主题：【整理】【讨论】回顾九兵团长津湖之役兼与诸友商榷(1) -- 虎王2006

史密斯师长的那种军人的直爽诙谐，令其议论颇有可看性。他这个段子，是人们印象中长津之役里陆战队很NB，陆军很SB这个通俗看法的来源之一。我们从中可以看到，当时美军东线各部的协调有很大的问题，陆战一师与陆军第七师的协同尤其糟。史密斯索性就拒绝了十军团派一个团去解围的指令，理由是他手下的两个团也在受到猛攻。他对麦大帅总部以及阿尔蒙德的指挥意见大了：在战役最激烈的时候，足有两天之久麦帅把十军团指挥官阿尔蒙德跟八军司令官瓦克召集到东京开会，而这两天里，史密斯在火线没有接到任何指令。此时原来的进攻计划自然不执行了，但是没有明确的撤退命令，史密斯也没法指挥所部跑路，只能硬扛着。史密斯的看法是：东京总部的大佬们都吓傻了("they were stunned").

。。。But we got no order from Corps for two days to actually withdraw, so we couldn't do anything but defend, as I couldn't withdraw without permission from higher authorities. On this redeployment of a regiment, I'd already told Litzenberg to use as much of his regiment as he could to try to clear the road back to Hagaru-ri. We didn't know just how much was across it.

Q. Was there any knowledge on the part of the Corps Commander of your predicament-

Smith: Every four hours we sent in a report of what was going on, but apparently they were stunned; they just couldn't make up their minds that the Chinese had attacked in force, you see. They just had to re-orient their thinking. It took them two days before we actually were told to withdraw to Hagaru-ri and advance to the coast - that took them two days to figure out.

他对于阿尔蒙德有一些生动的细节描写与八卦，很有可能是这些议论就是阿尔蒙德名声被败坏的主要源头之一。(史密斯的英文颇为生动有趣，翻译不出那个刻薄味道来，大家凑合看看吧)

The next time Almond came up, was after Litzenberg and Murray had fought their way out, and he came up and gave us all the Distinguished Service Cross, and he was weeping(他--指阿尔蒙德--上来给我们发卓越服务勋章，那时他在哭).I don't know what he was weeping about, whether from the cold or from emotion or what it was(我看不懂他在哭啥子，是天气寒冷冻的呢，是感情失控呢，还是别的啥子). I didn't' t know anything about this in advance. He came up to me and asked me if I'd line up Murray and Litzenberg and myself and Beale. He had one Distinguished Service Cross with him. We suggested that he give the cross to Beale who was the junior. Let him have the cross and we'd get ours some time later. I never did get a citation for that because that's that way they operate in those things. I supposed I would have had to write my own. It came out in Army General Order which simply stated that the decoration was for the Chosin Reservoir.

Q: You have great forbearance. A lesser man would have... Smith: (Laughs) That's what Heinl says! It is true....

Q: Weren't you ever tempted to ...

Smith: Very often, but I held it in. I told Gen. Shepherd some of the trouble. I told Gen. Cates. But I never had any confrontation with Almond. He was trying to get me back in the X Corps after we got out of there. He came to me one day and he said, "I'm going to get you back." I didn't say anything, but I made up my mind that if I could avoid it I wasn't going back. Relations were more or less friendly, but I'd lost confidence in him, that's all.

Q: Had he ever had a combat command before this?

Smith: I talked to one of the newspaper correspondents, and he couldn't understand why on earth they'd ever given him the corps. That was a newspaper correspondent who had been with him in Italy. And in Italy Gen Almond had commanded the 92nd Division which was Negro, and apparently they didn't do too well. He did considerable maneuvering like he tried to do in Korea. this correspondent told me that he maneuvered his outfit so much that he finally was defeated by one German battalion. Now I don't know what the score was. But, apparently, he was imbued with Stonewall Jackson's ideas. He got clobbered three times. He got clobbered at the Chosin Reservoir, and when we went up and attacked on the 21st of February from Wonju, that was his outfit that had been clobbered there. He'd taken a couple of South Korean divisions under his command and tried to effect a double envelopment of the Chinese, and both Korean divisions were clobbered. That's why we went in and went forward from Wonju. He was clobbered a third time - that was just after I left Korea, and I talked to his artillery officer who was a brigadier general, and he said, "Why, everybody told him that he was out on a limb." He had a flank that was open or something, and he said that he had heard the last he wanted to hear about that. The Chinese came around and they had an awful time getting squared away. They did, finally, get all their pieces together, and he Marines helped out a little bit.

Q: It sounds like the world's worst tactician, or at least in Korea.

史密斯师长显然是把长津之战看作比较丢人的败绩，这个从他的这段话可以看出来：“他(指阿尔蒙德)被痛扁了三回。他在长津湖被痛扁。。。”(He got clobbered three times. He got clobbered at the Chosin Reservoir,。。。)

在史密斯本人的陈述里，著名的“反向突击”的NB传说，是这样的：

Q: Knowing of you, your reputation and your career and what you've done during the war, this business of writing an attack order - was that a grandstand play - was this the logical move at this time?

史密斯：没错(这个进攻命令是合乎逻辑的)，你被包围的时候你是无法撤退的。我试图跟人们解释“让撤退见鬼去吧”这句话。被围了你就撤退不了。你只能突围，而当你突围时，那是在进攻。。。

Smith: Sure, you couldn't withdraw when you're surrounded. I've tried to explain that a "retreat hell" business to people. You can't retreat or withdraw when you are surrounded. The only thing you can do is break out, and when you break out, that's an attack. And the only fellow who understood that was S. L. A. Marshall - he understood it thoroughly. He wrote up a top secret report on the 1st Division breakout. A very fine document.

Q: I've never seen that.

Smith: Headquarters Marine Corps has got copies. You might dig it out. It was classified either secret or top secret. I had difficulty getting a copy, but I told Gen. Ridgway, I wrote him a letter saying I understood that Col. S. L. A. Marshall had made this study. He'd made a study of the 2nd Infantry Division and of the 1st Division reacting to the Chinese in the attack, and I said that we would be very glad to get the benefit of his observations on how we conducted the operation. He sent over a copy to me, and, of course, I sent that to FMF and they made more copies and I've got it around some place. He was very complimentary.

毫无疑问，史密斯对自己本人以及陆战一师部队的表现很欣赏。

。。。

阿尔蒙德的访谈录比较干吧，语言不及史密斯的形象生动，全文连接见前贴。大致意思是他本人时常亲临前线，十一月中到达鸭绿江边的前锋所在地，而战地调度七师，三师，陆战一师，南朝鲜军也是中规中矩。史密斯的陆战一师遭遇强敌时，他与麦帅，瓦克及时的在东京总部召开紧急会议，可算指挥若定。说到与史密斯与陆战队，他在肯定他们战斗勇敢的同时，指出史密斯总是执行任务打折扣，客观上行动迟缓，主观上有自作主张的嫌疑。

应该承认,读这些文件,容易受史密斯的影响,他写得很好看,也懂得宣传的技巧:尽量的突出本部队的英雄主义精神和事迹,拿友邻部队的失误与组织涣散的惨状来陪衬自己.他比较直率的承认长津湖战役的败绩,但是通过具体生动的丑化上司阿尔蒙德以及倒霉的陆军战友们,把自己跟陆战队摘了出来,而且成了英雄.