主题：【原创】东线防守大师 - 陆军元帅莫德尔 -- 史鉴

《Panzer Operations: The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus, 1941-1945》第89页第3段：

“We recorded the daily mean temperature during the first part of December as follows:

1 December: 19 F

2 December: 22 F

3 December: 16 F

4 December: -32 F

5 December: -34 F

6 December: -35 F

7 December: -36 F"

华氏零下32度，相当于摄氏零下40度。

德军中央集团军群在斯摩棱斯克战役之后的停顿，完全是因为希特勒的战略调整。Albert Seaton的名著《The Russo-German War》第141页有详细的记载，摘录如下。划线部分表明，早在7月19号，希特勒发布第33号元首令，中央集团军群继续以步兵部队向莫斯科进军，而两个装甲集群分别增援北方和南方集团军群。4天以后，凯特尔发布补充命令，古德里安第2装甲集群进军乌克兰，会同克莱斯特装甲集群围歼基辅苏军。注意这个时候德军尚未完成对斯摩棱斯克的合围。

“Hitler had always intended that Leningrad should be taken before Moscow and very early on he came to regard the seizure of the whole of the Ukraine, the Donets basin and even Caucasia as having priority over an eastwards advance from Smolensk. On 30 June he had emphasized the economic importance of the Ukraine and that of the Baltic. A week later he had proposed that Hoth's 3 Panzer Group should move away from Smolensk to the northeast as flank protection for von Leeb's Army Group North, while Guderian's 2 Panzer Group should move south-east into the Ukraine. His attention was riveted on the Crimea which he came to regard as a Soviet aircraft carrier for use to bomb the Ploesti oilfields, and the occupation of the Crimea would, he thought, enable German troops to invade the Caucasus by the shorter route across the Straits of Kerch. On 19 July he issued Directive 33 ordering Army Group Centre to advance on Moscow, using only its infantry formations, since its panzer troops were to be transferred to the north and the south. Four days later, on 23 July, Keitel, at the Führer's order, issued a very optimistic supplement to Directive 33, ordering Hoth's 3 Panzer Group to be transferred to the Baltic for the outflanking of Leningrad, after which it would be returned to Army Group Centre ready for the advance as far as the Volga, while Hoepner's 4 Panzer Group, together with other troops, would be withdrawn to Germany. Guderian's 2 Panzer Group was to join von Kleist's 1 Panzer Group in the Ukraine.”

另外David Glantz的著作《When Titans Clashed: How The Red Army Stopped Hitler》第74页记录，1941年8月2日为止，侵苏德军总伤亡179,500人。这对于四百万德军来说，无论如何算不上严重损失，因此中央集团军群的停顿跟战损无关。

“大造舆论”的用词，确有情绪色彩，但并非针对苏军，而是针对斯大林本人。基辅的悲剧完全是斯大林造成的。早在8月5日，总参谋长朱可夫就向斯大林提出，基辅苏军夹在德军中央和南方集团军群中间，处于一个三角形的突出部，战略态势很危险，建议撤离基辅。斯大林不但不听，反而撤销朱可夫的参谋长职务，派他去列宁格勒主持防务。斯大林坚信德军的目标是莫斯科，因此将重兵部署在维亚兹玛-布良斯克一线，即使在得知古德里安装甲集群南下以后，依然不允许基辅苏军撤退。我后面打算写一篇《斯大林在1941》，探讨他作为军事统帅在这关键一年里的得失。

我说苏军将领“谨小慎微”，是指他们缺乏主观能动性，普遍害怕担责任，没有命令不敢自作主张。你提到的彼得洛夫斯基率领的逆袭，应该是布良斯克方面军9月2日对德军中央集团军群的反击，这是苏军统帅部的命令。