主题：【能源】经济学家谢国忠预言：中国油价明年将会大跌 -- 西风陶陶

偶正式声明收回恶攻经济学的话若干千字

您对增量的描述很准确，偶只不过不同意谢国忠关于油价年底大跌的推断。

回复高速公路兄，这个1.3%是算出来的.

IEA预计今年世界原油消费增量为平均每天1.95百万桶,中国一国的增量占全球增量51%,约为1百万桶.全球年产量约为每天76百万桶.1除以76得1.3%. OPEC 产量约为世界的三分之一,约25百万桶,如中国一国的增量全部由OPEC解决,OPEC须增产4% (1/25 = 4%). OPEC中可怜的伊拉客战前产量约为2.8百万,现在的产量只有一半,所以即使伊拉客可以恢复生产的话基本上就可以COVER中国的增量,当然什么时候能恢复生产只有天知道.实际上中国希望的是从前苏联国家进口石油,不希望过度依赖阿拉伯兄弟,他们隔太远,中国影响不到.

中国自己的消费量绝对值为5.8百万桶,占世界消费量的8%.

另,美国的GDP是中国的6到8倍,但原油消费仅是中国的3倍多,从大面上看也可以看出中国的能源的浪费情况是多么严重.当然也说明中国尚大有潜力可挖.

原油不是偶的研究方向,本来呢作为外行乱说话实在有点不好意思,好在是交了你们几位朋友,希望玩好

我只知道绝大多数中国人连$20的油都用不起，‘穷人’买了车的用不了多久就会知道的。中国那点增量短期是经不起考验的。长期，大概吧，WHO KNOWS。有人说中国10年后1亿辆车，纯属瞎掰，车子怎么说也是消费品，养活那么大个车队，需要很大的CASH FLOW，光靠卖鞋怕是不够吧。RMB升值？如果CASH FLOW NEGATIVE（逆差），您又不是美国，靠什么？

中国哄抬油价，有没有搞错，其实看看油价的欧元图，就知道价格根本没怎么变，全是美元贬值惹的祸。短期，怕是MORGAN的OIL TRADING DESK都比中国因素力量大，$40的油至少有$10在他们手上。美国为什么要打伊拉克，为石油？美国可以随便印美元去换石油，可宁可死人也要打，是要“控制”油价，最少要达到先知油价高低，这才是维持TRADING ECONOMYD的精髓。这点“谢老”是不会告诉你我的。

中国会成为决定油价的决定因素之一，但远不是现在。

总得给人个活路吧

西西的特点是比较理性宽容，大家都很爱护这种气氛，上面的话有说的不对，还请LANDKID原谅。

1。美元下降造成美元计价的原材料价格上升，GOOD POINT！也是为什么俺觉得人民币升值能解决一些问题；

2。中国的贸易数据和外汇储备数据说明中国有顺差，而且不小；

3。TRADING是根据供求变化的信息来做的，当然会因为人的贪婪和畏惧，对信息的反应会夸大；打个比方，TRADING是浪花，基本面的供需是河床。

希望参将兄常来！

对投机和基本面的比喻很好。

但那不是我的POINT，我要说的是：当今世界上有样东西比上面提到的两样重要的多--政治。

中国要参不透这个，总在别人划好的圈圈里（例如“市场经济”）打转，好象没什么前途。

落实到石油问题，$40对美国人算高，对中国人$25就已经高了，看看油价20年没怎么变，无疑帮了美国为代表的金融经济的大忙，中国现在要加进来，TOO LATE A GAME。值得庆幸的是世界石油工业几十年技术也无革命性发展。但新技术的萌芽已经露头了，中国要充分发挥后发和崭新统一大市场的优势，采用最新技术，创造完全不同的能源汽车产业。

