主题：【整理原创】朝鲜战争中的细菌战（三） -- 思炎

I am Colonel Frank H. Schwable, 04429, and was

Chief of Staff of the First Marine Aircraft Wing until shot down and captured on July 8, 1952.

My service with the Marine Corps began in 1929 and I was designated an aviator in 1931, seeing duty in many parts of the world. Just before I came to Korea, I completed a tour of duty in the Division of Aviation at Marine Corps Headquarters.

DIRECTIVE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

I arrived in Korea on April 10, 1952, to take over

my duties as Chief of Staff of the First Marine Air-

craft Wing. All my instructions and decisions were

subject to confirmation by the Assistant Commanding

General, Lamson-Scribner. Just before I assumed fullresponsibility for the duties of Chief of Staff, General Lamson-Scribner called me into his office to talk over various problems of the Wing. During this conversation he said: "Has Binney given you all the background on the special missions run by VMF-513?" I asked him if he meant "suprop" (our code name for bac- teriological bombs) and he confirmed this. I told him I had been given all the background by Colonel Binney.

Colonel Arthur A. Binney, the officer I relieved as

Chief of Staff, had given me, as his duties required

that he should, an outline of the general plan of bac- teriological warfare in Korea and the details of the part played up to that time by the First Marine Air- craft Wing.

The general plan for bacteriological warfare in Korea was directed by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff in October, 1951. In that month the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a directive by hand to the Commanding General, Far East Command (at that time General Ridgway), directing the initiation of bac- teriological warfare in Korea on an initially small, experimental stage but in expanding proportions.

This directive was passed to the Commanding General, Far East Air Force, General Weyland, in Tokyo.General Weyland then called into personal conference General Everest, Commanding General of the Fifth Air Force in Korea, and also the Commander of the Nineteenth Bomb Wing at Okinawa, which unit operates directly under FEAF.

The plan that I shall now outline was gone over, the

broad aspects of the problem were agreed upon and

the following information was brought back to Korea

by General Everest, personally and verbally, since for security purposes it was decided not to have anything in writing on this matter in Korea and subject to possible capture.

OBJECTIVES

The basic objective was at that time to test, under

field conditions, the various elements of bacteriological warfare, and to possibly expand the field tests, at a later date, into an element of the regular combat operations, depending on the results obtained and the situation in Korea.

The effectiveness of the different diseases available was to be tested, especially for their spreading or epidemic qualities under various circumstances, and to test whether each disease caused a serious disrup tion to enemy operations arid civilian routine or just minor inconveniences, or was contained completely, causing no difficulties.

Various types of armament or containers were to

be tried out under field conditions and various types of aircraft were to be used to test their suitability as bacteriological bomb vehicles.

Terrain types to be tested included high areas,seacoast areas, open spaces, areas enclosed by mountains, isolated areas, areas relatively adjacent to one another, large and small towns and cities, congested it's and those relatively spread out. These tests were to be extended over an unstated period of time but sufficient to cover all extremes of temperature found in Korea.

All possible methods of delivery were to be tested

as well as tactics developed to include initially night attack and then expanding into day attack by specialized Squadrons Various types of bombing were to be tried out, and various combinations of bombing, from single planes up to and including formations of planes, were to be tried out, with bacteriological bombs used in conjunction with conventional bombs. Enemy reactions were particularly to be tested or observed by any means available to ascertain what his counter-measures would be, what propaganda steps he would take, and to what extent his military operations would be affected by this type of warfare.

Security measures were to be thoroughly tested

both friendly and enemy. On the friendly ride, all possible steps were to be taken to confine knowledge of the use of this weapon and to control information on the subject. On the enemy side, every possible means was to be used to deceive the enemy and prevent his actual proof that the weapon was being used. Finally, if the situation warranted, while continuing the experimental phase of bacteriological warfare according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive, it might be expanded to become a part of the military or tactical effort in Korea.

INITIAL STAGE

The B-29s from Okinawa began using bacteriolog-

ical bombs in November, 1951, covering targets

all over North Korea in what might be called

random bombing. One night the target might be in Northeast Korea and the next night in Northwest Korea. Their bacteriological bomb operations were conducted in combination with normal night armed reconnaissance as a measure of economy and security.

Early in January 1952, General Schilt, then Commanding General of the First Marine Aircraft Wing,was called to Fifth Air Force Headquarters in Seoul, where General Everest told him of the directive issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and ordered him to have VMF-513-Marine Night Fighter Squadron 513 of Marine Aircraft Group 33 of the First Marine Air-craft Wing-participate in the bacteriological warfare program. VMF-513 was based on K8, the AirForce base at Kunsan of the Third Bomb Wing, whoseB-26s had already begun bacteriological operations.VMF-513 was to be serviced by the Third Bomb Wing.

While all marine aircraft (combat types) shore based

in Korea operate directly under the Fifth Air Force,

with the First Marine Aircraft Wing being kept in-

formed of their activities, when a new or continuing

program is being initiated, the Fifth Air Force normally has initially informed the Wing as a matter of courtesy.

Towards the end of January 1952, Marine night fighters of Squadron 513, operating as single

planes on night armed reconnaissance, and carrying

bacteriological bombs, shared targets with the B-26s

covering the lower half of North Korea with the

greatest emphasis on the western portion. Squadron

513 coordinated with the Third Bomb Wing on all

these missions, using F7F aircraft (Tiger Cats) because of their twin engine safety.

