主题：大投资（一） -- 陈经

as my guess:

刀刃=1, 自己的队伍;

刀刃 =2, folks like 华为

我从92年就开始接触华为，华为的情况我还是很清楚的， [ 老成都 ]

http://www.ccthere.com/article/3906214

as to those 三农, 破产国企的下岗工人,

TG calculates that they will support TG, like 淮海战役是小车推出来, Chinese people will still do that, more or less, in a more twisted way of working with TG together as an odd couple ;

3. globally, TG thinks TG as a 执政党 is much better than those white 执政党, those white 执政党 don't really know what they are doing, in TG's eye, and TG has 制度优势, and "most" Chinese people somehow buys that theory;

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Paul Krugman - New York Times Blog

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August 18, 2013, 3:06 pm 28 Comments

The New Growth Fizzle

A sort of side-thought inspired by Brad DeLong on the end of Malthusian economics and all that, plus what looks like deja vu all over again on the payoff or lack thereof to Big Data: whatever happened to New Growth Theory?

For a while, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, theories of growth with endogenous technological change were widely heralded as the Next Big Thing in economics. Textbooks were restructured to put long-run growth up front, with business cycles (who cared about those anymore?) crammed into a chapter or two at the end. David Warsh wrote a book touting NGT as the most fundamental development since Adam Smith, casting Paul Romer as a heroic figure leading economics into a brave new world.

And here we are, a couple of decades on, and the whole thing seems to have fizzled out. Romer has had a very interesting and productive life, but not at all the kind of role Warsh imagined. The reasons some countries grow more successfully than others remain fairly mysterious, with most discussions ending, as Robert Solow remarked long ago, in a “blaze of amateur sociology”. And whaddya know, business cycles turn out still to be important.

My own sense is that NGT never really had the elements needed to turn it into an intellectual success story; too much of it involved making assumptions about how unmeasurable things affected other unmeasurable things. It took off, briefly, partly because the subject is so important, and people wanted to be able to say something about it; meanwhile, business-cycle macro was then, as it is now, a deeply disputatious area riven by politics, and people were eager to talk about something else. In short, it was an intellectual bubble that eventually deflated of its own accord.

But it’s still amazing, for someone who remembers the excitement of the time, how completely it has all vanished from the economics landscape.