显示国家意志的时候，千万不要交给市场来处理。

经济布局，行业配置又该怎么样？

买资源不如买技术，趁现在相关技术并不很贵，资源你要和发达国家去争，中石化和BP哪个更厉害？

当然还有怎么运作，那些“资本运作”高手哪里去了，为国出力嘛？

邻坛有朋友讲中芯的故事，我们前几年钻了空子。能源上现在下下工夫，没准也有机会。

Fuelcell，电力汽车，煤变油...YOU NAME IT。科技才是关键，不要他妈着急全国的建汽车厂，加油站。

有名的唱衰中国的角色。从他个人角度讲，比较容易做到政治上正确。从经济分析的角度讲，在任何时候都需要两种声音。不管怎么说，一见ANDY XIE的文章，不用细看都知道是中国要崩溃之类的结论。当然他讲的情况也都是事实。

关于油价，个人感觉小布什有很大影响力。影响的关键是美元汇率。石油作为COMMODITY，在美元一路狂贬的情况下，如果不采取积极措施增产，原油价格自然上涨。同期以欧圆衡量油价，还略有回落呢。人民币既然和美元挂钩，当然油价也会暴涨。

China: On Center Stage

Andy Xie (Hong Kong)

China is today at the center of attention in the financial community. I usually meet with Asian investment specialists on my tours through Europe and the US. During the last tour, global equity and bond specialists also showed up at my meetings. There is a simple explanation for this phenomenon, in my view: China's export base has become so large that the same growth rate as in the past generates a large enough increase to be felt in the global economy.

For example, China now accounts for over one-fifth of global trade growth. Its export increase this year is equal to its total exports in 1990. China's exports are now equal to 79% of Japan's, compared with 22% in 1990 and 14% in 1980. If it sustains the 12% annual growth rate of the past five years, China's exports will exceed Japan's by 2005 and the US's by 2009.

Nothing I see suggests that China's exports will slow: They have averaged 14.3% annual growth in the past two decades. Yet China's per-capita exports rank among the lowest in the world, at merely 8% of Japan's and 11% of the US's. I see no rationale to suggest that Chinese shouldn't produce for the global economy in the same manner as Americans or Japanese do.

China's export engine is so far limited to six provinces on the eastern seaboard, i.e., those in the Pearl River Delta and Yangtze River Delta. They account for 80% of China's total exports and 89% of the export increase this year. They have a combined population of 338 million, or one-quarter of the country's total. Per-capita exports in these provinces are merely US$762, compared with US$3,500 for Japan and US$2,300 for the US. There are still no limits to this region's export growth in the foreseeable future, in my view.

Further, China is investing massively in developing infrastructure in the middle and upper Yangtze River Valley, where another quarter of the country's population resides. Deep-water ports are being developed in the upper reach of the Yangtze River Valley, as the Three Gorges Dam lifts the water level by 180 meters. Highway and rail networks are sufficiently developed to accommodate rapid industrialization, and electricity and telecom services are in place. China will likely bring another quarter of its population into the global economy in this decade.

The eastern seaboard is moving into high-value-added production such as automobiles, semiconductors, telecoms, and pharmaceuticals. China has arguably the best universities in Asia and is producing over 2 million college graduates per annum. It appears to be in position to establish competitive industries that are R&D intensive. Indeed, multinational corporations are already moving on this prospect by establishing R&D centers in China to remain competitive.

Export industries that require low-skilled labor are moving inland. Even though China has a migrant labor force of about 150 million, the labor market is still not fully arbitraged across the country. The average labor cost in the middle and upper Yangtze River valleys is 30-50% less than in the coastal region. As the infrastructure bottleneck is removed, a significant number of export industries are moving inland.

The middle and upper Yangtze valleys are at a similar stage of development as the coastal region a decade ago. The population density inland allows China to develop infrastructure that will likely eliminate the geographical disadvantage. I expect this region to become successful in the global economy during this decade.

In the next decade, with half of the population in the global economy, China should be able to marshal sufficient resources to bring the rest of the population into the global economy. If the world remains peaceful over the next two decades, China should become a developed economy by 2020, by our estimates. My definition of a developed economy is that 90% of the population have jobs, own their homes, and can afford a vacation every year. In short, I expect China to become a normal economy by then.

