主题：【原创】我知道的老兵故事 -- 王外马甲

INFANTRY OPERATIONS AND WEAPONS USAGE IN KOREA

Winter of 1950-1951

OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE

The Johns Hopkins University

Chevy Chase, Maryland

S. L. A. Marshall

机枪

用法

由于朝鲜特殊的地形，使得我们在那里操作机枪的方式与常规以及教科书的规定大相径庭。

在防御的时候，机枪通常并不从两翼组成交叉火力，而是常常置于敌军的直接正面，从而对敌军最有可能的突破口进行直接的火力封锁和压制。一般情况下，那些利用山脊的高低起伏而建起的山头阵地，并不完全依赖机枪的保护。尽管有利的地形使我们的机枪在阵地上的作用变小了，但是当需要阻断一个在相当狭窄的扇形区域的敌军进攻时，通常还是机枪的作用大。有时候，机枪设置在与防线成直角的山梁和褶皱处，以这种方式他们的火力可以投射到任何径直闯进阵地的人身上。他们更频繁地布置在能以火力覆盖有利于敌人攀登的褶皱和斜坡的地方。在朝鲜很少遇到良好的机枪射界。

地形限制使这种武器失去了正常的战术效能和压制能力，而且消耗比迫击炮、勃朗宁轻机枪和步枪更大的弹药量。即使所有机枪操作状态良好，但单凭机枪火力不足以粉碎敌人的进攻，保障阵地安全。

中共军队主要以机枪火力为基础发扬战斗力，他们采用以下两种方式：（1）在防御时，将机枪配置在坚强的防御工事后方的掩体内；(2)在进攻时将机枪前出到尽可能靠近前沿的地方，尽管不可避免地要付出暴露目标的代价。

我方很少以这种方式使用机枪。

MACHINE GUNS

THEIR USE

The pattern of machine-gun operation in Korea is highly unconventional and contrary to the book, but the ground permits of nothing else.

In defense, the gun is most frequently used to block the more likely avenues of approach; its fire is directed straight ahead instead of from flankward across the front.The average hilltop position, by reason of elevation and the unevenness of the ridge crust, does not lend itself to over-all protection by machine guns. They do their bit, but usually they are set to traverse over a relatively narrow sector of the perimeter.

Occasionally, as the ground and situation permit, the guns are set up on a nose or fold in the ridge running at right angles to the defending line, in such a way that their fire will take in flank any body moving directly into the position. More frequently they are disposed in such a way as to cover the main draws or the slope which looks most favorable to ascent by the enemy. Good fields of fire for the machine gun are rarely met with in Korea. This limiting factor in the terrain deprives the weapon of its normal tactical power and persuasion, and throws an extra load of work on the mortars, the BARS, and the riflemen.Even though all guns remain in operation, machine-gun fire alone is never enough to break up enemy attack and give security to the position.

The CCF develop their fighting power largely around a base of machine-gun fire by (1) bunkering the guns behind heavily resistant works when on defense, and (2) advancing the guns well to the fore in the attack, despite the entailed exposure.

Our guns are seldom employed in this manner.

进攻中，我军士兵携带的机枪通常并不向前推进到前沿，而更经常地被布置在具有合理掩蔽条件的地点以提供半压制性的火力尽管如此，我军仍在敌军火力下损失了相当比率的机枪。在防御时，机枪经常在上方敞开的情况下作战，通常只有薄弱的防护，比如土堆或不牢固的岩石垒成的胸墙。我军要比中共军队进行更多的机动，阵地位置变换极为频繁。很少有时间为机枪提供保护措施。我军的攻势往往在黄昏时分趋弱，到天黑时机枪必须要准备好从新阵地上进行射击。

这些机枪操作方式上的一般差异，并不能确切反映出双方使用效率的高低，或是反映了在机枪技术发展方面的出现了某种空白。更准确的说，那些差异和技术空白直接源自交战双方所采用的战术手段的不同，而关键在于机枪只是整个火力体系中的一部分。

In the attack our man-handled machine guns are not ordinarily pressed far to the fore but are more likely to be used to provide a semi-covering fire from whatever ground will provide them reasonably good protection. Even so, we lose a high percentage of machine guns to enemy fire.

