意圖加強美國這兩個前進基地的空防及攻擊能力。

              算來算去,日方的優勢是明顯地大大優於美方。只不過是他們沒有好好利用,坐失良機。當然這是亞洲及中國人的福氣了。

              如果據你的假設,日本嚴重破壞了珍珠港美方的存油及好好利用其不錯的潛艇艦隊來封鎖美國至夏威夷之間的運輸的話,美國在亞洲都是無計可施。而日方可有充足的時間來經營新佔領的土地。一出一入之間,鹿死誰手,實未可知。

              • 家园 联合舰队是一点希望都没有的

                在战争结束时美国海军有385万人,各型舰船10759艘,总吨位1382.2万吨,陆战队近50万人。

                联合舰队呢?连开战时加上战时建造的是673艘1926120吨(还得把沉的捞上来)

                美、日两国在战争期间造舰数量的比较

                舰种\国别 日本 美国

                航空母舰 7艘 26艘

                护卫航空母舰 7艘 110艘

                战列舰 2艘 8艘

                重型巡洋舰 0艘 15艘

                轻型巡洋舰 6艘 32艘

                算上日本本土被轰炸导致造船停顿,我们把联合舰队规模翻一番,差距还是普遍存在的

                近7倍的吨位,这仗是打不下去的,同时也说明1382.2万吨,老美不缺油就怪了,但是就算只有一半能开,也比联合舰队多了不少

              • 家园 如果权力攻击,我相信美国海军的实力可以做到保护航运通畅

                不要忘了德国的例子

                大西洋上与德国潜艇作战就是例子,当然,同时期英国的日子就不一定好过了,板桥也不认为美国可以同时做到兼顾两边.

                另外戰爭初起那關鍵的一兩年,这个关键对于日本是关键,他影响不了战争的结果,只能影响战争的进程。所谓的一两年只是一厢情愿,日本根本没有长时间支持战争的能力。日本没有力量进攻美国本土,相反美国有这个力量。

                日军的地面力量决定它所能到达的极限不超过澳大利亚,同样海军力量,日军绵长的战线会有足够的力量防守南北太平洋么?

                另外阿留申群岛在必要的情况下也可以作为海军的前出基地。

                我们无论从哪一个小岛来看,美国都可以在1944年以前完成海军必要的物资集结

                最差结果就是战争多打2,3年,毕竟德国的潜艇战也没妨碍到盟军在英国的集结。

                • 家园 我只好說

                  Agree to disagree.

                  國家生產力是決定勝負的重要因素,但不是絕對因素。

                  美國的生產力是絕對優於日本,如果美日是大陸國家,連接著的話,日本必然戰敗是絕無異議。

                  但美日中間隔著太平洋,如果日方能善於利用這地理上阻隔的話,我的看法是日方未必是如此的一敗塗地。

                  • 家园 生产力不是绝对因素

                    但是日军在其他方面的优势远远没有达到弥补生产力上面的巨大劣势。所以在战后看来,战争中美国在生产力上的优势起到了主导作用。

                    毕竟战略上的错误想在战术层面上弥补,不是不可能,旦是相当困难。

                    当然,同样是战略错误,日本可以学德国把仗打得漂亮点,不至于输得一败涂地

                    但是小敌之坚,大敌之擒也。

                    • 家园 看老兄這帖

                      看來我們間的分歧並不太大。

                      只是程度問題。老兄認為日本戰敗概率是八至九成。我同樣認為天枰是側向美方,只不過並不是如斯一面倒,是六七成間。

                      我認為盟軍二戰勝在這幾點:Signal Intelligence,Logistic及生產力。尤以前二者對戰爭影響尤甚。

                      盟軍(英美)在Signal Intelligence投入極大的人力物力。在戰爭中後期,德日的舉動差不多盡在盟軍掌握中。在太平洋戰役上這點尤是明顯,不少的戰役日軍是有如自投羅網。

      • 好文
        家园 因为日本向来强调精神,忽略物质的作用。所以把自己搞迷了
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