There is little doubt that China's development is causing major realignments in global economic activities. It is changing relative prices between goods and services, labor and resources. I estimate that China brings down the relative price between goods and services by one percentage point per annum. Other things being equal, it improves the value of bonds relative to stocks. Typically, it also devalues manufacturing assets outside of China.

Anything that is in scarce supply will likely become scarcer. Something that is plentiful today may become scarce tomorrow. For example, China will likely import more oil than the US in the next decade. Chinese jewelry demand may eventually change the balance between demand and supply of precious metals. The returns on capital for most natural resource industries may finally rise above the cost of capital.

By creating artificial scarcity, a European specialty can often become more profitable. European luxury producers are already benefiting from China's development. Some luxury shops on Paris's Champs Elysee limit each customer's purchases to one item in order to excite demand. The trick seems to work well.

China's globalization is a boon to consumers worldwide. Low prices for consumer goods are especially useful for economies with aging populations. Europe and Japan face such a challenge. China's entry into the global economy fits well with their demographics, in my view.

Of course, China's entry into the global economy will likely cause some dislocation. The extremely low level of national wealth dictates that China integrates at an extremely low level of prices. However, the country's sheer size makes it difficult for the global economy to lift China's price level to the current global level. In many cases, Chinese prices will eventually become global prices, in my view. They should rise with China's wealth accumulation.

However, China's impact is mostly limited to the manufacturing sector, which accounts for about 20% of OECD GDP and is worth about US$5 trillion. The total dislocation will at most be 30% of this amount, or US$1.5 trillion, over the next two decades, in my view. Less than 4% of the total OECD labor force will likely need to shift from manufacturing to services. Most of the adjustment could be accomplished through attrition over such a long span. Absorbing China into the global economy will not be easy, but I see it as quite doable, giving a long enough period of time.

Some economies that now compete against China in third markets will need to adjust more and faster, in my view. The leading export economies in East Asia fall into this category. Their adjustment is being softened, however, by the shipping to China of components or raw materials that it doesn't yet make. For example, Korea has nearly doubled its exports to China in the past five years, even though its market shares in Japan and the US are waning. It has been shipping large quantities of industrial commodities (e.g., chemicals and semiconductors) to China.

For financial investors, China's entry into the global economy means that nominal global GDP will likely grow much slower, as China will charge the world far less than other countries for meeting increasing demand. This secular trend will likely have implications on profit margins for most businesses.

It is becoming popular to attribute China's export success to its currency peg to the US dollar. This is far from the truth, in my view. An exchange rate is a relative price. It typically affects competitiveness only if domestic prices are not flexible. Most economies in the world have price rigidities. Thus, exchange rate policy could alter relative competitiveness.

China appears to have far fewer price rigidities. Its vast surplus labor seemingly makes its labor market quite flexible. China's wages are determined by global demand for Chinese goods. If the exchange rate changes, it affects wages. Currency appreciation just means more bad debts in the Chinese context without changing China's competitiveness, in my view.

For example, China's currency appreciated significantly against other Asian currencies in 1998. This caused domestic prices to decline sharply. China's competitiveness was restored that way. But bad debts in the banking system rose with deflation.

There will likely be increasing scrutiny of China's role in the global economy. Integrating China into the global economy is, in my view, the greatest challenge for the world in this century. The debate on China's role in the global economy will likely only intensify. This debate is now taking place in the financial community. It may get into the political arena next year, as the contrast between a sluggish world and a rapidly growing China becomes sharper.

The debate, however, won't go anywhere, in my view. Multinational corporations have already woven China deeply into a complex global production chain. It is, in my view, already impossible to separate China out as a distinct production base associated with products or Chinese companies. The genie is already out of the bottle. China's globalization is likely to go ahead at full speed.