On defense, the gun is usually fought in the open and is seldom given better than superficial protection - such as an earth bank or a rude parapet of loose rock.We maneuver more than CCF; changes in position are most frequent. There is rarely time to provide the gun with a protected siting. Our own attack is likely to wear along until late afternoon; the guns must be ready to fire by dark from the new defensive position.

These general differences in operating method do not accurately reflect relative efficiency, or lack thereof, in the development of machine-gun technique. Rather, they arise from the fact that the two sides are employing two greatly differing tactical methods, in which emphasis on the machine gun is only part of the over-all fire equation.

中共军队的行动是以单一的火力手段为特色的，这种单一的火力手段完全以机枪为中心，围绕机枪的效用，将机枪的作用发挥到极至。而之所以可以这么做，其中一个重要因素是中共军队具有足可消耗的人力。中共军队中的重机枪组成员总是能够忠于职守，最后一个撤退，因此就使他的机枪发挥了更大的作用（当然，这种做法是要冒着被歼灭的风险的）。

而在我军的行动则发展出多元性的火力使用特点——比其他军队中发展出更多的特点。因为有多种可以选择的武器系统，机枪的使用并不十分重要。我们现在习惯认为机枪的使用就意味着广泛和良好的火力带。不过在朝鲜，这种情况比较少见。偶尔，时机合适，机枪也能够发挥在较大距离中充分发挥作用。不过，当战斗到关键时刻，这个优势距离会被前沿的缩短迅速打破。此时，步枪和勃朗宁轻机枪在300码以下的范围内就发挥了更大的杀伤效能。

中共军队使用机枪的有效距离是30到500码。进攻中，如果需要前沿火力压制，他们可以尽可能的使机枪伴随步枪和半自动步枪。并且在白天的就地防御中，如果他们能够得到较好掩护前沿，他们有时就会把机枪阵地设在步枪线前面。

他们的远距离射击缺乏准头，我们的重机枪则能很正常地射击，相比之下，他们在极短距离内对这种武器鲁莽而有效的使用则威胁较大。只有在极少数的情况下中共军队才会在500码的距离上使用机枪。当他们试图延长射程，也就是说加上200码，我们的部队就会毫不犹豫的开火，并且忽视他的存在。这通常是正确的，大群的步兵或者一个车队通常是一个相当合适的目标。根据教科书，重机枪在中等距离是相当精确的阻止武器。可根据我军在冬季战役中的经验，这并不是一个好方法。有大量战例记录显示，在几个小时的战斗中，2到3挺敌人机枪在600到700码距离上打击一个有限目标，取得的效果非常差。所有的参战条件都表明在火力范围超过500到650码这个范围，杀伤效率更多的依靠人眼所能看到的而不是机枪所能做到的。