K8 (Kunsan) offered the advantage of take-off

directly over the water, in the event of engine failure, and both the safety and security of over-water flights to enemy territory.

For security reasons, no information on the types

of bacteria being used was given to the First Marine

Aircraft Wing. In March 1952, General Schilt was again called to Fifth Air Force Headquarters and verbally directed by General Everest to prepare Marine Photographic Squadron I (VMJ-1 Squadron) of Marine Aircraft Group 33, to enter the program. VMJ-1 based on K3, Marine Aircraft Group 33's base at Pohang, Korea,was to use F2H-2P photographic reconnaissance aircraft (Banshees).

The missions would be intermittent and combined

with normal photographic missions and would be

scheduled by the Fifth Air Force in separate, top-secret orders.

The Banshees were brought into the program because

of their specialized operations, equipment, facilities and isolated area of operations at K3. They could penetrate further into North Korea as far as enemy counteraction is concerned and worked in two-plane sections involving a minimum of crews and disturbance of normal missions. They could also try out bombing from high altitudes in horizontal flight in conjunction with photographic runs.

During March 1952, the Banshees of Marine Photo-

graphic Squadron 1 commenced bacteriological opera-

tions, continuing and expanding the bacteriological

bombing of North Korean towns, always combining

these operations with normal photographic missions.

Only a minimum of bomb supplies were kept on hand

to reduce storage problems, and the Fifth Air Force

sent a team of two officers and several men to Y\3

(Pohang) to instruct the marine specialists in handling the bombs.

The Navy's part in the program was with the F9Fs(Panthers), ADs (Skyraiders) and standard F2Hs

(Banshees), which as distinct from the photographi--

configuration, used carriers off the east coast of Korea.The Air Force had also expanded its own operations to include squadrons of different type aircraft, with different methods and tactics of employing bacterio-logical warfare.

This was the situation up to my arrival in Korea.

Subsequent thereto, the following main events took

place.

During the latter part of May 1952, the new Commanding General of the First Marine Aircraft Wing,General Jerome, was called to Fifth Air Force

Headquarters and given a directive for expanding bacteriological operations. The directive was given personally and verbally by the new Commanding General of the Fifth Air Force, General Barcus.

On the following day, May 25, General Jerome out-

lined the new stage of bacteriological operations to

the Wing staff at a meeting in his office at which I was present in my capacity as Chief of Staff.

The other staff members of the First Marine Air-

craft Wing present were: General Lamson-Scribner,

Assistant Commanding General;, Colonel Stage, Inter-

ligence Officer (G2); Colonel Wendt, Operations Officer (G3) and Colonel Clark, Logistics Officer (G4). The directive from General Barcus, transmitted to and discussed by us that morning, was as follows:

A contamination bell was to be established across

Korea in an effort to make the interdiction program

effective in stopping enemy supplies from reaching the front lines. The Marines would take the left flank of this belt, to include the two cities of Sinanju and Kunuri and the area between and around them. The remainder of the belt would be handled by the Air Force in the centre and the Navy in the east or right flank.

Marine Squadron 513 would be diverted from its

random targets to this concentrated target, operating from K8 (Kunsan) stiff serviced by the Third Bomb Wing, using F7Fs (Tiger Cats) because of their twin engine safety. The Squadron was short of these aircraft but more were promised.

The responsibility for contaminating the left flank

and maintaining the contamination was assigned to

the Commander of Squadron 513, and the schedule of operations left to the Squadron's discretion, subject

to the limitations that:

The initial contamination of the area was to be

completed as soon as possible and the area must then be recontaminated or replenished at periods not to exceed ten days.

Aircraft engaged on these missions would be given

a standard night armed reconnaissance mission, usually in the Haeju Peninsula. On the way to the target, however, these lanes would go via Sinanju or Kunuri, drop their bacteriological bombs and then complete their normal missions. This would add to the security and interfere least with normal missions.

Reports on this program of maintaining the contamination belt would go direct to the Fifth Air Force,reporting normal mission numbers so-and-so had been completed "via Sinanju" or "via Kunuri" and stating how many "superpropaganda" bombs had been dropped. Squadron 513 was directed to make a more accurate "truck count" at night than had been customary in order to determine or defect any significant change in the flow off traffic through its operating area.

General Barcus also directed that Marine Aircraft

Group 12 of the First Marine Aircraft Wing was to

prepare to enter the bacteriological program. First the ADs (Skyraiders) and then the F4Us (Corsairs) were to take part in the expanded program, initially, however, only as substitute for the F7Fs....General Jerome further reported that the Fifth Air Force required Marine Photographic Squadron I to continue their current bacteriological operations, operating from K3 (Pohang). At the same time Marine Aircraft Group 33 at K3 was placed on a stand-by, last resort, basis. Owing to the distance of K3 from the target area, - large-scale participation in the, program by Marine Aircraft Group 33 was not desired. Because the F9Fs (Panthers) would only be used in an emergency, no special bomb supply would be established over and above that needed to supply the photographic reconnaissance aircraft. Bombs could be brought up from Ulsan in a few hours- if necessary. The plans and the ramifications thereof were discussed at General Jerome's conference and arrangements made to transmit the directive to the officers concerned with carrying out the new program.

It was decided that Colonel Wendt would initially

transmit this information to the commanders concerned and the details could be discussed by the cognizant staff officers as soon as they were worked out.

• 【整理原创】朝鲜战争中的细菌战（三）