CCF operations are characterized by simplicity of fire means, centering around maximum use of the machine gun. The expendability of this force’s human material is one of the enabling factors toward this end. When Chinese MG crews can be committed repeatedly to situations permitting no escape, the weapon ipso facto is given a chance to score heavily prior to liquidation. Our operations develop around multiplicity of fire means - an evolution more marked in our Army than in any other. The effects of the gun are less decisive simply because of the existence of so many complementary weapons. We habitually think of machine-gun usage in connection with expansive and favorable fields of fire. In Korea these are generally lacking. There are some occasions when the gun is useful at the longer ranges for relatively brief periods. But in the crises of action, the preponderant portion of its fire almost invariably is directed against the immediate foreground. As with the rifle and the BAR, its killing effects for the most part are achieved at ranges under 300 yards. The CCF employ the machine gun effectively at ranges running between 30 and 500 yards. In the attack, when there is suitable cover in the foreground, they will get in as close with their machine guns as with rifles and sub-machine guns, and in local counter-attacks during daylight, if they are advantaged by a thicket or brush-covered salient, they will sometimes run the machine gun out as a point beyond the rifle line. Their reckless and effective use of the weapon at extreme short ranges, however, is less instructive than what their gunnery appears to lack over distances which we have always considered quite normal for the HMG. It is only in the exceptional tactical circumstance that CCF employ the machine gun successfully against our infantry at 500 yards range. When they attempt to engage with the gun at ranges longer than that, say adding another 200 yards to the distance, our troops are relatively unsusceptible to the fire and pay it little heed. That holds generally true even when the fire is delivered broadside against a body of infantry (or a column of vehicles) offering a fairly substantial target. According to the book, the HMG should be an accurate stopping weapon at these intermediate ranges. Insofar as the general experience of our own line during the winter campaign sheds light on this subject, it does not work out in practice. There are numerous examples in the record of engagements wherein two or three enemy guns, firing from 600-700 yards distance against one limited target area, failed to bear effectively during several hours of fighting. All of the attendant circumstances appeared to indicate that when fires are exchanged at ranges in excess of somewhere between 550 and 650 yards, the rate of effectiveness is less dependent on what the gun can do than on what the human eye can see.

他们对机枪的使用最为持久稳定。有保养机枪和在任何天气情况下操作的诀窍。他们的火力在较短距离内十分精确。最大限度的使用火力掩护部队插入而不是浪费大量子弹去扫射地面。通过这些很基本的技术，他们取得了巨大的战果。机枪作为他们的进攻的支点表现出色。

一般情况下，如果和我们携带的其他步兵武器，即7.62毫米通用口径武器族的使用效果相比，在朝鲜的战斗中，我们机枪火力所发挥的影响力似乎逊于以往的那支现代化美军中所使用的机枪火力。距离有限，使机枪不能发挥防御点和在交火中阻止敌人进攻的关键作用。怎么会这样？很难解释，因为步兵连队里的搬运工们过去从来也没有抱怨过轻机枪是个特别沉重累赘的东西。枪不是特别重，机枪手们不会掉队。曾经有过部队扛着机枪径直向敌人阵地冲锋的事例。但是一般情况下机枪却做不到根据战术形势变化而机动部署。这可能真的是出於我们多种武器系统里面天生的惰性吧：武器多了，其战术效果就是加进一种新的兵器，导致其他所有兵器的相对机动性就下降。

在朝鲜的机枪使用，特别是在我们的进攻中，上述这种情况似乎出现的相当普遍，尽管普通勃朗宁轻机枪手的灵活性和显著的积极性提供了反例。

Their use of machine guns is most persistent. They have the knack of keeping their guns fed and operating under any weather conditions. Their fire is accurate at the short distances. They make maximum use of grazing fire, with the object of keeping troops inert, rather than wasting an excess of bullets by shooting into the dirt embankments. Out of these rather elementary techniques, they achieve large effects. The gun is pretty much the pivot of their attack.

In general, the impact of our own machine-gun fire upon the local situation in the Korean fighting, when considered in relation to the effects of other weapons carried by the infantry (this refers to the .30 fire), would seem to be somewhat less than in past performances by modern American forces. The instances are few indeed in which the operation of the machine guns appears to be the decisive factor in retaining a position, or in depressing the counterfire which is deterring the attack. Why this is so becomes difficult to evaluate, since the LMG is almost never mentioned among the overburdening items in the company load by the load carriers. The weight of the gun is not prohibitive; the gunners do not straggle. There are instances in the record where it was carried by troops directly charging the enemy position. But the average employment of the gun is not mobile in respect to local changes in the tactical situation. This may well be the consequence of an inertia inherent in our multiple weapons system: is it not within reason that one of the tactical effects of weapons multiplication is that the addition of each new weapon tends to lower the relative local mobility of every other weapon?

The employment of machine guns in Korea, particularly by our attack, would seem to call for exploration of the question, though the phenomenal enterprise and mobility of the average BAR carrier is evidence to the contrary.